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THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS:

BEING A SERIES OF SHORT STUDIES ON
THEOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL SUBJECTS

BY

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Realism"; "Notes on a New Theory of Time"; "Theory of Physical
Space as a Discrete Manifold"; and of numerous other philosophical
papers.

FIFTH AND REVISED EDITION

LONDON

DAVID NUTT, 57 to 59 LONG ACRE, W.C.

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THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS

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BEING A SERIES OF SHORT STUDIES ON
THEOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL SUBJECTS

(CHIEFLY ON SPECIALLY CONTROVERTED POINTS)

BY
F. W. FRANKLAND

FIFTH AND REVISED EDITION.

EXTRACT FROM "AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE"

'FRANKLAND (Frederick William), 'Okataina,' Foxton, New Zealand; Mathematics, Metaphysics, Biblical Criticism; Born, Manchester, England, April 18th. 1854; London, 1869-72; Government Actuary, New Zealand, 1878-90; Registrar Friendly Societies, New Zealand, 1884-85; Government Insurance Commissioner, New Zealand, 1889-90; Associate Actuary, New York Life Insurance Company, 1893-1902; Delegate from New Zealand to International Congress of Hygiene and Demography in London, 1891; Member of the Actuarial Society of America; Mathematical Society; Economic Association; Academy of Political and Social Sciences; Great Britain and Ireland Institute of Actuaries; Royal Statistical Society. Single elliptic space; discrete manifolds; epistemology; theology of American Communistic Societies; the relation of pangeometry to the ultimate constitution of matter and ether; logical affiliation of continuous geometry to tactic; epistemological aspect of time; Christian origins; the synoptic problem; supernormal element in prophecy.'

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	v
PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION	xi
PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION	xiii
THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS—	
A SYNOPSIS STATEMENT OF TWO THEODICIES	7
APPENDICES—	
A. NOTES ON A NEW THEORY OF TIME	33
B. ALTRUISM AND HAPPINESS, OR RATIONAL ESCHATOLOGY	35
C. THEORY OF DISCRETE MANIFOLDS	37
D. SUMMARY OF MY METAPHYSICAL WORK	43
E. SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS	45
F. HISTORICAL DATA RELATIVE TO THE BIRTH OF CHRIST	59
G. THE “JOHANNINE” PROBLEM	66
H. DATA ON THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT	77
I. ESCHATOLOGICAL QUESTIONS FOR THE CLERGY	89
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR	103
PRESS NOTICES	106
A “CAVEAT”	128

INTRODUCTION

THIS brochure—the author of which is a son of the late Sir Edward Frankland, K.C.B., the distinguished scientific chemist—contains a series of short studies on various keenly controverted subjects in Theology and Metaphysics. It is a result of forty years of anxious study of and earnest meditation on problems, some of them very fundamental, which have specially agitated the world since the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species" half a century ago, and since the commencement of the fierce ordeal of minute and searching criticism to which New Testament writings have been subjected during somewhat more than the corresponding period.

Starting from the standpoint of Objective Idealism or (what the author holds to be the same thing) Panpsychic Realism, Mr. Frankland has worked out a theory of the Hegelian Absolute (of which he considers that *Personality* must be predicated), of the Time-process, of Automatic Selection as chronologically the *prius* of telic action in Nature, and of the "transliminal" brain-activities of Collective Mankind as the *milieu* or *locus* both of Divine Providence and of Posthumous Personal Existence. Coming to the historic manifestations of this "transliminal" Providence, Mr. Frankland has touched on a few problems in connection with the New Testament story and its relation to the subsequent history, religious and secular, of mankind (in particular, the origin and growth of the Catholic Church)—those problems, namely, the (tentative) solution of which seemed to him most urgently necessary in order

to make a Christian view of human experience and cosmic destinies credible to the twentieth-century student.

In particular, he has endeavoured, in connection with Dr. Erich Bischoff's theory of the Nativity (to which Mr. Frankland gives his adhesion), to bring up incidental evidence against the destructive hypothesis of Bruno Bauer, Robertson, Drews, and Dr. Anderson, according to which the Christian Church virtually had an impersonal origin. Without denying the possibility of Professor W. B. Smith's thesis of a pre-Christian "Jesus"-cult, Mr. Frankland seeks to show that—whether or not such a cult already existed at the commencement of our era—the historic Catholic Church in any case owes its origin to the actual concrete human Jesus of Whom the gospels tell, the *mise-en-scène* of His visible Ministry having been that handed down by tradition, viz. Palestine during the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate.

The other New Testament problems on which Mr. Frankland has in this brochure essayed a (tentative) solution, are: (a) the degree and kind of historicity attaching to the Easter—or Resurrection—narratives; (b) the nature and significance of the "Parousia" predictions or apocalyptic eschatology of the New Testament, and the sense in which (or extent to which) these predictions were fulfilled at the close of the Apostolic Age; and (c) the origin of the "Johannine" gospel narrative, and the probable degree of historicity attaching to it.

On all these last-named questions the author holds views which are in some respects startling, though as regards the third he is (in the main) indebted for his opinion to a minority of the expert critics of the day, while as regards the second his view derives ultimately from a highly original American thinker who propounded it as early as the year 1833.

The Easter-Gospel is, for Mr. Frankland, strictly connected with his naturalistic theory of posthumous life as a "transliminal" brain-activity of living men and women. Therefore, while recognising the probable historicity of the "Empty Tomb," he disconnects it quite as much as Rénan and Holtzmann did from the series of Jesus-apparitions which followed (*vide* 1 Corinthians xv. 5-8, as well as the gospel-endings and several extra-canonical narratives), and which *truly* betokened the Resurrection, though—unlike Rénan—he earnestly believes in the conscious, personal, dominant and triumphant life of the exalted Jesus as King of the human race and (ultimately)—*through* future human activities—Almighty Lord of the entire cosmos (*vide* Matthew xxviii. 18).

On the "Parousia" question the author is frankly *preterist*, like Dr. Schweitzer : but, relying once more on his new physiological theory of posthumous existence, he thinks the apocalyptic predictions of a Parousia were mainly fulfilled (aside from the judgment on Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and other nearly contemporaneous catastrophes in the visible world) by the setting up of the "kingdom of heaven" or Christ's Church "Triumphant"—to use Catholic phraseology—in the invisible world and the gradual conquest *thenceforth* and *thereby* of all mankind. He also thinks, with Professor Streeter, though not to the same extent as the latter (*vide* "Oxford Synoptic Studies"), that our first canonical gospel unduly accentuates the crude *external* elements of apocalypticism, as compared with its two main sources—Mark and "Q."

The "Johannine" gospel-story is believed by Mr. Frankland to derive (ultimately) from the reminiscences, written and oral, of St. John of Ephesus, whom he identifies, not with the Galilean fisherman-apostle of that name (whom

he believes to have been martyred before the destruction of Jerusalem), but with Papias's "Presbyter" John—a "John" who, like his namesake, was also an eye-witness of the sacred Ministry, though chiefly of the Hierosolymite part of it. As a cadet of the Jewish priesthood, this "beloved disciple" was on a higher plane of intellectual culture than the Galilean apostles. An "Apostle" in the wider sense of Galatians i. 19, but not one of "The Twelve," this St. John the Divine was able to appreciate metaphysical implications which the Synoptists could not express but only unconsciously confirm. Mr. Frankland, however, sees evidence that the first *recension* of these sacred reminiscences proceeded from heretical sources; and when it was sought, by Catholic authorities in a subsequent generation, to eliminate the errors which heretical editors had imported, the materials were no longer at hand for making a completely satisfactory correction, and the historical value of the Fourth Gospel has suffered in consequence. Most precious of all the Gospels, and most reliable of them all in *some* of its historical details (as the "Jewish Encyclopædia" writers have discovered in regard to certain parts of the Passion-Story), it yet cannot—in the form in which we have it now—inspire us with the same confidence as the earlier *Marcan* narrative which lies at the base of the other Synoptics.

The various separate studies in this volume are prefaced by a "Synoptic Statement" of two theodicies which was compiled by the author as the result of a correspondence, extending over many months, with a fellow inquirer—R. W. Weeks—whose (tentative) metaphysical views are given as the First of the Two Theodicies there compared.

The propositions in the second "Theodicy" given therein are often put in a dogmatic form in order to avoid

the circumlocution of too frequent a use of such words as "probably," "possibly," "it would appear," &c. It has been hoped that the use, once for all, of the term "Speculations" in the heading would prevent misunderstanding on this point. Like those of Mr. Weeks, the author's views are to be understood as, in the main, tentative and provisional. As a fact, the propositions he has laid down in this "Theodicy" are entertained by him with very varying degrees of confidence. Such an ontological theorem as that all existence is necessarily psychic (the fundamental theorem of Berkeleyan Idealism) he holds as an indubitably proven fact, being assured indeed that the bare *statement* of any alternative view involves a misuse of language. In other words, he is certain that mentality is the *summum genus* of which all possible existences are the *species*. But he would not wish to be thought of as claiming an equal certitude for all the epistemological and theological theses he has enunciated.

PREFACE

TO

THE FIFTH EDITION

MACAULAY familiarised the world with a vision of some far distant time when a New Zealander seated upon the ruins of London Bridge would sketch the remains of St. Paul's.

In this book we have a not less astonishing spectacle, for Mr. Frankland is a New Zealander who has come to the Old Country not to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's, but to explain to a sceptical and incredulous generation that St. Paul's is not in ruins but still stands perfect and complete from pinnacle to foundation stone, notwithstanding all that has been done to destroy it by Higher Critics, Rationalists, and Materialists.

"Thoughts on Ultimate Problems" is an excessively condensed statement of the conclusions of a profound thinker, couched in metaphysical and mathematic phraseology which probably only two members of Parliament could understand. Mr. Balfour could, and that is possibly one reason why he has been superseded by Mr. Bonar Law. Lord Haldane could, and that is possibly one reason why he has never been Lord Chancellor. Excepting these two

I know none of our legislators who could grapple with Mr. Frankland's "Thoughts."

For myself I am "a child in such matters." I cannot profess to have even an elementary acquaintance with metaphysics, and although I have made many experiments in metapsychics that does not help me much. But I can see dimly through the obscure technicalities of abstruse philosophical discussion expressed in the formulæ of mathematical science that Mr. Frankland has emerged from a dreary wilderness of Doubt into what is to him a veritable Promised Land of assured conviction upon the great essentials of the Christian Faith. In this little book he sets out with the utmost brevity the signposts by which he found his way out from Darkness into Light.

Even those who may not be able to follow him in his evolution of the Hegelian theory of the Absolute will find in his tabloid summary of the result of his speculations much that is suggestive. His theories of posthumous existence and transliminal consciousness open up doors revealing vast and unexplored vistas of thought and speculation.

General Gordon once said to me, "Don't dare to praise me. When you praise a man you imply that you are his superior." I do not, therefore, venture to praise Mr. Frankland. I humbly acknowledge my inferiority, of which I am so conscious that I am utterly at a loss to know why he should have asked me to write a preface to his book.

I can only say, as a representative of the great public which knows nothing of metaphysics, that there is much food for thought in Mr. Frankland's writing, but it is not food that can be bolted and assimilated without due process of mastication and digestion.

WILLIAM T. STEAD.

LONDON: *December 26, 1911.*

P R E F A C E

TO

THE FOURTH EDITION

THIS little volume comprises a selection from the author's studies on philosophical and religious subjects, those studies having—in some cases—been chosen by preference which have been most helpful to himself individually in enabling him, amid the spiritual unrest of the closing nineteenth and opening twentieth century, to regain and hold fast (even if, to a large extent, only in the attitude of *hope*) the essentials of the Christian—and even a great part of the Catholic—Faith.

Where a writer is to so enormous an extent as the present one indebted to the thoughts of greater contemporary—or nearly contemporary—minds, it becomes his duty to express this indebtedness specifically so far as he is able. This the writer has endeavoured to do. But it may not be out of place to indicate here that the studies with regard to which he can claim *least* originality are the two which relate (*a*) to the Infancy-Stories of our first and third canonical gospels, and (*b*) to the eschatological teaching of the New Testament. The ground-idea of the last-named

study has been derived by the present writer, with deep and especial thankfulness, from a remarkable personality who is best known as initiator of the most daring and one of the most successful sociological experiments recorded in modern history: and the writer's originality is confined to the reconciliation of this ground-idea (which at first sight seems to involve "physical miracle" on a stupendous scale) with his strictly naturalistic and indeed (in the narrowest sense) *physiological* theory of spiritual crisis and destinies—a theory which he hopes will make eschatological teachings credible to the twentieth century student. It is an open secret that these teachings, especially as put in the mouth of the Founder of Christianity Himself, have been acutely felt as a stumbling-block and a perplexity by Christian thinkers in quite recent times. Even as the writer pens this preface he has before him the current number of the "Guardian," which includes, in its full text of Dr. Armitage Robinson's lecture of the previous Saturday in Westminster Abbey, the following words:—

"The whole subject of Eschatology, or the Doctrine of the Last Things, has come suddenly to the front in recent days, being pressed forward by a school of German critics who now seek to reconstruct the Gospel history in accordance with the theory that our Lord believed that the world was about to come to an immediate end."

The perplexity created by this problem has been voiced at the last Church Congress (in Cambridge), the subject having been reopened largely as a result of the critical speculations of Dr. Schweitzer alluded to by the Dean of Westminster in the sentence just quoted, and it therefore seemed that the time was perhaps specially opportune for

presenting a Preterist theory of the "Parousia" (as the—largely catastrophic and spectacular—end of an *age*, but by no means of the *world*) which harmonizes the evangelical anticipations of impending crisis with those other and equally unmistakable sayings, like the parables of the "mustard-seed" and the "leaven," which seem to predict just the sort of slow evolution and progress which we know to have taken place.

The other studies of the volume are less in need of apology. Those who have followed recent philosophical and religious controversies will recognise their appositeness, even if they utterly disagree with the writer's conclusions. Neither does the writer make any apology for the "annotative" literary form in which so large a part of these Studies is presented, and for which he has been exonerated in a press-notice which appears on page 95¹ herein. That literary form has been necessitated by lack, until recently, of health and leisure during the many years of a very busy life.

The Studies have been prefaced, as will be seen (pages 1² to 12² inclusive), by a careful analysis and summary of the author's chief philosophical and religious positions, as developed partly in the remainder of the present volume and partly in other essays not included therein.

F. W. FRANKLAND.

DEVON HOUSE, 4 UPPER BEDFORD PLACE,
RUSSELL SQUARE, LONDON :
December 12, 1910.

¹ Page 127 of the present edition.

² Pages 45 to 58 of the present edition.

THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS

A SYNOPTIC STATEMENT OF TWO THEODICIES

MR. WEEKS' THEODICY.

First Statement

The sole driving force of the cosmic process is *the cosmic craving to produce joy.*

MR. FRANKLAND'S SPECULATIONS

THE sole driving force of the cosmic process (*i.e.* the sole factor which makes the future follow from the past—the sole factor which determines the relation of the “next” to the “immediately preceding”) is *logical implication*, *i.e.* the logical possibility of drawing *conclusions* from *premisses*. What appear to us¹ as the relations of “before” and “after,” are really the *logical* relations in the constituents of an all-inclusive Personal Intellect which is *behind* Time. The logical relations between the components of His mind, are *constitutive* of Time. Hence the perfect uniformity of causation in Nature, and the inexorableness of natural law.

This preceded all phenomena; underlies all phenomena.

Such is the “driving force” of the Cosmos if by driving force be meant that which *connects* successive moments of the cosmic

¹ Sequence, as subjectively experienced by a human *ego*, is a relation that is qualitatively *sui generis*, its nearest analogue being the relation of “nextness,” also qualitatively *sui generis*, between contiguous elements of a visual “field.”

existence. The "connection" is, fundamentally, a *logical* one. It is the connection between premiss and conclusion. But if by "driving force" is meant the totality of original *premisses*—then "joy" is a part of the driving force, and "craving" (in the abstract) is another part of it. The "craving to produce joy" is already something composite, however slight its complexity. Still, being so small and immediate a remove from absolute simplicity, it must (on the theory that chronology is divine logic) have existed almost from the beginning, and it has doubtless pervaded the whole inorganic world (to say nothing of the world of life), though perhaps not as exclusively as Mr. Weeks' theodicy requires.

At first it was blind; by reaching forth for satisfaction it became more and more intelligent; even as in the animal, from the lowest type to the highest, the reaching forth for satisfaction produces intelligence. For the law of psychology is first craving, then effort, then intelligence.

The cosmic craving is necessarily benevolent, because only through the benevolent will could it satisfy itself: God cannot

Quite correct, except that—in *the most abstract and rudimentary sense*—"intelligence" must have existed from the beginning, because the mere *mutual relation* of two or more mental states (and nothing except mental states and their relations can ever have existed) *constitutes* "intelligence" of this most abstract and rudimentary type.

This is quite true of the "cosmic craving to produce joy." But there are *other* kinds of "cosmic craving," however nearly universal (through automatic selection as a very stable and conservative channel of intellec-

enjoy except in the enjoyment of sentient beings.

tion in a world of low intelligence but with myriads of subordinate egos embosomed within the Universal Ego) the craving to produce joy may be in the *living* world *below man*. We do not know that it is as nearly universal in the inorganic world : and we *do* know that it is not nearly as universal in the *human* world, where high intelligence gives the (dialectically suggested) diabolical an extensive opportunity for exercise without early automatic elimination. An Ivan the Terrible, for example, is possible in the human but would be impossible in the sub-human world.

Pain is the non-success of the cosmic craving to create joy, and is the result of a primitive mis-action of that craving while it was still unintelligent.

Pain is something more *positive* than this. It is related to "joy" as *minus one* is related to plus one—not as *nought* is related to plus one. It is the dialectically suggested *opposite* of joy. That mere fact (its logical relation to joy) is enough to bring it into existence at the beginning of the cosmic process, before high-grade Intelligence had arisen, and it will require benevolent high-grade Intelligence to eliminate it—especially as *malevolent* high-grade Intelligence has been (dialectically) generated in the meanwhile and *pari passu* with the benevolent high-grade Intelligence, and is, from its nature, striving for the continuance and intensification of pain. Until the genesis of the human race, the level of intelligence was too low to permit of the tragic to a degree that offset the general preponderance

of joy as secured by automatic selection, and creation might rightly on the whole be pronounced to be "very good." But soon after the genesis of a mammal that, by language and consequent sociality, was entitled to be called "human," this was no longer the case. Although the evidence available goes to show that at first the new talking animal was truly "social" (many surviving primitive folk being, as Spencer has pointed out, more so than any "civilised" race), the increase of intelligence among the *individuals* composing the new species soon suggested opportunities for the strong to exploit¹ the weak to an extent that was impossible among sub-human animals (where a violent death is usually the worst² fate in store for the weak at the hands of the strong, and starvation at the hands of nature), while—unfashionable as it is in this age to maintain it—the "inversive" half of the *cosmic* intelligence possessed in the human brain an instrument enabling it to initiate even darker tragedies which, from the nature of the case, are necessarily without a parallel in the sub-human world.

¹ An exploitation which finds its apotheosis in the "Herren-moral" ("masters' ethic,") as opposed to "Sklaven-moral"—"slaves' ethic"—the Judaeo-Christian "conspiracy" of the weak against the strong) of Nietzsche's philosophy of *avowed* diabolism.

² It must be remembered also that a given lot can hardly be as painful, in extreme cases, to a sub-human animal as the (outwardly) identical lot would be to a human being, because the former is probably almost entirely spared the miseries of prevision.

Still, in spite of the positive nature of pain, and the positive nature of much of its causation, there is a great deal of it that is "the result of a primitive mis-action of that craving while it was still unintelligent." When, in a recent catastrophe, it was asked, "Where was God?" the true¹ answer would have read, "Undergoing the logical unfoldment of the original experiences of His being." All events that happen are the *thoughts* of God, but not all events are the result of His *will*, and some events are not the result of *any* will. Thus, though the "craving to produce joy" is a "primum movens" (not the *only* one, however), very much of its "primitive" action is liable to be a "mis-action" permitting the occurrence of that which is the opposite of "joy."

Final Statement

The Real "Primum Movens"

The present drift in the physics of the *minute* is toward stating the atom as an arrangement of particles of electricity—so to speak—thus resolving back the whole phenomena of the universe into a single physical force.

Yes: and it is something more than a "drift." The possibility of explaining "mass" (the fundamental property of matter) as a function of "electric charge," is apparently so absolute and the reverse interpretation so impossible, that we may take it that probably both ordinary gross matter and also æther, will be banished (in the name of the principle of "parcimony," which forbids the needless multiplication of hypothetical entities) from the universe as

¹ This is not to say that God was not *also* spiritually succouring the dying and the mourners—a mockery on the orthodox theory of the divine sovereignty, but not on the panlogistic theory of a necessary evolution. "It *must needs be* that offences come."—Matt. xviii. 7.

having any existence distinct from "electric charge." This "electric charge" is, however, apparently not a *single* physical entity, but an alternative between *two opposite* somethings, called respectively "positive" and "negative" electricity, though the evidence seems to show that these adjectives might more appropriately have been transposed (so much is this the case that those physicists who still hope to rehabilitate the old Franklin theory of a single electrical "fluid" would unhesitatingly affirm that a *redundancy* of the single fluid constituted a so-called "negative" charge, and *vice versa*). In any case, the relation between the two opposite electricities is not an *equilateral* or interchangeable relation (like that between north and south, or between "clockwise" and "counterclockwise" rotation), but a *unilateral* or non-reversible relation like that ¹ between past and future, between

¹ Mr. Charles S. Peirce has objected that the equations of motion show the relation of Past and Future to be equilateral for all parts of the universe for which the conservation of energy holds. But surely, in spite of the equations of motion, the increase of Entropy is of itself sufficient to show that the processes even of inorganic nature (to say nothing of *Life*) are non-reversible. The reversal of a cinematograph gives a visual and grotesque emphasis to this unilateral character of the world-process; and it has been argued by certain French natural philosophers that the irreversibility of the cosmic process demonstrates that it cannot be a purely mechanical process in the Newtonian sense. Some processes are *cyclical*, or *nearly* so, in the sense that a starting-point is nearly returned to; but this is a very different thing from going through the cycle *in reverse order*. Mr. Peirce admits the unilateral character of Time as exemplified in *mental* history, inasmuch as memory only works backward, and will only works forward. Hence possibly, *i.e.*, if memory and will are in this respect sufficiently typical of mental operations in general, and if, as I here contend, *all* history is *purely* mental, *cadit quaestio*.

up and down, or between positively and negatively curved space. Its resemblance to the relation between the last named is so close, that I venture the surmise (which harmonises with a hint thrown out long ago by the late Professor Clifford) that the same principle of parcimony which threatens to banish matter and æther in favour of electricity, will yet banish matter, æther, and electricity, in favour of *space*, the varied and changing geometries of which will be found adequate to account for all the phenomena of the material world. I further venture, also in harmony with a hint of Clifford's, to surmise that these geometries of physical space will be found not to be truly "continuous," but to be merely the varied and changing "tactical" arrangements of a *discrete* manifold consisting of a finite number of indivisible units (true "atoms" in the etymological sense). "Parcimony" will thus be further satisfied, for the notion of extension (at present considered ultimate) will by this simplification be subsumed under the truly ultimate notion of *relative position*. The above simplification would reduce all physical facts to facts of nextness or contiguity between indivisible units. They would be analogous to the facts of nextness or contiguity subsisting between the minutest of our simultaneously experienced visual sensations. It is well known that there are *minima visibilia*; and the visual sensations corresponding to these,

I take it this single physical force is the phenomenal side of a single mental force, and that in this last we have the cause and source of the entire cosmic process.

constitute a discrete manifold having a finite number of elements. Moreover it is one belonging to the category of those manifolds which, in my "Theory of Discrete Manifolds," I have called "nets," *i.e.* manifolds in which the return to a starting point is always possible without the retracing of steps. This property also characterises the physical cosmos. The duplication of that property in our "visual field," and in that alone of our simultaneous sense-experiences, is what makes vision the only one of our senses that is adapted to give rough immediate information as to the structure of the cosmos without the necessity of patient exploration (such as would be necessary to a race of the blind). The physical cosmos must of course be the phenomenal side¹ of some complex of mental experiences of the Universal Self. We may legitimately infer that this complex is, at all events *in the mathematical relation of its parts*, imperfectly mirrored in the simultaneous visual sensations of a human being or other seeing animal, and it may therefore be called—in something more than a merely metaphorical sense—the *Divine Vision*. The structure of the material world is what God *sees* it to be. The experience of the Universal Ego, in this act of what, for want of a better

¹ It is in this sense that God may be said to be "immanent" in the physical cosmos, just as (on the theory of psychophysical parallelism) a human *ego* may be said to be immanent in the physiological processes of the brain—or, more strictly, in a *portion* of those processes.

word, we here call "vision," may be *qualitatively* very different¹ from the colour sensations experienced, in vision, by a human

¹ Indeed, if the psychophysical parallelism of human psychosis and human neurosis is as close as it is nowadays the fashion to assume, it necessarily follows that the divine "vision" of the cosmos must include *all* the qualitatively different sensations and emotions known to us—besides, doubtless, many others. But *all* must be mathematically arranged in a "net," instead of only the visual sensations as with us.

As regards the psychophysical parallelism which is affirmed in this essay of the *universe at large*, it has been well compared (by Henri Taine in "L'Intelligence"—1869—the earliest anticipation, so far as I know, of the "mind-stuff" doctrine associated with the name of Professor Clifford—I myself worked out the theory in 1870) to the parallelism between an original text and an interlinear translation. The original text is the history of the world-mind; and the interlinear translation is the physical history of the world. In the earlier chapters, as Taine says, the "original text" is blurred and, for us, almost blank. The mentality of the inorganic world is *too* simple (and *too alien* to us) for us to grasp, and it is in the *latest* chapter, the chapter of *humanity*, that the original text is easiest for us to read. With the "interlinear translation" the case is exactly the reverse. The earliest chapters are the easiest to read, and the later ones become more and more undecipherable, owing partly to increasing complexity and partly to increasing difficulties of observation. We understand the physics of inorganic nature better than we do the physics of a lowly organism, and we understand the latter more nearly than we do the physics of the human brain.

But while this metaphor of Henri Taine is very apposite, the most apposite metaphor from a mathematical point of view would be one that likened the spiritual world to a *painting*, and the physical world, as mapped out by the scientist, to an *outline drawing* of [at least] *part* of the same subject (of that part of the "painting"—if it *is* only "part"—which constitutes what we have called the divine "vision"). In the "outline drawing," the *qualitative* (the rich spiritual "colour" of the *real* world) has disappeared; only the *quantitative* is left. Atoms, electrons, and ether, spaces of various curvatures and tropisms or twists, "facts of nextness" subsisting among indivisible units, energies (whether potential or kinetic)—all these are affairs of pure *quantity*, without a vestige of inner *qualitative* essence in their composition. Moreover, the spiritual impoverishment in passing from the hardly known divine Reality to the well mapped out scientific simulacrum is much greater than in passing from the Sistine Madonna at Dresden to a good photograph of that supreme painting. In the *world*, the spiritual value is almost entirely dependent on what we have called the "colour," while in *art* perhaps the larger half of that value inheres in the quantitative relations or "outline."

or animal ego : but in *respect of the mathematical arrangement of its parts*, the divine vision is mirrored (though only roughly and inadequately) in the human vision. And it is in this sense that Berkeley was not quite right in denying to the so-called "primary" qualities of matter an existence outside our minds, though of course he was quite right to deny the existence of these or any other "qualities" outside *all* minds. The mental experiences of the Universal Ego, at any one moment of Time, form a mathematically connected whole, in which *our* simultaneous mental experiences are excessively small parts (whereof our *visual* experiences most nearly mirror the whole—not perhaps in respect of *quality*, but certainly in respect of *arrangement*). The mathematical connections of God's simultaneous mental experiences (or, at all events, of that portion of which the physical cosmos is the phenomenal side) are what constitute *Space*. But the mental experiences of God *through all Time*, form a *logically* connected whole, and it is the logical connections of His mental experiences which are constitutive of *Time*. It is these logical connections, therefore, that constitute the "cosmic process" : and, when we speak of the "cause and source" of the "entire cosmic process" we may mean either (a) this divine *logic*, which connects the successive moments of existence, or (b) the multiplicity of original premisses—all the simple undecon-

posable "qualities" plus all the simple undecomposable "relations" between them—from which the Universal Reason starts. Only in sense (a) can it be said that a "single mental force" is the "cause and source of the entire cosmic process."

What meaning can the term 'mental force' have? I can see but one possible meaning for this term; it is that which is expressed in various phases by the words 'craving,' 'desire,' 'purpose,' 'will.'

No. If by "mental force" you mean mental *antecedent*, then any mental state (and not merely "craving," "desire," "purpose," or "will") is a mental force: while, if by mental force you mean *that which connects* antecedent and consequent, then *only* divine logic is a mental force. *Only* the universal *Reason* propels the cosmos, and that is why rational creatures embedded within it can draw valid inferences respecting it—argue legitimately from the known to the unknown. Only by assuming the cosmos to be ultimately *reasonable* (not, indeed, in its original premisses, which are *alogical*,¹ but in its principle of *sequence* or *causation*), can we avoid being stalled in universal scepticism.²

Itakeitthen that the single homogeneous reality which existed from

"Reality" is not homogeneous, though it has a principle of unity in that its parts are related within a single Self, *i.e.* they

¹ And, as a consequence, *asymmetric* in their relations to one another.

² This is not too strong a statement. For without assuming the trustworthiness of memory, we cannot lay claim to knowledge of the past; without the axiom of causation, the future is a blank: and—paradoxically—the present moment is so elusive that it cannot be seized in reflection until it is just past, *i.e.* until it is at the mercy of *memory*.

all eternity, before process began, was, to use the lowest term, *craving*. The immediate question is—craving for what?

exist as the mental experiences of that Self. But there is irreducible qualitative diversity among these parts, nor could the perfectly homogeneous ever by any conceivable dialectical or credible physical process have given rise to the heterogeneous. The total number of irreducible “kinds” or undecomposable “qualities,” though finite, has from the beginning been *at least* as large as it is now: for, while original “kinds” may conceivably be eliminated by dialectical negation, no fundamentally new “kind” can possibly be introduced by a process which essentially consists in *quantitative* involution and rearrangement. No *fundamentally* new “kind”¹ or “quality”: but among the quantitative changes which the Time-process permits, *blending* is not an impossible one, and it is capable of giving rise to “kinds” which might be mistaken

¹ These fundamental “kinds,” or simple undecomposable fragments of mental experience, are the true “atoms” of the world. If *these* were substituted in the “*De Rerum Natura*” for the Epicurean simulacra—hard atoms traversing the void with no qualities save unchanging size and shape (mere *blank forms* of existence!)—the Lucretian philosophy would lose nothing in grandeur and would lose nearly all its absurdity. The number of *kinds* of atoms would still be finite: “mechanical” or “genetic” behaviour would still be at the *basis* of world history, and anything “telic” that looked more than one step ahead would still be regarded as, not the *source*, but a *product* of evolution. All we should have to insist on would be (a) a beginning in time to the process; (b) the finite, but *increasing*, number of *individuals* of each “kind”; and (c) the power of some complexes to resist disintegration, so that—in spite of much that was cyclical, and much that was purely catabolic like the increase of entropy—the cosmic process might on the whole be both linear and progressive. Already the so-called “immortality” of unicellular organisms shows that death is not as necessary a phenomenon as evolutionists at first supposed.

by an ego of limited experience for fundamental or irreducible ones. The so-called "secondary" colour sensations show that the process has been actual: and an ego which experienced "purple" but had never experienced "red" or "blue," would probably regard purple as a primary sensation. Yet, as introspection assures us that its quality stands *between* the qualities of "red" and "blue," it follows that it is *quantitatively related* to "red" and "blue": for "betweenness" is one of the most fundamental of all the quantitative relations, as a perusal of Professor Hilbert's "Foundations of Geometry" will make evident. Hence it can be dialectically generated from the premisses "red" and "blue." And let it not be said that "blue" can be dialectically generated in the same way from "purple" and "green." Introspection does not see purple and green in blue, though it sees blue and red in purple. Moreover "reality" not only is, and always has been, heterogeneous; but it has not "existed from eternity." If the chronological process is, in its nature, a *logical* one, it must root back in first premisses; and that means an absolute beginning of all mental history, or—on the phenomenal side—an absolute beginning to the cosmos.

The three great terms of the cosmic series are:—first, mineral; second,

As already indicated, the "series" is not caused entirely by any single "craving," nor even entirely by "cravings" in their

vegetable; third, animal. And it is reasonable to suppose that the mental movement—the craving which is the cause of this series—is in the line of the series itself; that it is a craving toward that which characterises the latest term of the series.

What then characterises the latest term of the series, *i.e.* sentient life? We can picture the universe of sentient life as a continuous stream made up of an immense number of separate threads of sensation; each little thread has its beginning, winds in among the others, and ends. But the current is continuous; something the way that a rope while continuous itself, is

totality. It is “caused,” in one sense, by all the undecomposable feelings or “kinds” which happen to exist; and, in another sense, by the Universal Reason or Logic which unfolds the implications or possibilities of multiplication or other quantitative relationships that can exist among these “kinds.” But the test proposed by Mr. Weeks would be a valid one for determining, *not* the nature of an imagined single cause, but the nature of the *strongest* or *most central* among the plurality of causes that have been at work, and the application of this test, as indicated in my paper on “Atheism, Theism, and Pantheism,” establishes *joy* as the strongest and most central of the perfectly simple causes, and the *joy-giving* impulse as the strongest and most central of those causes which are second in order of simplicity.

The kingdom of animal life can certainly be pictured just as Mr. Weeks here says—as “a continuous stream made up of an immense number of separate threads of sensation.” But it is too dogmatic to affirm that each thread “ends,” however profound may be the change in the character and constitution of the “thread” that synchronises with the dissolution of that corresponding structure in the phenomenal world which we call the physical organism. The “threads” of personal identity have not, necessarily, what mathematicians call a

composed of short, individual threads. Now let us imagine that we could take a cross section of this entire current. As we looked at the cross section we should see an immense number of little disks, these representing the individual threads of sensation — of lives. Let us suppose that red is the colour which represents joy, and black the colour which represents extreme pain. Then we should find an incalculable preponderance of red and rosy disks, with comparatively speaking a very few of black or grey disks scattered among them. I take it therefore that the net result of the cosmic process to the present moment is an immense volume of agreeable sensation, mixed, however, with threads of pain.

strict “one to one correspondence” with the individual animal organisms our senses cognise in the phenomenal world. Evidently there is at least a high degree of correspondence between the *intellectual grade* of the mental experiences of a given “self” and the degree of *complexity* and *co-ordination* of “structure” that manifests the said “self” in the phenomenal world. But the bare possibility of such a thing as thought-transference carries with it the possibility of *soul-transference* and shows that we need proof before confidently affirming that a “self” is dependent on any *one particular* individual “structure.” So far as there is evidence, it points in the opposite direction — at any rate in respect of some human beings. For the same reason, although each of the “threads” must undoubtedly have had a beginning, that beginning may have been long anterior to the beginning of the particular organic structure with which we associate it. We must not suppose that the total number of individual “selves” that have existed in the noumenal world is necessarily identical with the total number of individual organisms that have existed in the animal kingdom. Such a numerical identification may err both by excess and by defect — excess in certain directions, and defect in others. The same selves may appear over and over again in successive generations of organisms; and, on the other hand, many selves may animate a given

organism besides the one which comes to the front as director of the molar external relations of that organism—as the organism’s secretary of state for foreign affairs, so to speak. As a counter effect, again, to this, it is possible—especially in the case of the highest and most gregarious animals, viz., human beings—that the same “self” may have a foothold in, *i.e.* be a partial noumenal counterpart of, more than one *simultaneously existing* organism. If a “self” survives the physical death of its primary organism, something of this kind (which amounts to little more than telepathy) is probable, because it is an unlikely supposition that “soul-transference” should be limited to the moment of death, though the statistics of phantasms of the dying show even this extreme supposition to be less arbitrary than would at first sight seem to be the case.

I conclude, therefore, that the primal pre-cosmic craving is the craving to produce agreeable sensation, to create joy, a craving immensely successful though not as yet wholly successful.

The “craving to produce agreeable sensation, to create joy,” is the *strongest* and *most central* one in that multiplicity of primal precosmic cravings and other undecomposable mental experiences, the interaction of which has constituted and still constitutes the world-process. Revelation—superhuman in the sense of proceeding from a section of “extra-liminal” brain activity which is, in some respects at least, *superior* to the ordinary *intra-liminal* activity of *which alone each of us is conscious*—decisively affirms the ultimate triumph, complete and

eternal, of this most central craving. The whole stream of Hebrew prophecy (through which—perhaps on account of some organic peculiarity in the Semitic race—the Highest “Extra-liminal” has most easily been able to communicate itself to the intra-liminal), from the earliest dawn of the righteousness-religion to the incarnation of the Supreme Himself and His apocalyptic utterances at the close of the Jewish national existence, has as its main current the prognostication of an endless state of perfect joy. Apart from revelation, a hope of this ultimate triumph of good may be based on the fact that, probably for some *logical* reason at present uncomprehended by us, no self is ever apparently capable of “craving” pain *for itself* as a sole¹ ultimate end, while the corresponding power to crave joy for self alone is only too evident. As a result of this a perfect organisation of the powers of evil becomes impossible, whereas a corresponding organisation of the powers of good involves no logical impossibility. On the contrary, if the Hebrew revelation can be trusted, the nucleus of an organisation of the powers of good (the “kingdom of heaven”)—perfect as far as it goes—*already exists* in the “extra-liminal” activities of the human race, and has for eighteen hundred years been going forth “conquering and to

¹ Even the deliberately pursued “luxury” of self torture includes an element of *pleasure to self*.

conquer.” Now the struggle for the empire of the world is essentially a rivalry in excellence of *organisation*. And although the powers of evil are susceptible of an amazingly high degree of organisation, *perfection* in that regard is precluded by the fact that, from the nature of the case, an element of discord must remain.¹

And, meanwhile, however fierce the rival “cravings” may be, assuredly the “craving to produce joy” is the only one which *ought* to be supreme. It is the sole craving that is placed on the throne of the universe by the divine conscience and by the human conscience as far as it is educated by the divine. All other cravings that are compatible with it must be its servants, and all that contradict it must be destroyed. Not as a suppliant for favour, suggesting an optional “counsel of perfection,” but as a *sovereign*, backed by the whole force of conscience and of God, the “craving to produce joy” addresses the concourse of emotions—*commanding*, not *beseeking* obedience, and threatening all the ultimately

¹ How strikingly this principle of what might be called Rational Eschatology is illustrated in the recent Russo-Japanese campaign! The fundamental selfishness of Russian bureaucracy, amazing and world-overawing as the ability of that bureaucracy had hitherto been presumed to be, is reflected in the jealousies and quarrels of Generals at the front: while the extraordinary unselfishness and devotion of the Japanese character leads to an almost perfect organisation (doubtless inspired and helped by the *absolutely* perfect organisation “behind the veil”) and to consequent victory. As Matthew Arnold would have said, the God of Israel is “verifying Himself in history.”

recalcitrant (be it cruelty, be it mere selfishness, or be it asceticism), whether emotions or the selves harbouring them, whether the sinners or the sins, with "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of His power."

And now as to the extent to which the "craving to produce agreeable sensation" has been "immensely, though not as yet wholly successful" in the Past. We have seen that this craving is the sole monarch of the universe *de jure* ("neither shall there be any more pain"—Rev. xxi. 4—is one of the last proclamations of the Eternal through the prophets of His chosen Hebrew race). Let us see how far it has been monarch of the universe *de facto*. In the sub-human organic world it would certainly seem to have preponderating power, though that world is still "groaning and travailing, waiting for the redemption of the sons of God." As both the introspective and the interrogative methods fail us, it is difficult to assess the pleasures and pains of living creatures below the human plane, while as regards the hedonic value of the inorganic world we are still more entirely in the dark. The guess of Buddha with his promise of "lifeless, timeless bliss," when the "dew-drop slips into the shining sea" may be paired off against the at least equally logical forecast of Mr. Mallock's angel of Objective

Truth ("The Veil of the Temple," page 426), that—

"I shall become the painless pain,
The soundless sound, as deaf and dumb,
The whole creation strives in vain
To sing the song that will not come.

Till, maimed and wingless, burnt and blind,
I am made one with God and feel
The tumult of the mindless mind
Torn on its own eternal wheel."

Still, in spite of these "uncertainties inherent in the blur of sub-human psychology, the circumstances of the sub-human *living* world (with its countless multitude of selves subjected to an eternal automatic competition but with as yet no¹ intelligence emerging adequate to the deliberate exploitation of the weak) would seem to afford a fair guarantee for the marked preponderance of joy. And this is the impression produced also by a direct observation of the facts.

With the advent of the human race, all this is changed. With the building up of a certain level of intelligence, the hedonic fate of weaker selves comes to be largely at the mercy of the *deliberate choice* of stronger selves. Without impugning determinism *as a metaphysical doctrine*, we must obviously, *for practical purposes*, admit the truth of the old-fashioned view that with intelligence

¹ Ants are perhaps the only sub-human animals with intelligence adequate to the enslavement of others, and we do not know that even they treat their slaves cruelly.

sufficient for the deliberate choice between alternatives clearly contemplated, *sin* entered into the world, and—with sin—a degree and amount of misery altogether unparalleled in the earlier course of evolution. Hence the Hebrew story says truly that the fruit of the tree of knowledge was fraught with disaster—disaster to the weak, who are preyed on by the strong (in an altogether more tragic way than is possible at a lower psychic level), and disaster to the strong, who prey on each other. And the orthodox view of human history is justified in so far as it postulates an ethical *Fall*, from which a process of spiritual *Redemption* is needed. The ethical course¹ has not been continuously *upward*, but—aside from the saving influence of the Redeemer—largely *downward* and *precisely as a result of the almost continuously upward movement of human intelligence and civilisation*. If the orthodox view, in all its crudity, stands in need, as it does, of qualification, that qualification cannot be supplied by the shallow evolutionary optimism, born of Caucasian conceit and insolence but by no means endorsed by the chief prophets¹ of evolution,

¹ Herbert Spencer, for example, says most truly that the moral goodness of some primitive tribes is "like a dream." This goodness, however, is to be looked for in out of the way places and islands, where tribes—weak both numerically and in stamina—have been geographically protected from fierce competition. The savages who have multiplied exceedingly and been successful in the struggle for existence over wide continental areas are tainted with the same ruthlessness (often in an exaggerated form) that is apt to characterise—with some noble exceptions—the empires of "civilisation."

which rejects the story of the Fall because its own superciliousness ignores the ethical beauty of primitive communism. It must be supplied by the Marxist or "economic" interpretation of history. This latter, without denying the substantial¹ truth of the orthodox chart of ethical history, chains down the succession of ethical and hedonic moments to the iron bar of economic progress. The Garden of Eden remains as the *terminus a quo*, and the New Jerusalem as the *terminus ad quem*, and Christ remains as "the Way" from one to the other: but the spiritual is seen to be chained to the rigid economic needs of man instead of floating free as the orthodox have supposed.² At the same time, the materialistic fatalism of Marxian economics can be carried too far, and often is unduly accentuated by Marxian thinkers, who sometimes almost speak as if human volition were both impotent and unnecessary. Had the inherent altruism of the earliest men been sufficient, the temptation to oppress the weak would have been resisted in spite of an intellectual and industrial development that rendered such oppression physically possible: and unless both the altruism and

¹ Compare, for example, such a work as "The Origin of the Family, of Private Property, and of the State," by the Marxist writer Engels, with the portrayal of the human drama in the Westminster Confession.

² Less through honest ignorance of history than through aristocratic and (later) bourgeois prepossessions—thus illustrating once more, in the very dishonesty of their errors, the compelling power of economic influences.

the wisdom of the downtrodden are adequate in the crises that are to come, no amount of industrial consolidation will change economic oligarchy into the socialist millennium. Nor would the proletariat ever have had a chance of establishing the latter, had not the partial righteousness struggling upward under the earlier bourgeois régime endowed them with political rights that may be used, and are already¹ to some extent being used, as levers for economic betterment. Thus, in spite of the substantial² soundness of "revolutionary class-conscious" Marxism, it still remains true, as ever, that Altruism, *i.e.* Salvation from Sin (to use the phraseology of John H. Noyes), is the *sine quâ non* of universal happiness. Confucius spoke with approximate though not with entire truth when he said: "If at any time harmony reigns over humanity as it ought to reign, evil will no longer have any power over mankind. Physical evils are only the consequence of moral evil, of the hatred and injustice which always separate human beings." Physical evils are not indeed exclusively due to moral evil, but the entire abolition of moral evil is the necessary and sufficient condition for the ultimate removal of physical evil. There is no measure that may be required for the removal of any physical evil, which the

¹ Notably in New Zealand and in Switzerland.

² This must not be held, for example, to imply an endorsement of the erroneous Marxian theory of *Value*.

human race will not be willing and eventually able (if not so already) to undertake, if only the *volition* of all its members is absolutely righteous. But the volition of all its members is not likely to *become* righteous until economic conditions have been improved. This is no vicious circle: for a certain measure of altruistic volition already exists in the human race and is probably now increasing, and the (prospective) quantum thus available may turn out adequate, in conjunction with the mechanical improvements in production, to socialise the economic condition of humanity and so permit the *universal* spread of moral goodness.

The special triumph of God (*i.e.* of the cosmic craving towards joy) is in the bringing forth through the cosmic process of beings who, like Himself, are consciously and intelligently devoted to making others joyous—perhaps even conscious co-workers with Him in making the cosmic process clearer and clearer of the evil element.

God will certainly keep such beings alive with Himself for ever, if that achievement be possible under the conditions which

The present writer is in absolute agreement with this proposition of Mr. Weeks' theodicy.

This I agree with, but I should add that we have learnt from Christ that the achievement *is* now possible ("Christ brought life and immortality to light"). If Christ came late in Time (and Napoleon the First used

the preceding part of the cosmic process has set up.

to say that this was the chief difficulty in the way of believing Christianity), it may be because God was not till then in a position to announce the possibility of the achievement and to issue His conditional guarantee,¹ even though He was then able to make the latter at least partially retrospective (see the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews on the glorious destiny in store for pre-Christian servants of God).

I suppose that at the very beginning of the cosmic process an element was introduced, without foresight of all its effects, which is the primal cause of all the pains and evil that have existed and must yet exist.

Now what I contend is that this "element" is precisely *pain itself* as a qualitatively undecomposable entity (the logical germ of the malevolent or "inversive," as T. L. Harris calls it—the evil power meant by such terms as "the Devil" and "Satan"), and I quite agree that it was "introduced without *foresight* of all its effects." I should say without foresight of *any* of its effects, but simply by *dialectical necessity*, on the principle that every qualitatively undecomposable entity irresistibly suggests its own opposite. If we know (as we do) of some qualitatively undecomposable entities that have no opposites within our knowledge, *e.g.* a salty taste, we may depend upon it that such opposites *have* existed, but have

¹ Which, in its essential nature, is somewhat analogous to the guarantee He is represented to have given as to the non-recurrence of a Deluge: because, if high-grade intelligence invariably has as its counterpart (in the phenomenal world) a complex organic structure, it follows that immortality or *endless*, as distinguished from mere *posthumous*, personal existence, must depend on the possibility of averting, or else escaping the consequences of, cosmic catastrophes.

in some way been eliminated (at all events in our part of the universe), even as we may hope that pain will some day be eliminated from *all* parts of the universe. There can be "nothing (qualitatively) *new* under the sun," as *all* fundamental "*kinds*" must have existed in the first or second instant of Time : but some old "*kinds*" may disappear. Thus there is no ontological impossibility in the realisation of the glorious prophecy, "There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain : *for the former things are passed away*" (Rev. xxi. 4).

APPENDIX A

NOTES ON A NEW THEORY OF TIME

TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS

THE consciousness of an individual human ego consists of a succession of flashes separated by blank intervals many billions of times as long as a flash. A flash lasts for a length of time *equal to the absolute indivisible unit of Time*. How short this unit is, we cannot know; but it must be shorter—probably much shorter—than the period of vibration at the ultra-violet end of the spectrum, *i.e.* it must be less than the seven hundred billionth part of a second (using the word billion in its English sense as meaning the square of a million, and not in its French or American sense as meaning a thousand millions only). The interval between two successive flashes varies, being sometimes much shorter in morbid and other exceptional states of consciousness than in normal waking life. Thus in certain dreams one lives through a much larger number of flashes in a given time by the clock, than in waking consciousness. Even in waking consciousness the interval between two successive flashes must obviously be a tolerably small fraction of a second—say the fifth or sixth part of a second: for we are probably aware of fully five or six successive distinguishable units of consciousness during the tick of a second-pendulum. As we are, by hypothesis, unconscious during the intervals between the flashes, the thread of consciousness necessarily seems to us *unbroken* (and in *that* sense “continuous”) when we look back upon it in memory. But it obviously does not seem to us “continuous” in the mathematical sense of “infinitely divisible.” On the contrary, in ordinary

waking consciousness* there are, in every second of time, only a very few (say at the utmost ten) successive units of duration distinguishable by introspection.

Further, Time, like all else, has existence only in minds. But for reasons made clear by Neo-Hegelians, all minds, except One, are contained in that One Mind, and hence *there is a single stream of Time* in which all the flashes of consciousness of all minds find their place. To each of the subordinate minds, therefore, the single stream of Time common to them all *is an objective fact* : though to the One All-embracing Mind it is a purely subjective fact.

September 1895.

APPENDIX B

ALTRUISM AND HAPPINESS, OR RATIONAL ESCHATOLOGY

(INTRODUCTORY)

“MANKIND,” said Bentham, “is under the government of two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure. They alone can dictate what *ought* to be done, and also what actually *will* be done.” On this double axiom, half ethical, half psychological, the reasonings which follow will be based. I shall assume that what men *ought* to do is always determined by the pains and pleasures which are likely to result to others from their actions, and that what they *do* is always determined by the balance of immediate pain and pleasure to themselves. That constitution of mind which involves the experience of immediate pain or pleasure at the contemplation of pain or pleasure respectively in others, I shall call benevolence or altruism, and the constitution of mind which does not involve this experience, I shall call selfishness or non-altruism. Lastly, the constitution of mind which involves pleasure at the contemplation of pain in others, or pain at the contemplation of their pleasure, I shall call cruelty or anti-altruism. It is obvious that, from the point of view of this definition, all conceivable states of mind can be arranged in a continuous scale from the supremely altruistic or Christlike, through the neutral point of the simply callous, to the supremely anti-altruistic or diabolical.

On the basis of these definitions and of this axiom, I proceed to discuss what is the connection between dominant benevolence and universal happiness, and what are the prospects of the realisation of each. I shall endeavour to

prove that enduringly dominant benevolence is the one condition, both necessary and sufficient, of the ultimate realisation of universal happiness: that the *certainty* for mankind of reaching this fulcrum of dominant benevolence is contingent on the truth of the theistic hypothesis, and that, irrespectively of the truth or falsehood of this hypothesis, the way to attain the fulcrum—the *sure* way if theism be true, and the *best* way if it be false—is by a world-wide association or banding together of benevolent persons for increasing the secular power of the benevolent, whether within the association or outside it, at the expense of the selfish and the cruel: in other words, the admission of a new principle into the body of recognised ethical doctrine, namely the duty of the benevolent to discriminate, in the exercise of their helpfulness, in favour of those persons who are themselves benevolent.

WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND, 1888.

APPENDIX C

THEORY OF DISCRETE MANIFOLDS

(Read before the American Mathematical Society at its Fourth Summer Meeting, in Toronto, Canada, on August 17, 1897.)

PART I.—DEFINITIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL THEOREMS

SECTION I. In elaborating the theory of Discrete Manifolds, we may, for the sake of simplicity, suppose that all the properties of a given manifold depend exclusively on the *Facts of Nextness* which obtain in regard to the elements of which the manifold is composed. One feature which differentiates Discrete from Continuous Manifolds is that the former are actually *composed* of their elements, whereas Continuous Manifolds are, as is well known, something more than mere aggregates of their elements. An element of a Continuous Manifold is a *boundary* between two adjacent regions of the manifold; and hence, as Professor Clifford points out in his lecture on the "Postulates of the Science of Space," two adjacent regions of a Continuous Manifold have the *same* boundary, whereas two adjacent regions of a Discrete Manifold have two *different* boundaries—namely, the terminal elements of the two adjacent regions. As Professor Clifford remarks, this particular distinction between Continuous and Discrete Manifolds was already known to antiquity.

SECTION 2. The assumption made in Section 1 that the properties of any particular Discrete Manifold to be treated shall depend exclusively on the Facts of Nextness which obtain in regard to its elements, is not only a convenient one for the purpose of limiting an investigation which would otherwise cover too large an area, but it may also transpire that it has an important bearing on ultimate mechanical

theories of the physical universe, if the prejudice entertained by many physicists and philosophers against admitting the possibility of "action at a distance" should ever turn out to be in harmony with fact. For it is conceivable that an ultimate mechanical explanation of the universe may involve the assumption that it is a Discrete Manifold existing in a Time which is itself Discrete, or composed of indivisible elements of duration; and further, that an element of the physical universe can only influence its immediate neighbour or neighbours in the next instant of Time, and requires a plurality of such instants in order to influence, even in the slightest degree, more distant elements. We might thus get a mechanical explanation of the universe founded on the denial both of continuity and of "action at a distance." Or, as has been suggested by Dr. Theodore R. Noyes, elements of the discrete manifold constituting the physical universe may periodically appear and disappear (come into existence and cease to exist) at differing units of Time, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of wave-motion, because altering the "facts of nextness" in successive small regions of space.

SECTION 3. "Nextness" is, of course, assumed to be a mutual or reciprocal fact. If A is "next" to B, B, of course, is "next" to A. Under such circumstances, I shall call A a *neighbour* of B, and B a neighbour of A. This nomenclature is essential in order to avoid an awkward periphrasis.

SECTION 4. We shall further assume that all the Facts of Nextness obtaining with regard to the elements of a Discrete Manifold consist exclusively of statements respecting the number and identity of the various neighbours which each element of the manifold possesses. This assumption at once differentiates Discrete Manifolds into two great classes—(a) those in which each element has the same number of neighbours, and (b) those in which each element has not the same number of neighbours. The former we shall call Homodromic Manifolds, and the latter Heterodromic Manifolds. The ground of this terminology lies in the fact that the number of neighbours which a given element

of a manifold possesses determines the total choice in respect to initial direction of setting out which a traveller would have in passing from a given element to other elements of the manifold. It is thus analogous to the total quantity of *turning* or angular magnitude which exists at any point of a Continuous Manifold, and it is therefore appropriate, where this total choice is a constant quantity, to use the term Homodromic, and to use the term Heterodromic where the said total quantity of choice varies from one element to another of the manifold.

SECTION 5. The simplest of Discrete Manifolds is, of course, one which contains only two elements—say A and B. There can be no diversity in regard to the “Facts of Nextness” in this manifold. Each element must have one, and only one, neighbour.

SECTION 6. The next simplest case is that of a manifold having three elements. Here there are two possibilities in regard to the Facts of Nextness. It may be that one of the three elements has each of the two others as a neighbour, and that these two others are not next to each other, in which case we have a Heterodromic Manifold. Or, on the other hand, it may be that each element has both the others as neighbours, in which case we have a Homodromic Manifold. A Homodromic Manifold of three elements would, of course, be one where a traveller who never stopped or retraced his steps would of necessity make a cyclical journey by a unique route (the identity of a “route” being supposed independent of the *order in Time* in which it is traversed). Every Manifold of which this is true must consist of a finite number of elements, each having two, and only two, neighbours; and we shall call such a Manifold a *Cycle*.

SECTION 7. Four is the smallest number of elements which a Discrete Manifold can possess in order that any one element may have more than two neighbours. It is clear that, in a Discrete Manifold of four elements, one or more of those elements may have three neighbours. If each of the four elements has three neighbours, we obtain a Homodromic Discrete Manifold, which is analogous to the

face aggregate of a tetrahedron. On the other hand, if, for example, only one element of the four has three neighbours, while each of those other three has only the said first element as neighbour, we obtain a Heterodromic Manifold analogous to the chemical formula of ammonia.

SECTION 8. Leaving now for a moment the subject of Finite Manifolds with a very small number of elements—a subject which has been sufficiently treated in order to show what is really meant by the terminology here adopted—we observe that Homodromic Manifolds may be classified according to the number of neighbours which each element has, and, further, that an Infinite Manifold (that is, a manifold containing an infinite number of elements) must be such that each element has in general at least two neighbours.

SECTION 9. Passing to the consideration of Infinite Manifolds, the simplest case is obviously that in which each element has two neighbours. Such a manifold I call an *Infinite Chain*. One of its properties is clearly that a traveller, in starting from any particular element and setting out in either of the two directions open to him, could never again (without retracing his steps) arrive at the element from which he set out, for it will be found that if the chain crossed itself anywhere there would at the intersection be an element having more than two neighbours. An obvious complication on the “Infinite Chain” is the case of a manifold in which a certain element, to be called the *Initial Element*, has only one neighbour, whereas every other element has two neighbours. An example of such a manifold is furnished by the series of positive integers where the number 1 has only one neighbour (viz., the number 2), whereas each other number has two neighbours. Such a manifold we might call an *Infinite Ray*.

SECTION 10. The next simplest instance of an Infinite Homodromic Discrete Manifold is that of a manifold where each element has three and only three neighbours. It will be found on investigation that this manifold *may* share the property of the Infinite Chain of being so constituted that a traveller setting out from a particular element, and at no time retracing his steps, could never return to that

element. When it possesses this property I shall call it a "*Tree*."

SECTION 11. The smallest number of neighbours which the element of an Infinite Homodromic Discrete Manifold can have, in order that the above-named property shall not be inevitable, is three. Where the elements of a manifold each have three and only three neighbours, there, even although the manifold may be infinite, it does not follow that a traveller setting out from a particular element (and never reversing any step of his journey—this is, of course, assumed in all that precedes) cannot return to his starting point. It may be so or it may not be so. An Infinite Homodromic Manifold in which there is this impossibility of returning to the starting point, I shall call, as before stated, a "*Tree*," whereas an Infinite Homodromic Manifold in which the cyclical return spoken of is possible, I shall call a *Net*. It is obvious that "*Trees*," while they cannot be so constituted that an element has less than three neighbours, may be so constituted that each element has four or any larger number of neighbours. We might classify such manifolds as triply branched, quadruply branched, &c., *Trees*.

SECTION 12. The case of an Infinite Homodromic Discrete Manifold in which each element has four and only four neighbours, and in which cyclical return is possible, is one of the simplest cases of a Discrete Manifold which brings us *en rapport*, so to speak, with the doubly extended Continuous Manifolds that are familiar to us all as *surfaces* or "*two-way spreads*." I think it will be found that the above-mentioned simplest Discrete Manifold of this type, viz., one where each element has four and only four neighbours, and where cyclical return of the type A, B, C, D, A is everywhere possible is, when taken on a large scale, approximately identical in some of its properties with the Euclidian plane, though differing from the latter in being *æolotropic* (of "*crystalline*" structure, so to speak) instead of isotropic, and such that the ratio of the contour which most nearly satisfies the definition-property of the circle, to a diameter, is 4 instead of π . It would appear, however, that there

is another Infinite Homodromic Discrete Manifold which also has somewhat similar characteristics when taken on a large scale, viz., the manifold where each element has six and only six neighbours, and where cyclical return of a still more immediate type (viz., A, B, C, A) is everywhere possible.

SECTION 13. It will be found that in the case of "Trees" there is no meaning in predicating a number of "dimensions": but in the case of "Nets" the number of dimensions will be found to depend on the relation between the different routes of shortest cyclical return which can be traversed when setting out from an element. The comparison of a number of counters arranged in contact with each other on a table so that each counter has four neighbours, with a heap of cannon balls so arranged that each ball has six neighbours, will both suggest and illustrate this fact.

SECTION 14. It will be seen from the above that one of the purposes to be kept in view in elaborating the theory of Discrete Manifolds, is to affiliate the various types of such manifolds to the analogous Continuous Manifolds which are familiar to us in geometry and in the theory of Continuous Extension generally. To work out this relation or analogy in detail will be the object of a future paper. The purpose of the present one is merely to indicate the line of investigation which will have to be pursued in order to attain this end, and to show that in the case of Discrete Manifolds the theory of the subject can be built up by a strictly *synthetic* process, whereas, in the case of Continuous Manifolds, owing to the impossibility of deriving the properties of the manifold from Facts of Nextness obtaining in regard to its elements (since, in a Continuous Manifold, no two elements can be "next" to each other), a combination of analytical with synthetic treatment is indispensable.

NEW YORK,
1st March 1896.

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF MY METAPHYSICAL WORK

STARTING from the basis of Berkeleyan idealism, and endeavouring to do justice to the arguments on which it was founded, I have formulated a system of panpsychist realism which, in its postulation of ultimate discrete "reals," has much affinity with the peculiar type of realism originated by Herbart. These discrete "reals" I have treated mathematically on the lines of the theory of "discontinuous groups" and of Professor Cayley's "Tactic," and have shown how they furnish a possible clue to the constitution of the physical world without having recourse to the geometry of continuous manifolds except as an intellectual convenience—*i.e.*, as a useful approximation. I have delimited some of the conditions (*e.g.*, irregularity in the constitution of very small regions) under which alone the tactical arrangement of a manifold consisting of indivisible units (*i.e.*, a discrete manifold *in the narrowest sense* of the word "discrete") can, on the large scale, *simulate* the geometry of a continuous manifold—*i.e.*, exhibit *metrical* properties which are approximately identical with those of the latter.

But justice had also to be done to the epistemological development (Erkenntnisstheorie) initiated by Kant and carried further by Fichte and Hegel. The endeavour to do this led me to a metaphysical theory of the time-process which, by identifying chronological sequence with the *logical* concatenation of mental elements in an all-inclusive self, yields a new view of the nature of causation. It reconciles the general attitude of the so-called Neo-Hegelian school of philosophy (except in regard to the Free-Will controversy) and a theistic (and even specifically Christian) view of human history and experience, with an extreme application of Darwinian or Epicurean principles to an explanation of the early development of the sub-human world.

30th July 1904.



APPENDIX E

SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF MR. F. W. FRANKLAND'S ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

“Haply Thy ancient *automatic* ways
Thy ripening rule transcends.
That listless effort tends
To grow percipient with advance of days,
And—with percipience—mends.”

Thomas Hardy's "Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ."

I. OBJECTIVE IDEALISM OR PANPSYCHIST REALISM

STATEMENT of the author's position, formulated by him in 1870, and submitted by him to Professor Clifford in 1871, that our sense-perceptions, though not in a strict one-to-one correspondence with an external reality, do nevertheless correspond in a highly imperfect but practically serviceable way to such a reality, and that the latter is exclusively mental in its inner nature and extremely complex in structure. Further, *all* existence, whether correlated to our sense-perceptions or not, is of necessity purely mental. This fundamental metaphysical position has much affinity with the “mind-stuff” doctrine of Professor Clifford and Henri Taine (apparently its earliest exponent—at least in post-Kantian times—*vide* his “*L'Intelligence*”), but does not affirm the existence of *ejects* that form no part of any consciousness (*vide* Paragraph V).

II. THE DISCRETENESS OF EXISTENCE

The ultimate structure of the universal mental existence is atomic, *i.e.* it consists of ultimate indivisible elements or psychic facts. The illusion of an apparently "felt continuum" in a section of human experience is due to the qualitative similarity of contiguous elements, making impossible the focussing of attention on their numerical separateness. Only when contiguous elements are qualitatively *different* can the discreteness of structure be appreciated introspectively. Denial of the possibility of a completed whole comprising an infinite number of experienced elements; and denial (*à fortiori*) of the possibility that a mathematical "continuum" can ever represent the internal structure of psychic reality. The former denial logically involves the affirmation of an absolute beginning to the Time-process—a beginningless Past being excluded by the *nature* of the Time-process if the thesis of Paragraph IV is admitted.

III. THE SPACE-THEORY OF MATTER

Expansion and elaboration of Professor Clifford's hypothesis that all mechanical structure is an arrangement of minute regions of different space-curvature. Logical affiliation of space-curvature to facts of nextness or relations of contiguity (analogous to those existing between the simultaneous constituents of a human visual field) among ultimate psychic elements. This theory ultimately reduces all Physics to Geometry, and all Geometry to Tactic; for mechanical structure is explained in terms of positive and negative electricity, which in their turn are identified with the two opposite kinds of space-curvature, while the latter are not treated in terms of continuous geometry but explained as due to paucity and redundancy respectively in the facts of nextness subsisting between the ultimate elements of an *atomic* space, and thus—as both Lobachevsky and Professor Clifford hinted—extension is finally explicable in terms of *Position* only. Continuous Geometry, like the

Infinitesimal Calculus, becomes—on this hypothesis—a mere intellectual convenience for avoiding the enormous complexities of the Discrete and yet obtaining an approximation to accuracy : but it has nothing answering to it in Nature.

IV. THE TIME-PROCESS AS A LOGICAL CONCATENATION

There is a finite number of qualitatively undecomposable kinds of feeling or psychic fact, and a finite number of qualitatively undecomposable relations between feelings. From these origins—plural, asymmetric, and surd—the whole of existence derives by a dialectical or logical enchainment of compounding, multiplication, blending, elimination, negation, selection, &c.—all appertaining to the category of *quantity*. This logical enchainment or derivation is the Time-process or causal-nexus, and in this Time-process the subjective experiences of a human ego are embedded as a series of atomic nows separated by blank intervals of relatively very great length. The “before” and “after” of human and (presumably) animal experience correspond, on this hypothesis, to the “because” and “therefore” respectively in a logical concatenation of *Universal Experience*, and the uni-dimensionality of Time and the inexorableness of the Law of Causation are thus explained. Further, the assumption of blank intervals (very short absolutely—*i.e.* fractions of a second, but containing an enormous number of atomic time-units) in every human consciousness-series is necessary in order to correlate such a series with the corresponding time-series in *physical Nature*, where there are certainly *at least* many billions of successive events in every second of time. This problem of correlation has, it is well known, been considered by Henri Bergson : but he has offered an entirely different solution of it.

V. THE UNIVERSAL EGO

Personality, *i.e.* the coherence of a plurality of psychic facts in a unity of apperception, is one of the qualitatively undecomposable relations between feelings. From its nature

as sole combiner of the many into one, sole relation constitutive of that multiplicity-in-unity which we call the *universe*, it must embrace not only all the other qualitatively undecomposable relations but all psychic facts whatever. It must therefore be a universal self or awareness: and all human selves, however different from it in structure or other characteristics, must be *as such* mere minute copies existing within it. The self we each of us cognize by introspection is an "awareness" or unity of apperception holding the many in one, which repeats on a small scale the combining activity of that universal awareness which holds the all in one. Theistic inferences of the ordinary type are not at once legitimately deducible from this position: and, in the absence of *à posteriori* evidence to the contrary, a very "left wing" variety of Hegelianism may hold the field. As a matter of fact *à posteriori* evidence suggests a "left wing" variety of Hegelianism as applicable to the earlier stretches of Time and to the inorganic world even at the present day, but a much more orthodox standpoint as applicable to organic, and especially to *human* development.

VI. AUTOMATIC SELECTION

The Time-process being a logical enchainment—by multiplication, compounding, &c.—of the constituents in the universal awareness, it follows that complex structures, elaborately articulated mental processes, and that reticulation of impulse to pictures of distant results which we call a deliberate *plan*, cannot appertain to the earlier periods of Time. This conclusion, as stated at the end of Paragraph V, is also suggested by all the *à posteriori* evidence available. Professor Alfred Russell Wallace disputes this in his new book, but even in Paley's time it was not popular to adduce evidences of the *telic* from *Inorganic Nature*, and Sir J. J. Thomson's electronic theory of the origin of matter tends to put the "telic" still more out of court as regards *early* and *elementary* processes. The earliest intellection of the

All-Mind must be rudimentary and must proceed, by logical necessity, in all possible directions, the "telic" element being limited, at the utmost, to immediate results. High-grade consciousness and far-seeing plans must be a *conquest* which arises, later, as a result of age-long *groping* and the automatic discontinuance of unsuccessful trials. On this hypothesis, Providence is recognised as only a *proximate* "prius"—a *product*, in fact, of the more *ultimate* "prius" of Automatic Selection.

This justifies, in outline, the cosmogony of thinkers of the school of Empedocles, Epicurus, and Lucretius (a cosmogony which, as a fact, is implied not only in modern Darwinism—when rigidly consistent—but in practically all recent speculation in astrophysics and in genetic chemistry) except that, for obvious metaphysical reasons, it is necessary to replace the crude and childish Materialism of antiquity (which involves the most naïf confusion of categories) by a Berkeleyan Panpsychism which refuses to admit any concrete existence except mentality.

VII. THE "TRANSLIMINAL" CONSCIOUSNESS

Among the varieties of high-grade intelligence and quasi-intelligence which natural selection has evolved, that which is embodied in human organisms holds (as far as we have any evidence) the chief place. But it is not confined to the faculties we cognize by introspection, whose functions are principally limited to directing the external (molar) relations of the organism, but has reached in most respects an even higher grade in certain sections of that "transliminal" region which our introspection cannot penetrate, but which is often shown by psychic research to be, on *its* side, not unaware of *our* consciousness.

VIII. THE RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF MANKIND

This highest section of "transliminal" consciousness, which is thus seen to be (up to the present) the highest known development of the universal ego, includes the deep

race-instincts which act protectively in a much more efficacious manner than the discursive reason of the individual and which confront the individual with their ethical imperative, and also that telepathic providence which—acting through human brains—has guided the course of history in a way only very partially foreseen by the human agents concerned. The affinity of this view with Comtism is obvious. It might be described as Comtism *taking itself seriously*. Through recognition of collective human brain-tissue as *telepathically connected*, and through recognising that there is more unity and less personal separateness in the transliminal than in the *cis*-liminal brain-activities of the aggregate of individuals composing mankind, we are able to adore as a concrete Personal Self-conscious Reality that “Human Providence” which is in Comte’s system hardly more than a metaphor.

IX. THE ANTITHESIS OF GOOD AND EVIL

The contrast of Joy and Pain, reaching down as it does to the foundations of existence and being due to the dialectical movement of affirmation and negation which constitutes the essence of the Time-process, effloresces at the higher levels of intelligence into a contrast of Benevolence and Malignity. The relative dominance of these and all other forces is determined by the superior controlling power of Automatic Selection, *i.e.* the automatic competition between moving equilibria or configurations of varying degrees of stability. Under these circumstances, while Benevolence finds much opportunity for its exercise in parental and tribal activities at sub-human levels of organic life, and although Pain is everywhere in evidence as a result partly of imperfect adjustment and partly of incompatibility of interests among the competing individuals in a crowding exuberant development, yet actual *Malignity* finds little scope till the level of human intelligence is attained. Roughly, therefore, it may be said that, at sub-human levels, suffering is largely and perhaps mainly due to Malthusian pressure, even although that same pressure is an efficient cause of organic

ascent by intensifying natural selection. Even without Malthusian pressure, elaborateness of structure would—on Empedoclean principles—arise in the course of unimaginable ages : yet the comparatively rapid and *steady* evolution contemplated by modern selectionists would have been impossible but for the crowding exuberance which Malthusian philosophy posits. As a historical fact, of course, the Darwinian theory was entirely based on the previous and epoch-making discovery of T. R. Malthus.

X. PRIMITIVE HUMAN ALTRUISM AND SUBSEQUENT ETHICAL DECLENSION

On the attainment of human intelligence, there is full scope for both deliberate benevolence or altruism and also for deliberate malignity. As, however, the latter can but rarely impart stability to a configuration, it is—even in human times—rather in alliance with selfishness than in its *purity* that it is able to preserve a parasitic (and precarious) existence. Moreover, as gregariousness seems to have been the determining factor which originally lifted the human species (if *language* is made the test of humanity) from the immediately preceding animal level, the earlier human times—the race being cradled in tribal communism and matriarchal innocence—would afford but little stimulus to malignity or even to anti-tribal selfishness. The latter becomes developed at a higher intellectual and industrial level, when the possibility of deliberate exploitation of the relatively weak becomes apparent to the relatively strong and when the resulting industrial progress more than compensates, in the Darwinian struggle, for the loss of communal solidarity. This replacement (in the course of industrial progress) of primitive tribal altruism by the selfishness of competitive “civilisation,” is well described by Friedrich Engels in his “Origin of the Family, Property, and the State”; and the extreme, though imperfect, altruism of many primitive tribes at the present day tends *pro tanto* to

corroborate his (otherwise well-grounded) theories. This far-reaching anthropological process is probably the nucleus of fact underlying the Eden-story of the "Fall," which is assumed by the Apostle Paul as the condition precedent of his gospel of Redemption. Few things in current superficial interpretations of evolution-doctrine are more ill-grounded than the very common assumption of "modernists" that the ethical development from sub-human animal to "civilised" man has been continuously *upward*. There is, on the contrary, much evidence of an intermediate state, lasting perhaps many ages (along most lines of ascent) when the *ethical* condition was relatively Edenic, though the *industrial* condition was simple.

XI. RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM AND ETHICAL RESTORATION

The ethical discord to which the individual has opened his soul by this lapse from the primitive tribal altruism, is liable to be periodically, or at least intermittently, attacked by irruptions from the "Transliminal." These irruptions, as H. G. Wells has pointed out, represent an effort of the organism to restore the original ethical harmony, and are called religious "revivals." Now that we are authorised by psychic research (and also by natural history, which shows the later phylogeny of organic life to be very purposive, even if only intermittently so) to credit the "Transliminal," in some of its sections, with a grade of intelligence in most respects much higher than our own, we can see in this religious history of the race, just as the orthodox theologian does, a deliberate process of education. We can also understand the choice of a particular nation as organically the most serviceable instrument for the "Transliminal's" redemptive purposes—a process of redemption or restoration being rendered necessary by the lapse from original communism. Nearly every argument which can be forcibly urged at the present day in the realm of Christian Apologetics calls attention to the historic evidence of divine dealing with

mankind,—especially along the lines of Hebrew development (culminating in the great New Testament crisis) and the subsequent evolution of Christendom.

XII. THE CHRISTIAN INCARNATION

This redemptive process, physiologically prepared in race-tissues for thousands of years and giving rise to numberless anticipatory myths of dying Saviour-gods, reaches its natural climax in a Supreme Individual of the selected race. Panpsychism prepares us to credit the implication of Christian theology that the All-embracing Ego is not, either in its universality or in its highest development as apex of human “transliminal” faculties, a mere barren unity such as Mohammedanism and Deism would have us believe it to be. The elements both of sociality and of subordination enter into the inmost nature of the Supreme, as affirmed by both the Fourth Gospel and St. Paul, by both the “Apostles” and the Nicene Creed. If the Universal Spirit reaches its highest grade as Species-Mind of the human race and as such has become (in collective and telepathically-connected human brain-tissue) an incipient Loving Providence—the “Heavenly Father” of Christ’s Galilean preaching—we are prepared to credit the claim that Christ is in a unique sense the “Son of God” and became incarnate to act as Mediator between each human soul and the “Heavenly Father” He preached. And if the Species-Mind of Humanity is indeed the Father of human souls, the appropriateness of Christ’s own favourite title “Son of *Man*” (*i.e.* Representative Man) becomes manifest as never before.

XIII. POSTHUMOUS PERSONAL EXISTENCE

The transliminal activities of cerebral tissue are the milieu, not only of that Racial Guidance which constitutes the theocratic government of mankind, as well as of the Malignity which—battening parasitically on the exploitation

of weak by strong which Natural Selection favours at a transitional stage of human progress—at least sporadically uprises to thwart that government, but also of all that posthumous personal existence which is connected by definite memory-synthesis with selves that have been “in the flesh.” This posthumous existence arises by the telepathic interpenetration of organisms in a highly intellectual and gregarious species like the human (and is possibly favoured by natural selection, as certain phenomena connected with ancestor-worship would prepare us to believe), such interpenetration permitting the continuance of a secondary life in the brains of survivors when the brain of the person dying has been disintegrated. The spread of personality from brain to brain may, on this view, be compared to the spread of a musical note from tuning-fork to tuning-fork; and, in both cases, we are furnished with a mechanism which enables an identity (in the one case personal, in the other musical) to survive even though the primary structure in which that identity originated should be destroyed.

Posthumous human existence, always hitherto (except, perhaps, in the ages of early and strongest tribal altruism, the posthumous experiences of which may be the true physiological basis of the angelology of later times) incoherent and on a lower level than ordinary human existence, entered on an entirely new phase of possibilities with the “resurrection” of Christ. This was also a posthumous personal existence in the brains of survivors, especially of the loving and loved. But it was not a survival of an incoherent and subordinate kind. On the contrary, it was dominant and integrating in its activity, manifesting itself at first in overwhelming apparitions or christophanies to the few with whom intimate spiritual relations had been established, and—later—in the organisation of the Christian Church and the gradual transformation of the world. The apostolic doctrine of the Church as the “Body” of Christ shows that this theory of an *indwelling* Risen Saviour was

preached from the earliest Christian days, even though apparently combined with the hardly compatible doctrine of a (glorified) corporeal existence beyond the skies or in a transcendental world. Even aside from considerations of *a priori* probability (the force of which, however, is overwhelming), the "higher criticism" of the New Testament tends to suggest that the life of the Risen Christ was in the brains of the disciples and was unconnected with the Body which perished on the Cross. More especially, the light thrown by the "Pseudo-Peter" fragment on the probable ending of St. Mark's Gospel suggests powerfully that no phenomena connected with the Empty Grave at Jerusalem availed to completely dispel the gloom of the apostolic band, but that their despair was turned to triumphant joy and steadfast conviction by subsequent christophanies in *Galilee*.

XIV. THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

This dominant or "resurrection" posthumous life, brought into or restored to the world by Jesus Christ, is not confined exclusively to him, but can be ultimately attained (by appropriation) by all those who assimilate the primitive altruism which He came to restore and is restoring on a higher plane. The apostolic church which He organised did attain it (in the persons of its best members) as anticipated, and has been influencing with Him the course of history ever since, the so-called "Christian Churches" of later times—the descendants of those *not* fitted to take part in this supernormal influence,—being simply the most conspicuous, and in some respects the most efficient, of the many instruments used by the true and now invisible Christian Church which achieves its purposes from the vantage-ground of our "transliminal" brain faculties. This view harmonises (in *part*) with the Catholic doctrine of an already existing "Church Triumphant" in the heavenly or "resurrection"-world, although it takes a (relatively) less exalted view than Catholicity requires of the position and functions of

the so-called "Church Militant." It, on the contrary, maintains that the "Church Triumphant" is the *real* militant Church, and that she acts powerfully through secular and political agencies as well as through ecclesiastical organisations and the other agencies that are distinctively labelled "religious." On this view, the unique and wonderful history of the *visible* Catholic Church since apostolic times, becomes a testimony less to the truth of the specific claims of the outward organisation than to the heavenly rule of that Invisible Church which has inspired her and watched over her. In fact on this hypothesis, and on this hypothesis alone (so far as the present writer can see), both the good and the evil in historic visible churches is adequately accounted for,—the good by inspiration from the true Apostolic Church behind the veil, and the evil by non-identity of these visible "churches" with that true Church which Christ Himself founded and by their (partial) historic discontinuity with the latter. Catholic theology itself, by the distinctions it draws between the "Church Triumphant," the "Church Expectant," and the "Church Militant," is committed to a belief having a certain degree of affinity with the foregoing view, and has even (in a measure) enshrined it in her creed in the mysterious clause "The Communion of Saints"; while New Testament eschatology, with its insistence on an almost *immediate* establishment of the "Kingdom of Heaven" as the result of a Second "Advent," is (it seems to the writer) incompatible with any other view. Unless the apocalypticism of Christ and the New Testament is entirely erroneous, the "Church Triumphant" has been in existence in the unseen world throughout the post-apostolic Christian centuries (and this indeed is Catholic doctrine): but it follows from the Parable of the "Ten Virgins" that the Catholic is not the successor of the Apostolic Church in quite the sense or to quite the extent that she claims to be. Indeed, *some* diminution of authority would be generally admitted.

XV. CHRISTIAN COMMUNISM

The final end to which human progress is directed by the "Church Triumphant" is a universal restoration and perfection of that union of hearts which existed, in an imperfect and consequently precarious and unstable form, in the original tribe—a state of things where each individual regards the welfare of all other sentient existence as having *pro tanto* equal claims with his own, and feels and acts accordingly. The Ethic implied is that of the "Golden Rule," which is explicitly stated by Christ to be the true basis of morality (Matthew vii. 12) and which He also makes the single test at the Judgment-assize described in Matthew xxv. 31–46. Both the theology and the ethics here contended for, excluding those propositions which relate to pre-Christian stages of existence, have been almost exhaustively expounded by John H. Noyes, the founder of that Communistic Society which was based on the theology referred to and which carried out most nearly the ethical principles which Christianity is gradually restoring. The most recent political and social developments (the movements toward national and international fraternity, the crusade for the protection of Womanhood and the support or endowment of Motherhood, and for the Rights of the Unborn) tend powerfully to confirm this forecast.

XVI. COSMIC CATASTROPHES AND THE FUTURE

The main feature in which the Christian or enlightened altruism of the future must differ from the crude altruism or primeval solidarity of the tribe, is that it must energetically foster, instead of handicapping, those discoveries in Science and inventions in Technics on which the human (or, what is probably the same thing so far as the *early* future is concerned, the *divine*) conquest of the cosmos depends. For although, by automatic selection, the solar system has probably

acquired an almost inconceivable degree of stability (the high present grade of terrestrial life being, indeed, *due* to that stability), yet, in the absence of intelligent interference, the ultimate overthrow of all that lifts us above the inorganic chaos is only a question of time; and though mere *posthumous* existence has long been achieved, it still remains for Intelligence to conquer for us that *immortality* which it has been able to guarantee.

The central thought underlying the essays which are here summarised, may thus be described as the synthesis of an Epicurean (though panpsychist) view of natural *origins* with a strictly Christian view of human and cosmic *destinies*.

APPENDIX F

HISTORICAL DATA RELATIVE TO THE BIRTH OF CHRIST

[A NATURALISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE THESIS THAT THE
INCARNATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THE
VIRGIN-BIRTH]

*Being a Naturalistic View of the Incarnation suggested by
DR. ERICH BISCHOFF, the eminent "Toldoth-Jeschu" expert,
viz. his pronouncement (published in 1904) on the recent
controversy between Prof. Ernst Haeckel and Prof.
Friedrich Loofs of Halle respecting the historic value of
the Talmudic and "Toldoth-Jeschu" Jesus-stories, with
Annotations by F. W. FRANKLAND.*

"Et Verbum caro factum est."—John i. 14.

"I COME now to the chief point in dispute between Haeckel and Loofs, the historical truth regarding the birth of Jesus. I may without presumption claim the right to pronounce an opinion on this subject, as well as on the views of the two disputants, for I know the Biblical, patristic, and Talmudic sources in the original, and, above all, with my honoured collaborateur, Professor Krauss,¹ I am the only modern expert in the Jewish *Toldoth-Jeschu* literature,

¹ The Buda-Pesth expert and scholar who has published the recent "*Leben Jesu nach jüdischen Quellen*" ("Life of Jesus according to Jewish Sources"). His monograph seeks to accomplish the work that has been waiting for centuries (delayed no doubt by the painful scurrility of some of the ancient and medieval Jesus-stories), viz. a scientific appraisalment of the historic value and bearing of Jewish sidelights on the life of Christ.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

whether edited or unedited. Now, in my judgment, Professor Haeckel is wrong in thinking that the paternity of Joseph 'is excluded by the testimony of the canonical Gospels themselves.' If the miraculous be eliminated from Matthew, there remains the following: Mary and Joseph were betrothed, and as such enjoyed marital rights and duties. According to Jewish custom, betrothal might take place by a simple declaration, or even simply by a carnal act (*Kiddushin*, 2a, 6a). Still this method of betrothal, which was often revealed only by the advance of pregnancy, was frequently punished by the Rabbis with scourging (*ibid.* 12b), as they sanctioned intercourse only after the betrothal had received the religious benediction (*Kallah ad init.*). Now Joseph, according to Matthew's¹ representation, is a 'Dikaïos' (*Zaddiq*, a strict observer of the law), who, in order to escape 'Church discipline' for their informal betrothal and its consequences, prefers² to separate

¹ Although the narratives of canonical "Matthew" do not give evidence, like those of Luke, that the author (or rather, the *editor*, of this combination of an abridged Mark with "Q" and supplementary data) had endeavoured to make a careful historical research, they are nevertheless entitled to much consideration owing to their probably superior antiquity. This antiquity is almost *guaranteed* (as regards the bulk of this very systematic and even somewhat "churchy" gospel) by, among many other internal evidences, the "euthcos" ("immediately") of chapter xxiv. 29, an expression which would argue a carelessness almost inconceivable in an author writing at any considerable interval after 70 A.D. This argument for a date not later than 75 A.D. at the very latest is now admitted, or rather *asserted*, by Harnack and some others of the best critics.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² If so, his type of character and legalistic idiosyncrasies seem to have been at any rate partially reproduced in his son "James, the brother of the Lord." For, in the earliest *undisputed* Talmudic reference to Jesus, a certain "Jacob" (= James) is credited with the transmission to a prominent Jewish Rabbi (? *circa* 60 A.D.) of a saying uttered by Jesus the Nazarene ("Jeschu ha Notzri"). This saying, while strictly in harmony with the spiritual bias here attributed by Dr. Bischoff to Joseph, is diametrically opposed to the spirit of Jesus (Luke vii. 26-50; John viii. 11). What more likely than that James, the brother of Jesus—the James whose legalism is so strongly evidenced in a Pauline epistle—should really have been the source of this maxim for the Rabbi, but that here, as in some other connections, he should have shown a profound misunderstanding of that Brother

secretly from his betrothed, but is restrained from doing so by the dream. Nor is there anything in Luke (if we put aside the supernatural)¹ to prevent our supposing that, after the annunciation by the angel, perhaps as a result of the impression it produced (i.e. between i. 38 and 39), intercourse, which, as explained above, was perfectly legitimate, took place between Mary and her betrothed. Even on this 'human' interpretation, abundant room is left for the action of the Holy Ghost,² especially in relation to Mary's permanent virginity of soul,³ which is of such importance. Strange as this irregularity in Joseph's marriage may appear to Western habits of thought, Jewish enemies could find no fault with the birth of Jesus as a result of such intercourse. To declare Jesus' birth illegitimate, they would have to impute adultery to Mary, whom they consistently regard as either the wedded wife or, what is precisely equivalent, the betrothed of Joseph. This is done in the assertion of Simon ben Azzai (about 100 A.D.) reproduced in the Talmud (*J'ramoth*, iv. 13=fol. 49a), in which Simon appeals to a *Sepher Tholdoth* (Register of Births), which he professes to have seen in Jerusalem. 'Simon ben Azzai said I found in Jerusalem a *Sepher Tholdoth* in which was

and Master in Whom he did not even *believe* (John vii. 5) during the Ministry of Humiliation?—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ The textual soundness of Luke i. 34, the only passage in our third canonical gospel which could even *seem* to imply (putting aside the artistic *crescendo* from the smaller physical miracle in connection with the Baptist's birth) a Parthenogenesis, has been disputed, and is in any case contra-indicated by the genealogy of *Joseph* in chapter ii.—F. W. F.

² In fact, on Dr. Bischoff's view, the whole Story of the Infancy is in harmony with the hypothesis which I have put forward elsewhere, that the theocratic providential government of mankind is carried on exclusively in the "transliminal" section of human brain-activities.—F. W. F.

³ The deep impression of this is to be traced along two wholly divergent and almost opposite paths of tradition. On the one hand, in the Catholic Church the belief in the perpetual *physical* virginity of Mary soon became almost a dogma: and, at the opposite extreme, the Toldoth Jeschu, with all its slanders, has one story vindicating, by an elaborate narration of alleged incidents, the moral guiltlessness of Mary in spite of the assumed irregularity in the birth of Jesus.—F. W. F.

written, *That man*¹ (=Jesus) is the bastard of a married woman.' Genealogical collections of documents of this kind were important for furnishing evidence of qualification for the priestly status, &c., and were provided with all kinds of details more or less closely connected therewith (cf. Laible, *Jesus Christus im Talmud*, p. 31). Herod I, probably to obliterate the traces of his humble birth and to break the ancestral pride of the Jews (Hamburger, *Real-Enc. f. Bib. u. Talm.*, ii. 294), is said to have destroyed all such registers existing in his time (Eusebius, *H. E.* 1, 7, 5; cf. Talmud, P'sachim, 62b). Now, as Herod died in 44 A.D., Ben Azzai evidently means to represent the *Sepher Tholdoth* found by him as one which had escaped this piece of vandalism on Herod's part, and therefore as one dating from the Herodian epoch, i.e. completed soon after Jesus' birth, and thus a contemporary document. The passage cited is, in any case, one of the earliest statements in the Talmud about Jesus, for it stands in the Mischnah;² while the later details (especially the one on which the accusation of Celsus is based, viz. 'Ben Stada'³ = Ben Stratiota = Soldier's son; cf. G. Rösch, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1873, pp. 77-155) date only from the time of Akiba, i.e.

¹ If we could be certain that this passage really does refer to the Founder of Christianity, and the well-known Talmudic equivalents "Balaam" and "that man" undoubtedly suggest it, it would on account of its early date be a stronger corroboration of the historic existence of Jesus than any other extra-canonical Jewish reference excepting only the allusion in Josephus (if, unlike the longer interpolated passage, it is genuine—as I believe it to be) to the martyr James as "brother of Jesus the so-called Christ."—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² The other Talmudic references to Jesus (at all events all the undisputed ones) are in the so-called "Gemara," and the mere lateness of the dates at which this latter compilation was put together detracts greatly from the historic value of these references,—a historic value which is still further discounted by their contradictory character.—F. W. F.

³ Jesus is variously spoken of in the Talmud as Ben Pandera and Ben Stada, and also as the son of Pappus. It is expressly stated that Ben Pandera and Ben Stada are identical, though a medieval Jewish (non-Christian) commentator says that they are *not*, and that only *one* of them is identical with the Founder of Christianity. To me it seems most probable that no less than *two* other Jesuses have been confused by Talmudic writers

about the middle¹ of the second century A.D. (cf. Laible, p. 89).

"It is the brief notice in the above-mentioned Talmudic *Sepher Tholdoth*—a parallel to the words of the Jews in chap. ii. of the Gospel of Nicodemus, 'Thou wast begotten in sin' (Tischendorf, *Ev. apocr.*, ed. ii. 291)—which has expanded *viâ* 'Ben Stada' and 'Ben Pandira' in the Talmud into the assertion² of Celsus that the centurion, Joseph Pandera,³ was the father of Jesus.

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(perhaps purposely) with our Lord, viz. (a) a Jesus, son of the soldier Pandera, hanged at Jerusalem in the reign of Alexander Jannæus (*circa* 100 B.C.); and (b) a Jesus, son of Pappus, stoned to death at Lydda in the days of Rabbi Akiba, many years after the foundation of Christianity. John M. Robertson, who denies to our faith a Personal Founder, was once in my opinion on the right track, namely when he framed his transitional (and not entirely abandoned) hypothesis that the solution of these enigmas lies in a *succession* of Jesuses.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ Rabbi Akiba was martyred about 135 A.D. in extreme old age (according to legend he reached the age of 120 years!), as a result, according to the common tradition (though this view is disputed by the learned writer of Art. "*Akiba*" in the "Jewish Encyclopædia"), of his enthusiastic advocacy of Bar Cocebas as Messiah in the insurrection against Hadrian. But it would be hard to prove that the "*Gemara*" Jesus-stories have even *his* degree of antiquity.—F. W. F.

² To be explained, on my view, by supposing that Celsus (*circa* 160 A.D.), in the course of the inquiries which we have evidence that he made among Jews, came upon undoubted traces of a Jesus the son of Joseph and also of a Jesus the son of Pandera, and that he (whether in good faith or in dishonest malice) confounded them.—F. W. F.

³ G. R. S. Mead, in his fair-minded but ultra-sceptical work "Did Jesus live 100 B.C.?" makes the point that the Pandera story agrees better with the date 100 B.C. than with the Pilate-date. Believing, however, in a *plurality* of Palestinian victims of execution named Jesus, I should not myself regard this as even a straw pointing away from the Pilate-date were it not for the fact, pointed out to me by my friend Mr. John Gammell, B.A., that the *Aretas* reference in 2nd Corinthians is most naturally understood as referring to a time anterior to Roman occupation. But in view of the negative evidence of coins (see Art. "*Aretas*" in "Encyclopædia Biblica") this circumstance is far from being conclusive, and quite recently Wellhausen has given his weighty pronouncement for an *Aretas*-date in harmony with ordinary New Testament chronology (the question hinges partly on the probability, or improbability, of certain dealings with the Nabathæan kingdom by Tiberius and Caligula respectively). Still, it seems to me the most respectable piece of evidence in favour of the "Jannæus-date," so dear to some of the opponents of Christianity, that has yet been

"Considering the all but absolute incapacity of the Talmudists for dealing with history,¹ Haeckel's position in regarding such a piece of Talmudic gossip as an 'historical statement,' nay, as the only historical detail we have about Jesus' real parentage (because he believes that in the Gospels Joseph is represented merely as Jesus' 'stepfather'), is in my opinion untenable.

"I maintain that traces of the *Tholdoth Jeschu* can be proved to have existed as early² as about 800 A.D., and that some of the extant versions go back to the eleventh or twelfth century. The treatise of Professor Krauss on the whole *Tholdoth* literature, which may be expected next year, will prove, indeed, that certain elements reach much further back.³ Nay more, inasmuch as the *Tholdoth Jeschu* contains many Talmudic statements about Jesus which the

produced. If it could be proved that Paul's Jesus, so far as he was not an abstract Saviour-God, was an obscure thaumaturg and "speechless sacrifice" as J. M. Robertson calls him, done to death in the reign of Alexander Jannæus, and leaving neither life-story nor identifiable teaching behind him, the substance of the Christian Faith would indeed be clouded; and the accepted view of its historic origin would be shattered to pieces.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ This ought, of itself, to negative the attempts which have sometimes been made to upset evangelical statements respecting the life of Jesus by conflicting Talmudic statements. These latter are, in addition, much later than the evangelical statements, and their authors do not show the same absorbing interest in getting at the truth that Christian believers had. Let apologists for the Talmud attempt to elaborate a web of "undesigned coincidences" that shall parallel Paley's "*Horæ Paulinæ*"!—F. W. F.

² The lateness of some recensions does not in the least militate against this conclusion, for, as Dr. Bishoff elsewhere says, "down to our own day Russian and other Jews pass their leisure hours in the composition of similar elegant literature."—F. W. F.

³ One all-important element, relating to the Jewish explanation of the emptiness of Christ's tomb on Easter morning, can demonstrably be carried back to the time of Tertullian (*circa* 200 A.D.), being alluded to in the "*De Spectaculis*" of that author; while the so-called "Mamzer" stories (*i.e.* stories of an alleged illegitimate birth) reach, as we have seen, to the still higher antiquity of Celsus (*circa* 160 A.D., probably, though it has been argued with plausibility from data in Origen that Celsus wrote in the *first* half of the second century).—F. W. F.

State-censor has struck out of editions of the Talmud since the seventeenth century, one might say *cum grano salis* that they may be employed to confirm the statements which Celsus has drawn from the Talmudists."

EDITORIAL COMMENT.—If Dr. Bischoff's theory of the Incarnation be true, how it re-consecrates Nature's great sacrament, and what a rebuke it administers (especially when taken in conjunction with the *ancestry* of Messiah—see Matt. i. 3, 5, and 6) to the savage inhumanity of current ethical judgments! It also constitutes the most impressive assertion of the majesty and the unbroken continuity of Physical Law. As with the Exit of Christ's earthly life, so with the Entrance upon it, all the miracles (whether the Annunciation and the singing of the Heavenly Choir, the Voice from Heaven at baptism, or the overwhelming and convincing Resurrection appearances which established the Christian Church)—however wonderful they both seem and *are*—are on this view purely cerebral phenomena which would never have affected a phonograph or a photographic plate, and the Greatest of all Events was consummated in obedience to adamantine Law and without breaking a single strand in the Web of Physical (*i.e.* Logical) Causation.—
F. W. FRANKLAND.

APPENDIX G

THE "JOHANNINE" PROBLEM:

A FEW THOUGHTS RELATING TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE
FOURTH GOSPEL

PART I

SUPERIOR ARCHÆOLOGICAL ACCURACY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

(THE JOHANNINE ACCOUNT OF THE DATE OF THE
CRUCIFIXION MUST BE THE CORRECT ONE.)

Extracted, with Annotations by F. W. FRANKLAND, from
"The Gospel According to St. John: An Inquiry into
its Genesis and Historical Value" (by DR. H. H. WENDT,
Professor in the University of Jena).

ACCORDING to the fourth evangelist, *Jesus was crucified on that day on the evening of which the Jews ate the Passover, that is, on the 14th Nisan* (xviii. 28). But according to the synoptic view, based on Mark, Jesus kept the Passover meal with His disciples on the evening before His death (Mark xiv. 12 and parallels,) so that would be on the 15th Nisan.¹ This is a case where the *record in the Fourth Gospel*

¹ As has been pointed out by Chwolson (a very competent Jewish expert whose interest in the question is purely archæological), it is possible that Jesus and His disciples may (on *this* occasion at all events) have anticipated the regular Passover by a day. Dr. Chwolson adduces special reasons for such anticipation in the particular year of the Passion. In view of all the archæological data, it appears to the present writer most probable that

may claim the greater internal probability.¹ How are we to explain the haste with which events were hurried forward after the arrest of Jesus? He was arrested late in the evening; tried by night before the Sanhedrin; taken at daybreak before Pilate; the execution itself followed immediately on the sentence, and the burial upon the death. It can only be understood if we suppose that the arrest of Jesus, which was made possible by Judas' treachery, happened on the evening of the 13th Nisan; the utmost haste would then be needed to bring the whole trial, execution, and burial to an end before the beginning of the Feast, that is, before sunset on the 14th Nisan. On the other hand, it is most improbable that strict formalists such as were the Jewish leaders would bring about the arrest on the evening of the 14th Nisan after the solemn Passover meal; and would hold the trial, wring from Pilate the final sentence, and press for an immediate crucifixion, all upon the ensuing first day of the Feast, for which a full Sabbath observance was prescribed by the law (Ex. xii. 16). The notice in Mark (xv. 46), that Joseph of Arimathea bought fine linen to enwrap the body of Jesus, is a piece of evidence furnished by Mark itself in favour of the Johannine record.²

assuming A.D. 29 as the year of the Crucifixion (unless the recent astronomical arguments in favour of A.D. 33 should be held to prevail), our Lord and His disciples ate the Passover meal (perhaps in accordance with a custom apparently practised by a minority of the nation) on the 13th Nisan. The Crucifixion itself, it would seem, must in any case have taken place on the 14th Nisan.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ The Talmud also agrees on this point with the Fourth Gospel as against what is at least *apparently* (but see preceding footnote) the implication of the Synoptics.—F. W. F.

² The writer of article "Jesus of Nazareth" in the *Jewish Encyclopædia* very justly points out that the Fourth Evangelist appears to have had access to specially reliable sources for the history of Christ's last days. This harmonises with the Church tradition and Patristic testimony, which derive the Fourth Gospel from the "beloved disciple" John of Ephesus. whether this latter was the Galilean fisherman-apostle of that name or whether he had been a young *Judean* disciple with high-priestly connections (*vide* John xviii. 15, 16; and the statement of Polycrates, Bishop of *Ephesus* only two generations after the death of St. John, that the "beloved disciple" who leaned on the Lord's bosom at the Last Supper wore the "high-priestly *petalon*"; also

At midnight on the 15th Nisan such a purchase can hardly have been possible.

the recently disinterred evidence tending to show that the *Galilean* John was martyred like his brother James in accordance with our Lord's prediction in Mark x. 39 and "Matthew" xx. 23), and whether the Ephesian St. John actually wrote the Gospel as we have it now or whether he was only the source whose disjointed memoirs were edited by other hands. The last-named supposition seems preferable in view (among other reasons) of such indications of imperfect acquaintance (on the part of the *final editor*) with Palestinian custom as are furnished by the glosses "He must needs go through Samaria" (John iv. 4) and "being the high priest *that same year*" (John xi. 49). Moreover, in John xix. 35 the writer seems to *distinguish* himself from the eye-witness whose testimony he is adducing—thus lending support to the hypothesis that our Gospel is a *compilation*—though one which is mainly based on the testimony of an eye-witness to many of the facts which it records. The present writer has received a letter (dated 13th April, 1909) from the eminent Biblical critic Prof. P. W. Schmiedel of Zürich, writer of the article "John the Son of Zebedee" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* and author of the recently-translated work "The Johannine Writings," stating that this hypothesis of a distinction (in the Fourth Gospel) between editor and source "receives considerable support" from the recent (1907 and 1908) "daring researches of Wellhausen and the philologist Eduard Schwartz." See also the just published (June 1911) work of Professor Wendt, "Die Schichten im vierten Evangelium" ("The Strata in the Fourth Gospel"), which emphatically vindicates the authenticity of the chief *sayings* in the Fourth Gospel as—in substance, though not in *form*—genuine sayings of Jesus, written down a good many decades later by the beloved eye-witness to whose testimony the editor or redactor of the Gospel appeals in xix. 35 and elsewhere. In this work Wendt, among other things, weighs carefully the literary and philological labours of Wellhausen and Schwartz which Schmiedel refers to.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

PART II

THE FOURTH GOSPEL BASED ON RECOLLECTIONS OF EYE-WITNESSES

*Extracted by F. W. FRANKLAND (with Annotations) from
"The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief" by
PROFESSOR FISHER, LL.D., of Yale University.*

WE have now to test the character of the Fourth Gospel by a more detailed scrutiny of its contents. We have seen that, according to the theory of which Baur was the most eminent sponsor, this Gospel was the development of a theological idea, fervently cherished by the unknown author, yet appropriated by him from Alexandrian sources and interwoven by him both with imaginary teachings of Jesus and with allegorical facts likewise imaginary.

The first question is whether the narrative portions of the gospel furnish a proof for this theory. Not to dwell on the strain which is required in so many instances to match the allegory to the narrative, the theory is confuted by the *abundant evidences of a distinct historical feeling and point of view on the part of the writer*. No critic has shown this more effectively than Rénan, despite his *à priori* incredulity in respect to everything that partakes of the miraculous.¹

Before citing some of his observations, certain of the indirect indications that the Evangelist speaks from personal recollection may be pointed out. "And it was at Jerusalem at the Feast of the Dedication, and it was winter. And Jesus walked in the temple in Solomon's porch" (x. 22, 23). *Why should it be mentioned that Jesus was in*

¹ *Vie de Jesus*, 13th ed. Appendix.

this porch? Nothing in the context called for it. How account for its being mentioned except on the supposition that the scene was pictured in the author's¹ memory? Stating this fact, he must needs explain to heathen readers why Jesus walked in this sheltered place: "it was winter." The festival occurred in December. When Mary anointed the feet of Jesus, "the house was filled with the odour of the ointment" (xii. 3).² A similar personal reminiscence is in John viii. 20. The brazen chests constituting the "treasury" the author³ had seen. The image of Jesus as He stood near them was stamped on his memory. Why should he refer to "Ænon," where John was baptizing, as being "near to Salim" (iii. 23)? Why should he describe the pool at Jerusalem as being by the sheep-gate,⁴ as called in the Hebrew "Bethesda," and as having five porches (v. 2)? Why give the number of porches? Chronological statements, some of them defining not only the day but the hour, are frequent. They come in, not as if they had been picked up to be wrought in, but as a spontaneous reminiscence. "It was about the tenth hour" (i. 39); "For John was not yet cast into prison" (iii. 24)—these are examples. For what reason is Philip designated (xii. 21) as "of Bethsaida of Galilee," when the connected incident does not call for any such local specification? What reason is there for adding to the statement that Pilate sat down in his judgment-seat

¹ Or in the memory of one from whom the author, directly or indirectly, drew information.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² In the account of a landing of certain passengers from the *Mayflower* before the whole company disembarked at Plymouth, it is said that while on the land they filled their boat with juniper. The writer says of the juniper, it "smelled very sweet and strong," and "we burnt the most part of it while we lay there"—a feature in the description which shows of itself that he was one of them.

³ Or some one to whose recollections the author had direct or indirect access.—F. W. F.

⁴ In this case the use of the *present tense* establishes a certain degree of probability (see Professor Blass's "Philology of the Gospels") that the narrative was penned before the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in 70 A.D. This presumption, however, would apply only to the notes of the Ephesian John on which the existing Gospel was ultimately based.—F. W. F.

the remark that the place "is called the pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha"? *What can this be but an instance of local description, natural in referring to a spot where a man has witnessed a memorable event? What reason¹ for the mention of the visit of Jesus to Capernaum (John ii. 12) save as a personal reminiscence?*²

Whence came particulars so exact, upon Philip, upon the country of Andrew, and especially about Nathanael? Nathanael belongs to this Gospel alone. I cannot regard traits so precise which pertain to him as inventions originating a hundred years after the time of Jesus, and far away from Palestine. If he is a symbolic personage, *why does the writer take the trouble to inform us that he is of Cana of Galilee, a city which the Evangelist appears to be particularly well acquainted with?*

Why should our Evangelist speak repeatedly of Cana of Galilee, a small city, extremely obscure? Why should he want

¹ It is believed that the masters of the use of *irrelevant* detail for heightening vraisemblance can be counted on the fingers of one hand. I can call to mind only three—Daniel Defoe, Sheridan Le Fanu, and Herbert G. Wells. This highest art of illusion is something very different from the insertion of graphic and interesting but strictly *relevant* details which is so marked a feature of some of the apocryphal gospels. And that seems to me the true rejoinder to the argument based on the apocryphal gospels in the work of Principal James Drummond, who asserts the apostolic *authorship* but denies the historical *character* of the Fourth Gospel. Aside from the masters of irrelevant detail whom I have named, the great geniuses of Literature—who can be extremely graphic and picturesque in giving *relevant* details, *i.e.* details cohering in an artistic unity with the rest of the narrative—are very apt, when they *do* occasionally introduce an "irrelevant" detail, to be drawing on *actual fact* (sometimes autobiographical), as in the case of the "willow-wand" episode in George Eliot's "Adam Bede." The "relevant" detail often gratifies the natural curiosity of the reader by answering a question which that curiosity as naturally prompts, but the "irrelevant" one generally answers a question which no reader would have thought of asking.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² See on John ii. 12 Dr. Dwight's note in the translation of Godet's *Commentary*. The passage in John reads, "After this He [Jesus] went down to Capernaum, He and His mother, and His brother, and His disciples; and there they abode not many days." The bare fact of this visit is stated *with no assigning of a motive for it, or of anything that occurred. To make anything out of this statement but a historical recollection is a desperate undertaking.*

to create, too late, celebrity for this little borough, which certainly semi-Gnostic Christians of Asia Minor had no motive for remembering?

The whole passage from ch. i. to ch. iv. 2 appears to Rénan¹ to be *stamped with tokens of historical truth. He mentions specially the topographical references.* Of ch. iv. 3-6 he does not hesitate to say that "*none but a Jew of Palestine who has often passed to the entrance of the Valley of Sychem could have written this.*"

The verses vii. 1-10 are a little historical treasure. It is here that the symbolic and dogmatic explanation is completely at fault. . . . After this, how can it be said that the personages of the Fourth Gospel are types, invented characters, and not *living beings in flesh and blood*?

¹ Rénan is often struck with *marks of historical verity in the Gospel.*

REMARKS BY F. W. FRANKLAND

I. The writer of the Second and Third "Johannine" Epistles speaks of himself as the "Elder" or "Presbyter," and is therefore not improbably identical with the "Presbyter John" from whom, among other contemporaries of the apostles, Papias claims to have, either directly or indirectly, got access to oral traditions which made him better informed than those who relied chiefly on written gospels. This John the Presbyter was an eyewitness of the ministry of Jesus, though perhaps only in boyhood, and chiefly of the portion of it spent in Jerusalem. (According to the most definite account that has reached us, though it is no early or reliable one, the Ephesian John died in the year 101 A.D., at the age of ninety-three. This would make him just twenty-one in the year of the Crucifixion, if that great year was A.D. 29, as seems most likely.) If, therefore, he was one of the authors of the First "Johannine" Epistle, we can well comprehend the plural form of the sentences: "That which was from the beginning, which *we* have heard, which *we* have seen with our eyes, which *we* have looked upon, and *our* hands have handled, of the Word of life," &c. (1 John i. 1, 3, 5). Similarly, in the Fourth Gospel, we perhaps have personal recollections of Andrew and other friends of the "beloved disciple" as well as of the beloved disciple himself—"the disciple which testifieth these things, and wrote these things" (John xxi. 24). In the Muratorian Fragment the name of Andrew is associated with that of John in connection with the alleged authorship of the work, and John i. 35-40 tends to show that these two very earliest disciples of our Lord were intimately connected. Perhaps at his death the Apostle Andrew may have urged this surviving disciple John to place on record some of their joint reminiscences: and, as

already stated, John v. 2 presents internal evidence of having been originally noted down before the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus.

2. The philosophical writer or writers who edited the aged Presbyter's notes may have contributed to suffuse them with a metaphysic of Good and Evil, of Light and Darkness, undoubtedly identical with that which Jesus had preached (as the Synoptic Gospels testify), though (unlike the Synoptic "Logia") expressed largely in their own *language* and perhaps also that of the "beloved disciple" himself (*vide* the First Epistle), and not in that of Jesus. We ought, perhaps, not to ignore the possibility that Gaius and the Alogi (all of whom, it is believed by some scholars of eminence, were Catholics in good standing) may not have been entirely wrong in attributing the Fourth Gospel to heretical sources. The heretic Cerinthus, to whom the Alogi attributed this Gospel, was indeed, according to tradition, an enemy of the Ephesian John (here assumed to be identical with the "Presbyter" and distinct from the Galilean fisherman-Apostle of that name, who, according to various concurrent evidences, must probably have been martyred by the Jews at an earlier period of the apostolic age, though most likely not at as early an epoch as his brother James—*see* Acts xii.); but the possibility may not be precluded that, with the boldness and initiative characteristic of the greatest heretics, he may have been the first—or one of the first—to weld the notes and reminiscences of this aged John, and perhaps of some of his companions (Andrew or others), into a connected whole, however loth the Catholic Church may at first have been to accept the result of his labours. Though we know little of Cerinthus, what we do know makes it nearly certain that the Gospel cannot have reached us in the shape in which (on this hypothesis) it left his hands. There must have been one or more revisions by Catholic authorities or Catholic scribes; and the difference in attitude between Tatian's "Apology" and his subsequent "Diatesseron" suggests that such prunings or revisions, possibly by quite undistinguished though orthodox men, may have gone on for a long while after the death of St. John the Divine (chapter xvi. was presumably added *very shortly* after his death). How imperative such prunings or revisions must have been becomes startlingly evident if we accept P. C. Sense's reconstruction ["The Origin of the Fourth Gospel," by P. C. Sense, M.A.: Williams and Norgate, 1899] of the original Cerinthian draft, according to which that heretic had the audacity to falsify the facts as to the "spear-thrust" in the interest of his theory that the "Dove" or Holy Spirit left our Saviour at the Crucifixion. No wonder the attestation of the true (or approximately true) facts is so emphatic and so vehement in John xix. 35! That there have been revisions or rearrangements of some sort has been strongly suggested recently by Wellhausen ["Das Evangelium Johannis." Berlin: Georg. Reimer, 1908], who insists among other things on the almost obvious connection between John xiv. 31 and John xviii. 1—a connection which compels us to admit as probable that chapters xv., xvi., and xvii. did not originally stand in their present position. A heretical origin from a personal antagonist of St. John, and the undistinguished personality of some or all of the Catholic revisers, would account for the unauthoritative position which this Gospel seems to have occupied during the earlier half of the second century (cf. the slighting reference of Papias to written gospels and the extremely scanty and doubtful use made

of the Fourth Gospel by Justin Martyr as compared with his copious references to the Synoptics under the title "Memoirs of the Apostles"), though immediately after that period (when oral tradition had become almost extinct and documentary data consequently attained a *priceless* value) the Church rightly recognised that she had an inestimable treasure in this masterpiece, and one which, in its ultimate origin, was substantially Johannine. Indeed, on the hypothesis here contended for, the Catholic "revisions" would doubtless largely have been the *restoration* of Johannine features which had been distorted in the original Cerinthian draft.

3. These considerations, bearing as they do merely on the relation between our Fourth Gospel and the reminiscences of the Ephesian John, of course do not in any way prejudice the further question *as to the identity of the Ephesian John himself*. Those who attach conclusive value to Church tradition, unanimous on this point from the third century onwards (though *not*, as Von Soden points out, vouched for in any *explicit* manner by second-century writings), and who resist the evidence of the De Boor fragment, of the early Christian festivals, and of our Lord's recorded prediction (Mark x. 39), may continue to see in him "the son of thunder," the fisherman-Apostle of Bethsaida, the younger son of Galilean Zebedee. And it must, in fairness, be admitted that the fiery spirit of a Boanerges (prone by nature to intolerance) does show itself in the Johannine Apocalypse and even—in a softened form—in the First Johannine Epistle; nor is it absent from all the stories told about the Ephesian John—Apostle of Love though he pre-eminently was. But on this generally accepted hypothesis of the identity of Polycarp's and Irenaeus's "John" with the younger son of Zebedee, it is passing strange that the Fourth Gospel records hardly any facts about our Lord's Galilean ministry not already contained in the Synoptics, although it contains such a wealth of new material about His ministry in Jerusalem and the neighbourhood. How much more likely that the "beloved disciple" (? the mysterious "Prester John" of folk-lore) should have been a cadet (identified conjecturally by Rev. Latimer Jackson with the "rich young man" of the Synoptics) of a Hierosolymite high-priestly family (cf. John xviii. 15, 16)—a young disciple of John the Baptist who had connections with Cana and with the Galilean Andrew (and, through him, with his brother Simon Peter)! Doubtless he was occasionally with the Master in Galilee, as at the Feeding of the Five Thousand (cf. the minute details recorded in John vi.), which, unless there is some even more naturalistic explanation as Edwin A. Abbott and others have urged, I take to have been a gigantic act of (unconscious) *hypnotism*, analogous to the (so-called) "miracles" which seem to have marked the rise of the recent Babist religion in Persia. But it is reasonable to suppose that such a priestly cadet ordinarily lived with his parents in Jerusalem, and that he was the ardent young pioneer of what afterwards became a great priestly movement towards recognition of our Lord's Messiahship (see Acts vi. 7). The sacred trust evidenced in John xix. 26, 27, as well as the beloved disciple's presence at the Cross, would make entirely in favour of this hypothesis, were it not for the fact that there is some ground (in the combination of John xix. 25 with Mark xv. 40) for the presumption that Salome was a sister of our Lord's Mother. But is it likely that Salome's younger son could be said *at that time* to have a "home" of his own (if the Greek term implies as much) *at Jerusalem* (*vide* John xix. 27)? At the same time I do not here forget that recent investigations into

the probable chronological order of events have tended toward the conclusion that our Lord's ministry in Judæa may have been continuous and, as a whole, subsequent to the Galilean ministry to a greater extent than the present structure of the Fourth Gospel would imply (for instance, it now seems very probable that the events of John v. are really posterior to those of John vi.). This makes it somewhat less unlikely than it otherwise would be that these two brothers, James and John, may already for some months before the fatal Passover Week have had a domicile in Jerusalem.

4. One of the most interesting considerations arising from a change in our opinion as to the identity of the Ephesian John is as to which of the final occurrences related in the Fourth Gospel he may have personally witnessed if he was not one of the "Twelve." Probably we must hold that the eye-witness (if merely a Judæan priestly cadet) was present at the Last Supper, the Cross, the Holy Sepulchre, and the Gennesaret Christophany of chapter xxi.; but not at the resuscitation of Lazarus (in connection with which, as Wendt has urged, the verse "Jesus wept" points to a very different original story from that which has come down to us), or at the Easter-evening Christophany to the Ten, which, though giving joy at the moment (John xx. 20), must have seemed for some time afterwards very inconclusive, if we are to follow the indications of the Pseudo-Peter fragment as to the despairing frame of mind in which the Apostles returned to their former avocations in Galilee. On this view (which derives its main strength from the probability—in the opinion of some eminent scholars—that Pseudo-Peter follows, in however irresponsible and apocryphal a manner, the lost ending or sequel to St. Mark's Gospel) we must regard the touching Gennesaret Christophany as having been the turning-point, for St. Peter and other chiefs of the nascent Church, from sorrow to joy; and it will on this occasion have been more *permanently* true than it was at the Easter-evening Christophany in Jerusalem (John xx. 20) that "then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord." And, on the same hypothesis, this Gennesaret Christophany (though *really*, and not merely in the mistaken opinion of some compiler, "the third time"—John xxi. 14—our Risen Lord showed Himself in a way to produce permanent faith, inasmuch as He had already appeared convincingly to both Mary Magdalene and the Emmaus disciples) must have been the appearance to St. Peter which the Apostle Paul places at the head of the list of Christophanies ("He was seen of Cephas"—1 Corinthians xv. 5), and which our third canonical gospel refers to in the textually doubtful and (on this hypothesis) chronologically misplaced statement "hath appeared to Simon" (Luke xxiv. 34). It will, in that case, further be necessary to assume that our Lord's appearance "after eight days" to the doubting Thomas (John xx. 26–29) took place in Galilee—probably on the very evening following the Gennesaret Christophany, as St. Peter would be likely to assemble his colleagues at the house in Capernaum (Mark i. 29 and ii. 1) immediately after that event. We know from the Appendix to John (xxi. 2) that St. Thomas was in Galilee at the time. It is nowhere *explicitly* stated that this Christophany took place at Jerusalem, and Rohrbach has even argued from a passage in Syrus Ephraem that Tatian's "Diatesseron" must have placed it at Capernaum, though Prof. Burkitt—one of our greatest Syriac scholars and palæographers—disputes this inference. On the whole, it seems most probable that St. Peter's house in Capernaum (the "city of consolation") was the *place*, and evening of the

Second Lord's Day the *time*, of the crucial Manifestation to the eleven Apostles (1 Corinthians xv. 5), as morning of the same day (after a night of fishing on Gennesaret) saw the great Christophany to Peter and a few chosen companions. Nevertheless, although the earlier Resurrection-Christophanies at Jerusalem may have availed only to lift a disciple here and there from gloom to permanent faith (John xx. 11-18 and Luke xxiv. 13-35), there is yet evidence in the detailed autoptic narratives that have reached us that the "St. John" behind our Fourth Gospel was not only the first to recognise the Risen Lord on the lake-shore (John xxi. 7), but was also the first—even prior to any Christophany—to infer the Easter Gospel (John xx. 8) from the grave-clothes in the Empty Tomb. This intuition, transcending logic, was *in substance* (though, as I hold, not in the *letter*) justified by the overwhelming evidences of Christ's new and victorious heavenly life which began on Easter Day.

POSTSCRIPT

The above extremely condensed remarks on the "Johannine" problem are preliminary, the author hopes, to a more extended study of the Fourth Gospel, especially in its relation to the still earlier Marcan (or Petrine) story which underlies the chief narrative portions of the Synoptics.

Similarly the author has in contemplation a larger work, which, it is hoped, will expound systematically and in greater detail the ideas of this little volume and of his other cognate essays, and which it is proposed to subdivide into a series of sections following the same order as the "synopsis" contained in the present volume. This sequence of subdivisions, as will be seen, is as follows: (1) Objective Idealism or Panpsychist Realism; (2) The Discreteness of Existence; (3) The Space-Theory of Matter; (4) The Time-Process as a Logical Concatenation; (5) The Universal Ego; (6) Automatic Selection; (7) The Transliminal Consciousness; (8) The Religious Development of Mankind; (9) The Antithesis of Good and Evil; (10) Primitive Human Altruism and Subsequent Ethical Declension; (11) Religious Revivalism and Ethical Restoration; (12) The Christian Incarnation; (13) Posthumous Personal Existence; (14) The Christian Church; (15) Christian Communism; (16) Cosmic Catastrophes and the Future.

The general thought underlying these pamphlets and essays may be characterised as the synthesis of an Epicurean (though panpsychist) view of natural *origins* with a strictly Christian view of human experience and cosmic *destinies*.

APPENDIX H

DATA ON THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

THE subjoined synopsis of New Testament passages (extracted from a work advocating the Preterist view of the Second Advent as a spiritual occurrence winding up the Apostolic Age soon after the destruction of Jerusalem) is perhaps specially opportune at the present time owing to the recent concentration of interest in critical circles (cf. the weighty words of our greatest authority, Professor W. Sanday) on Christ's Eschatological utterances, as a result of Schweitzer's speculations.¹ Nor is the value of this synopsis entirely destroyed, though it is undoubtedly reduced, by the fact that it brackets together indiscriminately texts belonging to the most diverse strata of New Testament literature without attempt at critical appraisement save occasionally in footnotes. *All* canonical references to

¹ See also a work entitled "The Parousia" by Dr. J. Stuart Russell (Messrs. Randolph, Fifth Avenue, New York), and a pamphlet entitled "The Greatest Secret in the World, or The Nobleman's Return" (Geo. H. Burnham & Co., 188 West Houston St., New York), abridged from the writings of J. H. Noyes, the founder of the Oneida Community. The masterly treatise of Rev. E. Hampden-Cook, M.A., gives, in its third edition, probably the most convincing defence of thorough-going, but well-balanced, Preterism that has yet appeared. Dr. Stuart Russell's work is even more complete (and, indeed, *unequalled*) in its marshalling of evidence, but it carries the Preterist conclusion to an extreme which many disciples of that school of thought (including the present writer) are unable to subscribe to. The present writer is also differentiated, not only from Dr. Stuart Russell, but from all other exponents of the doctrine known to him, in holding the "Parousia" (in common with every other event in history) to have been an entirely non-miraculous occurrence.

apocalyptic expectation should be appraised as contributory data in view of the fact that Church Conferences and Hibbert Journal articles seem agreed to regard the New Testament eschatology, in its unmistakable insistence on an *imminent* catastrophe, as a great and possibly *crucial* difficulty for the Christian faith. It is contended by the present writer that this insistence, rightly understood, is an *aid* to faith, as harmonising with both aspects of the great change which took place at the close of the apostolic age—viz. (a) the cataclysmic destruction of the old Jewish theocracy, coupled with the subsequent extraordinary and unique experience of the entire Jewish race for well-nigh two millenniums; and (b) the rapid constructive establishment, so soon thereafter, of new beneficent agencies (both secular and religious) among the Gentiles, pointing to the real setting up of Christ's ruling "Church Triumphant" or "kingdom of heaven" in the invisible world. On this view the dynasty of the Antonines is, no less than the quickly spreading post-apostolic Church, a fulfilment of Christ's prediction of an almost immediately approaching "new age." To those who do not believe in the reality of what Catholics call the "Church Triumphant" (*i.e.* a dominant posthumous life) the prediction of a Parousia must seem like the utterance of a fanatic (and therefore a deadly danger to the Christian faith). But it has here been shown that such a dominant posthumous life is quite conceivably reconcilable with ordinary cerebral physiology (see paragraphs xiii and xiv of Appendix E). And, if so, the apparent fanaticism or insanity of New Testament eschatology is shown to be much more sane and sober—in view of the course which history actually took—than the "superior" sneers of contemporary sceptics.

1. "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe the gospel."—Mark i. 15.

2. "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."
—Matt. iii. 2.

3. "From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is *at hand*."—Matt. iv. 17.

4. "And as ye go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is *at hand*."—Matt. x. 7.

5. "Verily I say unto you, *Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come*."—Matt. x. 23.

6. "For the Son of man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels; and then shall He reward every man according to his works. Verily I say unto you, *There be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in His kingdom*."—Matt.¹ xvi. 27, 28.

7. "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet *before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord*."—Mal. iv. 5. "And if ye will receive it, *this* (i.e. John the Baptist) is *Elias which was for to come*. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."—Matt. xi. 14, 15.

8. "Whereunto shall I liken this generation, &c."—Matt. xi. 16. "Verily I say unto you, *This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled*. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away."—Matt. xxiv. 34, 35.²

9. "When ye shall see these things come to pass, know that *it is nigh, even at the doors*. Verily I say unto you, that *this generation shall not pass till all these things be done*."—Mark xiii. 29, 30.²

10. "When ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is *nigh at hand*. Verily I say unto you, *This generation shall not pass away till all be fulfilled*."—Luke xxi. 31 32.²

¹ This passage becomes all the more impressive when one reflects that the author or editor of our first canonical gospel has almost certainly copied from an earlier edition of St. Mark than our present canonical Mark.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² The well-known critical question as to the so-called "Little Apocalypse" of Mark xiii., which is the basis of the synoptic parallels, is here involved; but any possible discount applied on this ground can do little to shake the general position here taken up.—F. W. F.

11. "*There be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the kingdom of God.*"—Luke ix. 27.

12. "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for Me, but weep for yourselves and for your children. For, behold the days are coming, in the which they shall say . . . *Then shall they begin to say to the mountains, Fall on us ; and to the hills, Cover us.*"—Luke xxiii. 28–30. "And the kings of the earth . . . said to the mountains and to the rocks, *Fall on us, and hide us from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb ; for the great day of His wrath is come.*"—Rev. vi. 15, 16.

13. "The Revelation of Jesus Christ . . . to show unto His servants things which must *shortly* come to pass."—Rev. i. 1.¹

14. "Blessed is he that readeth and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things that are written therein ; for *the time is at hand.*"—Rev. i. 3.¹

15. "If I will that he *tarry till I come*, what is that to thee ?"—John xxi. 22.

16. "Knowing the time, that *now it is high time* to awaken out of sleep ; for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. *The night is far spent, the day is at hand.*"—Rom. xiii. 11, 12.

17. "But of the times and the seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you. For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night. . . . But ye, brethren, are not in darkness, *that that day should overtake you as a thief.*"—1 Thess. v. 1, 2, 4.

18. "And the God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet *shortly.*"—Rom. xvi. 20.

19. "Wherefore gird up the loins of your mind, be sober,

¹ Even if, as is probable, this preface (along with the Letter to the Seven Churches) is of Domitian date, and so somewhat subsequent to the destruction of Jerusalem, it is still prior (and only *just* prior) to the final close of the Apostolic age and also to that accession of the "Good" emperors and improvement of moral and social conditions in the second century of our era which witness so powerfully to the new reign of heaven "within the veil."—F. W. FRANKLAND.

and hope to the end for the grace *that is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ.*"—1 Pet. i. 13.

20. "And they are written for our admonition *upon whom the ends of the age (aion) are come.*"—1 Cor. x. 11. "What shall be the sign of Thy coming and of the *end of the age (aion).*"—Matt. xxiv. 3. "Now once *in the end of the age (aion)* hath He appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself."—Heb. ix. 26.

21. "The Lord *is at hand.*"—Phil. iv. 5.

22. "... exhorting one another, and so much the more *as ye see the day approaching.*"—Heb. x. 25.

23. "Yet *a little while*, and He that shall come *will come, and will not tarry.*"—Heb. x. 37.

24. "Be ye also patient; establish your hearts, *for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh* . . . behold, the Judge *standeth before the door.*"—James v. 8, 9.

25. "Ye are come unto Mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, *the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born*, which are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect."—Heb. xii. 22, 23.

26. "The end of all things *is at hand*; be ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer."—1 Pet. iv. 7.

27. "But unto you I say, and unto the *rest in Thyatira* . . . that which ye have already, hold fast *till I come.*"—Rev. ii. 24, 25.²

28. "And unto the angel of *the Church in Sardis* write :

¹ This passage, written perhaps before the destruction of Jerusalem, well shows that the climax which the first generation of Christians (it must be remembered that, on the Preterist view here advocated, that *first generation* was, in certain respects, in a *radically* different position from *subsequent* generations of Christians) looked forward to (*rightly*, in my opinion) was a triumph *in the invisible world*,—well characterised by the Catholic terminology "Church Triumphant."—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² The same remarks apply to this extract from the "Letter to the Seven Churches" as to the Apocalyptic Preface. The Domitian date for these enlargements of the Apocalypse does not militate against the Preterist view of the Second Advent.—F. W. F.

. . . If therefore thou shalt not watch, *I will come on thee as a thief, and thou shalt not know what hour I will come upon thee.*"—Rev. iii. 1-3.¹

29. "*Immediately*² after the tribulation of those days (i.e. the tribulation preceding and accompanying the destruction of Jerusalem) . . . shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven . . . and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory."—Matt. xxiv. 29, 30.

[Christ is represented in the Gospels as designating the time of His second coming in six different ways. 1. He placed it immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem. 2. He instructed His disciples to expect it when they should see the fearful signs that should precede and accompany the destruction of Jerusalem, as they would look for summer after the budding of the fig-tree. 3. He most solemnly declared it would take place before the generation contemporary with Himself should pass away. 4. He assured His disciples that it would happen before their ministry to the Jews should be finished. 5. He said there were some standing with Him who should live till the event. 6. He plainly intimated that the "beloved disciple" who is claimed as the eye-witness behind the Fourth Gospel (whether or not that disciple is the Galilean apostle John) should tarry till His coming.]

30. "Ye come behind in no gift, *waiting for the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ.*"—1 Cor. i. 7.

31. "Ye turn from God to idols, to serve the living and true God, and *to wait for His Son from Heaven.*"—1 Thess. i. 10. Men do not *wait* and *look* for a far distant event.³

¹ Ibid., p. 81, note ².

² It may or may *not* be that the editor of our first canonical gospel has here quoted from Ur-Mark or Proto-Mark. He may, on the contrary, in the excitement of A.D. 70 (almost certainly the approximate date of our "Matthew") have *added* to the latter.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

³ This point has recently been well brought out in a pamphlet by Rev. T. H. Passmore, entitled "Some Questions for the Clergy," which—with answers suggested by the present writer—is subjoined as Appendix I hereto.—F. W. F.

Such language implies that the event expected is supposed to be *impending*.

32. “. . . that ye may be sincere and without offence till the day of Christ.”—Phil. i. 10.

33. “I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless *unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ*.”—1 Thess. v. 23.

34. “I give thee charge . . . that thou keep this commandment without spot and blameless, *until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ*.”—1 Tim. vi. 13, 14. Nothing can be plainer than that the second coming of Christ, in the minds of those who use such language as this, was the event which stood at the end of their trial of obedience. They manifestly waited for it as though it were so nigh that their temporal probation would reach “*unto*” it.

35. “*We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in a twinkling of an eye, at the last trump*¹; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, *and we shall be changed*.”—1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.

36. “For this we say unto you *by the word of the Lord* that *we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord* shall not prevent (*i.e.* anticipate) them which are asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from Heaven with a shout, and with the voice of the archangel and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then *we which are alive and remain* shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.¹”—

¹ It is evident from these Epistles, especially from what is probably the earliest of his extant Epistles (*viz.* 1st Thessalonians), that the Great Apostle expected, at all events in the earlier part of his missionary career, that the supreme cataclysm which was to deliver himself and the faithful among his co-religionists and raise them to a heavenly throne would come by way of “*physical*” miracle. If, as is here contended, our new views of the relation of God to the world render this belief incredible, that does not greatly militate against the many evidences that a corresponding *spiritual* crisis *did* occur at the close of the Apostolic age, and does not *at all* alter the historic fact that a supreme *national* cataclysm (the most tremendous conceivable to Jews) immediately preceded it. The *political* catastrophe of A.D. 70 is *certain*, and the *spiritual* crisis at the turn of the century is hardly less so.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

1 Thess. iv. 15-17. If Paul had believed the First Resurrection to be a far distant event he would have said, "*We who will then be dead shall be raised incorruptible, and they that remain alive shall be changed.*"

37. "Little children, *it is the last time*: and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists; *whereby we know that it is the last time.*"—1 John ii. 18.

38. "He that testifieth these things saith, Surely I come *quickly*. Amen. Even so, come, Lord Jesus."—Rev. xxii. 20.

As Christ *predicted*, so the primitive church *expected*, His second coming within the lifetime of their own generation. Let it be borne in mind that the primitive church were contemporaries with Christ,—that many of them received Christ's predictions from His own lips—that the language in which those predictions were uttered was their mother-tongue, and that they were favoured with unexampled measures of the spirit of interpretation and revelation; in a word, that they were in the most favourable circumstances possible for correctly understanding the language of Christ. Nor is the correctness of their belief as to Christ's actual teaching made more than very partially dubious (as Dr. Sanday has so well shown) by the fact that they were likely to be saturated with the Jewish apocalyptic beliefs so prevalent during the three hundred years from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes to the suppression of the Barcocebas rebellion. On the contrary, the significant comparative cessation of apocalyptic after A.D. 135 is in harmony with the view that this whole apocalyptic movement was (in its *essence*) a true prophetic inspiration. Also, let it be remembered that the history of the Christian Church from the destruction of Jerusalem to the middle of the second century is confessedly an almost total blank, and that, with the exception of St. John of Ephesus (who may or

may *not* have been an "Apostle" in the narrower sense of the word), no reasonably authentic account exists of the fate of any of the apostles except of those who died *before* 70 A.D. Shall we then suppose that, because no extant history has recorded, and doubtless no eye of flesh has *seen*, the exalted destiny predicted for the "wise virgins" or a "resurrection" from sleep to the activity of invisible dominance, the wise virgins were therefore mistaken in their construction of Christ's prophecies by at least eighteen hundred years, and that the strained, unnatural, and uncandid interpretation of those prophecies by modern commentators, who are admittedly uninspired, is the correct one? Because the secular histories—the few that have come down to us—which failed to record any darkness at Christ's crucifixion, have also failed to record¹ "the sign of the Son of man in heaven" after the capture of Jerusalem, and have only noted apparent portents witnessed during the continuance of the siege, and because ecclesiastical writers, living a hundred years afterwards, have failed to mention a spiritual crisis which apparently left "all things continuing as they had been from the beginning of the world": shall we therefore deny the express prediction of Christ, and affirm that no such crisis took place, especially when the negative half of the crisis—viz. the destruction of the old theocratic order in A.D. 70—is an undisputed fact of history?

¹ Even so, it must be remembered that, as Rénan has pointed out in his "Antichrist," the years A.D. 60-80 were, to an extent unprecedented in Mediterranean history, crowded with physical "portents,"—although, of course, on the view here contended for, all such inorganic phenomena were an inexorable *prius* to which the providential government of mankind could only be *adjusted*,—not *vice versa*.

POSTSCRIPT.

To any one who remembers the earliest of the "black" fogs in London—its sudden and mysterious formation, its gradual disappearance—it will be evident that such an event as the "Parousia," even if (as we Christian Rationalists are of course unable to suppose) the event were a "physical" miracle, would be not unlikely to fail of record in permanent

secular history, while its fate with ecclesiastical historians would depend on its accordance with the interests and preconceived notions of the party whom those historians represented. The sign said to have been seen in the sky—"in hoc signo vinces"—by Constantine and his army, was referred to by writers who were eager to glorify the wearer of the purple: but a "Parousia" would fail of record in an ecclesiastical organisation whose growing pretensions it stultified. Confounding the Second Advent with the Final Judgment (as indicated by the spurious Second Epistle of St. Peter, and despite the teaching of the Apocalypse relative to the intervening period of more than a thousand years), the post-apostolic church of the early second century awaited the Final Judgment as imminent, and when, after many years, this expectation was slowly put aside and deferred for an indefinite period, the real "Parousia" had already been buried in oblivion (though it has been acutely suggested by Rev. T. H. Passmore that the legend of the "Assumption" of the Virgin Mary may be based on a dim and not entirely suppressed tradition that the faithful portion of the Primitive Church—the "wise virgins" of the Parable—*did* meet with their anticipated heavenly reward at death during the closing years of the apostolic age, however entirely non-miraculous such a posthumous experience may have been). To listen to those who argue against the "Parousia" from the silence of history, one would suppose that, instead of being almost totally ignorant of church affairs for a hundred years after the destruction of Jerusalem and meagrely informed about contemporaneous secular history, we possessed daily records of the first century and complete insight into the posthumous experiences of all first-century Christians.

It is, on the contrary, well known to all students of Church history that the life which breathes before us in the Pauline epistles and the remainder of the New Testament suffers an eclipse just before the close of the Apostolic age. The narrative of the Acts breaks off abruptly, St. Mark (according to Wellhausen's interpretation of the strange phenomenon of the Mark-ending) lays down his pen almost in the middle of a sentence, and the Apocalypse is a lightning-flash (as Rénan truly terms it) in the midnight gloom, a clap of thunder breaking the awed hush, which precedes the transformation of inspired New Testament churches into post-apostolic mediocrity. For history, as Dr. Stuart Russell says, the Church is like a train vanishing amid smoke into a tunnel from which it emerges in an altered form a hundred years later; the celebrated letter of Pliny to his imperial master being almost the only certain evidence of its existence in the interval, and bearing oblique but eloquent witness, in its account of the strength of Bithynian Christianity, to the impression produced by great events in the recent Past. The "conspiracy of silence" is a phenomenon not unknown in modern times, and from the number and importance of unwelcome facts which are *nearly* suppressed by bigotry and disingenuousness, we may conjecture the amount of *complete* suppression which cases of *attempted* concealment merely fringe. History and the social life of which it treats are, as Bagehot has shown in his "Physics and Politics," a *selection* in which that which is *welcome* to an age or generation is brought into prominence, while the *unwelcome* is thrust into the background and may count itself fortunate if the changing taste of a later generation avails to disentomb it. So far from the silence of history disproving the substantial truth of Christ's prediction, the peculiar features of that silence, and the strange mixture of

good and evil characterising the churches of historical Christendom, have never yet been satisfactorily explained on any other hypothesis than that of the reality of some great spiritual crisis which made the visible post-apostolic church only a very imperfect successor of the Church which the Apostles founded.

A theory of the consciousness of Jesus has been formulated which explains the (possibly) too great externalisation of His predictions of the Second Advent, in spite of the (approximate) correctness of the prediction as regards *time*. This has been done in "Lux Hominum: Studies of the Living Christ in the World of To-day," edited by F. W. Orde Ward. As pointed out in the "Annals of Psychical Science," it is a book of composite authorship, after the fashion of "Lux Mundi." "Papers are contributed by Professors A. S. Peake and Allan Menzies, Dr. W. F. Adeney, Revs. Hewlett Johnson, S. Lawrence Brown, H. D. A. Major, and others whose names are an equal guarantee of the high quality of the matter included in the book. All the articles are good, and the tone is advanced and catholic in the true sense of both words; but the majority of them, being theological or exegetical, do not fall within the scope of psychical science. The one exception which touches on the subjects dealt with in the 'Annals,' is the very interesting and able paper on Christ the Mystic, by H. A. Dallas. In this article the writer makes a novel and an ingenious application of the newer psychological theories in the elucidation of certain obscure points of Gospel story. Take, for example, the question of the Second Advent. The Apostles certainly looked forward to this as 'an event of an objective character. . . . which would definitely occur at some date unknown to them.' And their belief was based on Christ's own words. He declared that He would soon be 'coming in the clouds of Heaven.' How shall we explain these passages, in which His true foresight of His future influence in the world seems coupled with untrue form or presentation? Miss Dallas, taking Myers' theory of human personality as a basis, supposes that Jesus had a subliminal pre-cognition of His influence in future world-history, but that this subliminal knowledge, on partly emerging into the supraliminal stratum of His mind, naturally clothed itself in supraliminal symbols which prevented full manifestation of the truth. A similar explanation is suggested of His foreknowledge of death, coupled with (supraliminal) doubt which inspired the prayer that 'this cup should pass from' Him. These ideas are somewhat startlingly novel, but no one can say that they are inconceivable, or even that they are improbable. Psychical research has done much to give us new views of the *daimonion* of Socrates, and of the life and 'voices' of Joan of Arc, and it may well be that modern discoveries in this domain will shed new light on the works, character, and teaching of Jesus."

No one can prove that this "foresight" did not include pre-cognition of a heavenly kingdom He would soon be able to set up in the invisible world, with His saints, as both a militant government and a judgment a-size over the affairs of humanity, both living and dead. The "supraliminal symbols" Miss Dallas refers to (cosmic portents and convulsions) were, as is well known, in large part *verified* toward the close of the Apostolic age. Further, the main event itself was predicted to occur with the *secrecy* of a "thief in the night," and to be as *momentary* as the lightning-flash; so that there is not much room left for demonstrated falsification (by

the events) of even the more *outward* features of the "Second Advent" prophecy. Let it be added that the more materialistic features of apocalyptic prediction (those features the falsification of which by subsequent history could most plausibly be maintained) rest chiefly—so far as Christ's own alleged teachings are concerned—on the "Little Apocalypse" of Mark xiii. (and synoptic parallels), the genuineness of which is under suspicion, and on our canonical first gospel, which—as Professor Streeter has shown—betrays a tendency to exaggerate the cruder and more external elements of apocalyptic as compared with its two main sources Mark and "Q."

The possibility of such a divergence between the "supraliminal" and "subliminal" is pregnant and stimulating. It may clear up much besides eschatology. For example, it should make us loth to entirely reject the hypothesis which has been put forward, according to which the dispositions mentioned in Mark xiv. 13–16 were precautions to avoid arrest, and not merely to avoid *premature* arrest. There may possibly be a similar explanation of the apparently hesitating attitude of Jesus as to His own sinlessness in St. Mark's Gospel and in the "Gospel according to the Hebrews." The *full* knowledge of His absolute moral perfection may at times have been "transliminal" only, the *cis*-liminal consciousness being uncertain or hesitating in this regard. In short, not our eschatology only, but our Christology as a whole, needs to be revolutionised in the light of this fruitful conception, which, after all, only extends the application of the well-known doctrine of the "*kenosis*," and the recent well-known hypothesis of Dr. Sanday in connection with the "subliminal" personality of Christ may well be the herald of this revolution.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

APPENDIX I

ESCHATOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CLERGY,

BY
REV. T. H. PASSMORE, M.A.
(ANGLICAN MINISTER.)

WITH ANSWERS,

BY
THE PRESENT WRITER

THIS Appendix constitutes a little Catechism on Eschatology, written from what is in the main a "Preterist" standpoint (which, so far as the present writer is concerned, was derived ultimately from a highly original American thinker, who laid down the basis of it as early as the year 1833); but it must be understood that Rev. T. H. Passmore, M.A., is responsible solely for the "*Questions*" herein. The "*Answers*" are published on the sole responsibility of the present writer.

1. *Question.* Is it a fact that Jesus Christ distinctly and repeatedly announced His speedy Return, a Resurrection¹ of the Dead, a Judgment, the Consummation of the Age,

¹ It must be borne in mind that, from the point of view of the present writer, a "resurrection from the dead" can only mean an awakening to comparatively vivid and coherent (and, in the case of the righteous, comparatively *dominant*) awareness (in the brains of survivors) of departed personalities; and also that "judgment" takes place *mainly* in the posthumous life.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

the "Coming" of the Kingdom of God and the entrance of the righteous therein, within the lifetime of the current generation and before some standing by should have tasted of death? *Answer.* Yes.

2. Q. Did these announcements come true? A. Yes.

3. Q. If so, when and how? A. At the end of the Apostolic Age, by the establishment of Christ's "Church Triumphant" and Judgment-Assize in the invisible world.

4. Q. If not, how do you know that they did not, seeing He asserted they were to take place "not with observation, neither should they say, Lo, here! or Lo, there!"—that is, in the spiritual sphere? A. There is absolutely *no* evidence that these things did not occur as predicted, but much evidence that they *did*.

5. Q. Assuming that they did not, how do you reconcile the falsification of His express statements with His Divinity? A. Such "reconciliation" would be impossible.

6. Q. Do you believe that our Lord, in the Prophecies on the Mount of Olives,¹ while describing the approaching doom of Jerusalem, took a sudden leap over two thousand years without the smallest hint that He was doing anything but going forward in reasonable sequence? In which case, between which pair of verses, or in the middle of what verse, do you propose to put the break? A. It is preposterous to suppose anything of the kind.

7. Q. And that He solemnly instructed His disciples, in two thousand years' time, to "look up and lift up their heads, because their redemption drew nigh"; and to "watch," lest a day as far off in the future as was Abraham's

¹ It is interesting to notice that Professor Sanday, in his recent article "The Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels" (*Hibbert Journal*, October 1911) does not venture to affirm—like so many rationalising critics—that the "Little Apocalypse" of St. Mark xiii. was not uttered, in whole or in part, by our Lord. But it must be said that the few predictions therein which it might be plausibly contended that history had falsified, are precisely those which the chapter has in common with the crude non-Christian Jewish apocalypticism of B.C. 165 to A.D. 135.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

in the past, should come on them suddenly "as a snare"?
A. This also is preposterous.

8. *Q.* And then finally bound up the whole chain of predictions, natural and supernatural, in the solemn limitation, "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all these things be accomplished"? *A.* On the contrary, all these things *were* accomplished (most of them *demonstrably* so) before that generation passed away.

9. *Q.* Waiving the incongruity of this hopeless chronologic confusion, how would it strike you to find Elijah instructing his prophet-pupils as to their behaviour in the time of William the Conqueror, or Hannibal warning his troops to expect a visit from him in Napoleon's days? *A.* It would have been about equally appropriate.

10. *Q.* Or, if you can be content to suppose that Jesus Christ by "ye" and "you" meant "posterity unborn," what interest or concern do you consider His far-away vaticinations can have had for a body of peasants and fishermen in days of acute crisis and deep anxiety for themselves? *A.* They could have had (practically) *no* interest in such "vaticinations."

11. *Q.* What do you understand Jesus Christ to have meant by the following words to His Apostles: "Verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel,¹ till the Son of Man be come"? *A.* Precisely what He said.

¹ Here, again, Dr. Sanday does not venture with Dobschütz to deny the genuineness of the saying, and—on the contrary—gives good ground for believing in its *extreme* antiquity. Indeed, if we believe—as the present writer does—that St. Matthew was not only the author of "Q" during our Lord's earthly lifetime, but also of the later and more systematic five-chapter collection of "Logia" (perhaps commented on by Papias in the lost "Oracles of the Lord") which, sandwiched at intervals into an abridged and slightly altered Marcan record, constitutes nearly the whole of our first canonical gospel, then we have *apostolic authority* for the saying. And the only point (in connection therewith) on which we should have to differ from Dr. Sanday is with regard to his allegation that the saying has been "contradicted by the event." For those who believe in the "obsession," so to speak, of living human brains from the close of the

12. Q. Was this fulfilled? A. Yes.

13. Q. If you can read into the words, consistently with faith in Jesus Christ, any possibility of their not having yet been fulfilled, where are the "cities of Israel" now, and where are the Apostles? And if modern Christian teachers have the right to arrogate to themselves words addressed to the Apostles, why are they not expecting to sit on thrones judging the Twelve Tribes of Israel? Or, if all things said to the first Christians apply to modern Christians, how is it the latter cannot "take up serpents and drink any deadly thing" harmlessly? A. The whole contention of Christendom that no "Parousia" of Christ took place at the close of the Apostolic Age is contrary to fact.

14. Q. What is the "Kingdom of God," which Jesus Christ bade His followers "seek"; in preparation for which His whole Ministry was one long instruction; which, He repeatedly and solemnly announced, was to "come," concurrently with His own "Coming"; and whose annunciation introduced and summed the Mission of St. John Baptist, Jesus Christ, and the Apostles, in the words "The Kingdom of Heaven is *athand*"? A. The establishment of His "Church Triumphant" and Judgment-Assize in the heavenly world.

15. Q. Seeing that every Epistle, explicitly or implicitly, still urges the expectation of this "Kingdom," and that the New Testament closes with the aspiration, "Come, Lord Jesus," when did the Kingdom come? A. Exactly when it was *predicted* to come, viz. at the close of the Apostolic Age.

16. Q. Or has it not yet come? A. It came more than eighteen centuries ago.

17. Q. If not, what was the matter with the efficacy of the Atonement? And how has God "opened the Kingdom of Heaven to all believers," if there has never been any "Kingdom" to open? A. God would have been *defeated* if the Kingdom had not come.

18. Q. Are you aware of any "Kingdom" on earth really deserving the name, that has followed upon Jesus Christ's announcements, except the Roman Catholic Church, whose chief Bishop claims to be a king? This being so, are you a Roman Catholic? And if not, why not? A. No visible "Kingdom" fully deserves the great name; and I am not a Roman Catholic because the Roman "Church" is only the greatest¹ visible *instrument* of the true (and invisible) Church or Kingdom in the heavens.

19. Q. Was Jesus Christ, in His predictions, (a) mistaken, or (b) ill-advised in His choice of words, or (c) unable to keep His word, or (d) has He since changed His mind, or (e) did He mean on false pretences to keep two millenniums of "believers" watchful and hopeful? A. None of these. His language was well chosen, and He kept His word.

20. Q. If either of these, how do you reconcile it (a) with His omniscience, (b) with His claim as the Divine Logos, (c) with His omnipotence, (d) with His wisdom, or (e) with His assertion, "I am The Truth"? A. No such reconciliation would be possible if the "Parousia" had not taken place as predicted.

21. Q. The Apostles applied to the Second Advent, the Resurrection, the Judgment, the Reward of the Righteous, and the Doom of the Wicked, the following expressions: "At hand," "near," "about to be," "quickly," "ready to be revealed," "in due season," "nearer than when we (first) believed," "waiting for that blessed Hope," "now is the Day of Salvation," "the time is shortened," "shortly," "redeeming the time," "the Hope set before us," "so

¹ It must be remembered that, on the view here taken as to the position the Apostolic Church (the "Bride of Christ") has occupied in the unseen world since her humble sojourn and missionary labours in the sphere of our visibility, she carries out her militant and beneficent rule over human affairs by means of *secular* agencies as well as ecclesiastical organisations. Indeed, the most conspicuous beneficent force which immediately succeeded the Apostolic Age was, not the humble and struggling post-apostolic church, but the dynasty of "good" Emperors (Nerva to Marcus Aurelius) which followed after the reign of the tyrant Domitian.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

long as it is called To-day," "the Day drawing nigh," "we seek after the City which is about to be" ("ten mellousan," in Greek), "your miseries that are coming upon you," "that ye may be sincere and void of offence till the Day of Christ," "the Judge standeth before the doors," "pass the time of your sojourning here in fear," "ready to judge the quick and the dead," "the time is come for judgment to begin," "as a thief," "ye look for these things," "it is the last *hour*," "the darkness is passing away," "looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto Eternal Life," "the Time is at hand," "the things which must shortly come to pass," "behold, I come quickly." Were these expressions justified by the event? *A.* Yes. Our Lord spoke the *literal* truth to His disciples at the Last Supper when He said (John xiv. 2, 3): "I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto Myself; that, where I am, there ye may be also." And in an important sense, the Catholic Church has recognised that this promise was fulfilled. For she realises that, beginning with these early times, the Saints whom she invokes have been in *Heaven*.

22. *Q.* If not, by what logical process do you expand them into a delay of nearly a third part of the ages that have rolled over the world since recorded history began? *A.* They could not be so expanded by *any* logical process whatever.

23. *Q.* And, if the Apostles have been found false in a simple matter of fact, how is it possible to repose faith in their spiritual, doctrinal, and moral teachings? *A.* Hardly *any* such faith would have been deserved, had they been found false in this their central teaching.

24. *Q.* Did it ever strike you to think of the effect of the Apostles' teaching upon *their hearers*—who were mostly holding their lives in their hands day by day, persecuted to the death for their faith by Jews on the one side and Romans on the other? Was it, under

the circumstances, either kind or reasonable to perplex and delude them with Utopian prognostications of things which were to come to pass when they were dead and gone for æons, under the pretence that they were imminent? Would you encourage a soldier on the battlefield with Mr. Wells's "War of the Worlds," or throw drowning men copies of Bulwer Lytton's "Coming Race"? *A.* The whole contention that the "Parousia" was other than *imminent* is utterly unscriptural and preposterous.

25. *Q.* Did you ever notice the intense and breathless hurry, the strained sense of crisis, the tremulous and vital expectation, like that of wrecked men waiting for a life-boat, which pervades the whole of the writings of the Apostles; the utter obscurity, apart from legend and guess-work, which involves the eventual history and death of the whole Apostolic College with the single exception of St. James, who was early martyred; the abrupt and incomplete manner in which the New Testament breaks off like the last words of the last letter of a man who is about to engage in a deadly conflict; the abundance of dark allusions to previous oral understandings of the Apostles with their converts, of which we know nothing; and the almost utter silence—only broken by a handful of letters whose genuineness is contested inch by inch, and by a cluster of legends more pious than probable—which wraps the history of the Christian Church from the eve of the doom of Jerusalem to nearly 150 A.D.? If so, how do you account for this sudden quietus, followed by a dark gap at the very point where we might have expected the brightest historic lustre? Why is the Church History of that First Age almost entirely dark to us, when we know so much about (for instance) the older¹ period of Alexander the Great? And why have such mysteries as the Agape, Baptism for the Dead, the Gifts of Tongues and Miracles, vanished like a cloud of smoke from the world and left

¹ And also about the "older" period covered by the Pauline Epistles and the Lucan Acts.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

nothing but their scarcely intelligible names behind them ?
 A. Because the Apostolic Church itself (or, rather, the "wise virgins" within it) vanished from the (visible) world, and left behind only the "foolish virgins" to be among the earthly instruments of their own thenceforward heavenly rule.¹ As already stated, Christ told the literal truth to the "wise virgins" at the Last Supper, that in "a little while" (John xvi. 16) they would see Him again and be with Him. It is the fact that those left behind in the visible world were (with rare exceptions, such as—doubtless—St. John "the beloved disciple") only the "foolish" virgins, which makes the historic churches (whose legitimate claims to apostolic authority are largely reduced, though not entirely extinguished, by this fact) so loth to admit the full significance of a "Parousia" which was already past when the Ignatian letters formulated extreme hierarchical claims. The ecclesiastical position is somewhat analogous to that of the ancient Jewish priesthood, whose authority is *partly* discounted through the anachronism revealed by "Higher Criticism" as involved in the orthodox but partly erroneous tradition of this priesthood's persistence through the period of "prophetism." Like those who "sat in Moses' seat," the ecclesiastical representatives of Apostles are *legitimately* entitled to a certain authority : but, in both cases, the extreme claims are partly vitiated by an anachronism which those claims rested on. The *full*

¹ i.e. of the heavenly rule (invisible to us) of the "wise" virgins, who are on the view here defended (which is very much like the Roman Catholic doctrine of the "Saints"), dominantly active and militantly beneficent in the brains of generation after generation of living men and women. The only crudity that has to be got rid of in the popular doctrine of "Heaven" and "Saints" is the crudity of *spatial location* above the sky. But a parallel crudity has to be got rid of in connection with our Lord's Ascension. In the one case, as in the other, astronomy will not allow us to people the abyss and desert of inter-planetary or inter-stellar space with the sacred objects of our religious veneration. It is the collective and telepathically connected brain-tissue of mankind, not the great astronomical void (nor yet a fourth dimension of space or a non-spatial transcendent universe) which is the *locus* of all we hold dearest in the world.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

priestly code was not as ancient as Moses, and was not recognised by the prophets: and post-apostolic bishops are not in the *full* sense successors of the Apostles.

26. Q. Have you ever noticed that the key to the Apocalypse hangs just outside the door? the opening words being: "The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave Him to show unto His servants, *even the things which must shortly come to pass . . . for the time is at hand*"? And that the same stringent limit is set in the last verse of the last chapter, "He which testifieth these things saith, Yea, *I come quickly*. Amen; even so come, Lord Jesus"? A. Yes; the coming of Christ there predicted took place almost before there had been time to ponder the prophet's words. In the *secular* world the effect of it was seen *immediately* in the inauguration of a dynasty of Emperors (beginning with Nerva and ending with Marcus Aurelius) which was superior in beneficence to any other succession of rulers that has existed on earth, and which was suddenly substituted for a reign of infamy, the reign of him whom antiquity called the "Nero Redivivus" (the "Beast" which was slain and which lived again). And, before the dynasty of "good" emperors came to an end, a *spiritual* regeneration had come over the world which has lasted to this day.

27. Q. Do you consider the intimation to St. John, that he should "tarry till I come," satisfied by a *dream*—in which, as a matter of fact, Christ did not "come," but "sent His Angel" (Rev. i. 1)? A. No; it was satisfied by the tarrying of St. John in the visible world till after the establishment of Christ's "Church Triumphant" and Judgment-Assize in the heavens. According to the most definite tradition that has come down to us, St. John of Ephesus (the "beloved disciple" of John xxi. 22) died in the year 101 A.D., during the reign of Trajan. Even though it seems probable that *this* "St. John" was not the Galilean fisherman-apostle of that name (who, in accordance with the prediction of Mark x. 39 and the Matthaean parallel,

was perhaps martyred before the destruction of Jerusalem), yet he was the "beloved disciple" who stands behind the Fourth Gospel; and, from his personal idiosyncrasies as revealed in the "Johannine" writings, we need not be surprised that *he*, of all New Testament saints, was chosen to remain on earth (John xxi. 22) after the close of the Apostolic Age, to mediate the transition to the visible Catholic Church of history.—F. W. F.

28. Q. If you do not know Greek, has anyone ever told you that the phrase "End of the World," in the Authorised Version, is an utter mistranslation of the words used by Jesus Christ, which properly mean the "Consummation of the Age"; and that this expression, together with "Last Day," "Latter Days," "Last Times," "Redemption," "Salvation," "Day of the Lord," as applied by Him and His Apostles to His Second Coming and Kingdom, are the common designations used in the Old Testament always to denote the epoch of the Atonement, and of that great adjustment of the Mosaic Age, which should connectedly follow it? A. Yes; the expressions referred to have nothing whatever to do with the end of the *world* ("ton *Kosmon*" in Greek), but only with the end of the *age*. And the age palpably *did* come to an end at the time predicted.

29. Q. Can you find a single instance in which any Apostle ever urged any contemporary believer to prepare for Death? A. None.

30. Q. With what sort of feelings do you imagine the last Christians of "that generation" would die one by one, in the discovery that their Lord had lied to them? A. The feelings would have been such that Christianity would probably have sickened unto death, as the Irvingite Church has done since the falsification of its great prophecy by the death of Mr. Woodhouse—the last of its twelve "Apostles." But if a powerful kingdom was established by our Lord in the invisible world (at the time He predicted) and inspired with comfort and heroism the believers who were left on earth, then the phenomena of the post-apostolic age and

the rapid expansion of Christianity therein (as testified by Pliny, the Proconsul of Bithynia, in his letter to the Emperor Trajan) are amply accounted for.

31. Q. Did you ever realise that this *upward* destiny, this spiritual "Lord's House established in the Top of the Mountains," this "City set upon a Hill," this "walking upon Mine High Places," and "lifting up mine eyes unto the Hills," was precisely what Israel had always been taught to expect in the "Days of the Messiah"; that the disciples themselves (rightly, according to Moses, Prophets, and Psalms) expected Christ to bring the Kingdom and be manifested as a King? If, then, these universal Hebrew hopes were *not* realised by the quick and dead of the Old Covenant, where are *we*? A. These "Hebrew hopes" *were* realised at the close of the Apostolic Age, and we have ever since then been living under the rule and protection of the Invisible Church and her Divine Head and Bridegroom.

32. Q. Does it not seem to you a little weak to be looking forward to "wars and rumours of wars" as "signs," after *nineteen centuries* during which the world has scarcely rested from the continuous din of battle, and the ever-flowing tide of blood has never been stanchèd? Or to "earthquakes" and "famines"? And yet the supernatural events predicted were to be in a continuous line with these! A. Yes; the attitude referred to is a *preposterous* one. As a matter of fact, the supernormal psychic developments which constituted the setting up of Christ's reign in the invisible world followed in a continuous line on the visible catastrophes¹ and tribulations¹

¹ Of course, on the view here defended, these "catastrophes" and "tribulations," so far as they were occurrences of the inorganic or sub-human world (and that such disastrous occurrences were especially numerous during the decades in question has been already noticed by Rénan in his "Anti-Christ"), cannot be regarded as *telic*. The eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D. can no more, on the modern scientific view, be regarded as "*telic*" or providential than the recent earthquake at Messina. But it may well be that a providential and theocratic government of *human* affairs is

which marked the decade of Jerusalem's overthrow and the immediately succeeding decades.

33. Q. Or, on the other hand, if as a Christian you are not living in such expectations, is it not incumbent on you to show cause *why* you are not? On what grounds have you discounted the great bulk of the New Testament? For the prophetic announcements of that Book, so far as is commonly known to the contrary, stand open still! Is it not, one way or the other, for a professing follower of Jesus Christ, a *very important matter*? A. It is the *most important matter* now before the "Church" and the world. As Dr. Schweitzer has shown (however much many disbelievers in the past "Parousia" have tried to ignore or minimise his work), Eschatology and Apocalypticism are the very *soul* of the gospel announcement: and the spiritual unrest of the present age is never likely to be quieted until it is generally and more definitely realised (as the Roman¹ Catholic Church has, in an important though less definite sense, always realised) how this Gospel announcement was historically fulfilled.

34. Q. Among even the most earnest Christians, though they naturally and necessarily believe² in a Christ-Judgment and in eternal life after² death, this particular series of Apostolic hopes and dreads (a Great Tribulation, a Rapture of the Church, an Abomination of Desolation, an Antichrist, and so forth) is almost entirely extinct. Can you explain on

adjusted to and correlated with such events of inorganic nature, which would in any case have taken place and which thus constitute an inexorable *prius* or fixed background which, being recognised and perhaps even *anticipated* by the theocratic government, influences the course of the latter.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ Perhaps the enormous extent to which God has honoured that Church throughout the course of history may be—in great part, at any rate—due to her overt recognition of the invisible "reign of the Saints" and her consequent greater appropriation (*pro tanto*) of the blessings which flow from that reign.—F. W. F.

² If their belief in these posthumous occurrences were as *confident* as it has been (notoriously) *feeble* during the present era of sceptical and materialistic thought, we should have heard less of the supposed falsification of our Lord's apocalyptic prophecies!—F. W. F.

what grounds this can be defended? For to say that the subject "doesn't matter," or that "you are not interested in it," is to part company with Jesus Christ altogether; as we are told it was for this "Joy that was set before Him" that He endured the Cross. *A.* The attitude of Christendom in this regard *cannot* be defended. It arises from a virtual and very widespread scepticism of the entire Christian Position.

35. *Q.* Will you not confess that the whole thing is a glorified muddle? *A.* It is the natural "muddle" consequent on a rejection of obvious truth. Though clinging to the two great physical miracles of the creeds, which Science *may* have something to say against, the clerical leaders fail to grasp the obvious possibility—quite unobjectionable to Science—of an entirely non-miraculous "Parousia" consummated principally in the life after death.

36. *Q.* Do you realise that Christianity is becoming effete, because in its popular form it is inadequate to meet the intellectual demands of the present age? *A.* Yes, to an *alarming* extent it is becoming effete, because the leaders of thought do not grapple with the intellectual problems of the day with sufficiently single-eyed courage.

37. *Q.* Do you altogether wonder that hard-headed men of the world, and, still more, men of science and thoughtfulness, are becoming dissatisfied with "Christianity" as it is popularly taught, and rejecting its claim upon the intellect of an educated man; that men are ceasing to come to Church, where music and ritual are in strong evidence, but the preacher for the most part does not seem even to have been struck by the *existence* of these fearful difficulties—much less capable of solving them; that in view of the clearer and more logical trend of modern intellectual development, there is a growing dearth of candidates for Holy Orders? *A.* It is indeed no "wonder."

38. *Q.* Whose fault is this? *A.* The fault of theologians and other intellectual leaders who have been deficient in the inclination to pursue wholesome trains of thought *to their logical conclusions*.

39. *Q.* Do you *see* the difficulties in question ? For the Agnostic does ; *and his hand is on your treasure.* *A.* I see the “ difficulties,” and in this case (and many others) their obvious *solution*. If God’s solution is not accepted, the Agnostic will *capture* the “ treasure.”

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Extracted from "THE QUADRANGLE" (Kenwood, New York, U.S.A.) for July, 1910, and from "THE NATIONAL CYCLO-PÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY."

FREDERICK W. FRANKLAND, actuary and philosophical writer, was born in Manchester, England, April 18, 1854 ; son of Sir Edward Frankland, K.C.B. (the scientific chemist and foreign secretary of the Royal Society), and Sophie Christiana (Fick) Frankland. He was educated at University College School and University College, London. In 1874 he became his father's private assistant at the chemical research laboratory in the South Kensington Science Schools. In 1875 failing health obliged him to emigrate to New Zealand, and in 1876 he entered the New Zealand civil service as a cadet. He was appointed Actuary to the Registry of Friendly Societies in 1878, Actuary of the Government Life Insurance Department and Registrar of Friendly Societies in 1884, Government Statist in 1886, and Government Insurance Commissioner in 1889. In 1890 he returned to England and was appointed Assistant Actuary of the Atlas Assurance Co., London. In 1893 he became Associate Actuary of the New York Life Insurance Co. and came to New York city, where he assisted in the new departure of that company in the insurance on under-average lives. In 1891 he was a delegate from New Zealand to the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography. He is a fellow of the Royal Statistical Society of London, a fellow of the Institute of Actuaries of Great Britain and Ireland, a member of the Actuarial Society of America, and a fellow of the American Mathematical Society, of the American Economic Association, and of the American Academy of Political Sciences. He married in Wellington, New Zealand, April 30, 1879, Miriam Symons, and they have two children :

Frederick Herston, born in 1882, and Charles Edward Harold, born in 1897. He travelled in India in 1903, for the purpose of studying the ethnological characteristics of Tibetans and Todas, especially with respect to the influence of their polyandrous domestic institutions on national and tribal life. He has been a resident since then in New Zealand, where he has taken an active part in politics, and has advised the government on financial and actuarial matters. He has been a member of the Borough Council of Foxton, New Zealand, since 1904, and was a Parliamentary candidate at the general election of 1905, but retired from the contest to avoid splitting of votes injurious to his party. He has been a Justice of the Peace since 1906; has contributed to various publications (such as "Nature," "Mind," and the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), and has also written on sociological and philosophical subjects, notably with reference to the relation of discrete Time and Space to certain physical and metaphysical problems, and with reference to the theology of American Perfectionism.

Mr. Frankland's most conspicuous title to recognition as a thinker is, undoubtedly, his formulation, in 1870, of the system of Objective and Evolutionary Idealism or Panpsychist Realism, which, through the writings of Professor Clifford, has since exerted such a marked influence on modern metaphysical speculation, and Professor Clifford was doubtless oblivious of having received a suggestion (at that time quite new to him) from one of his boy students.

Mr. Frankland's view as to "Perfectionist" theology has for many years been, that the system worked out by John H. Noyes in the middle of the nineteenth century is the only one which exhibits the Religion of the New Testament as a harmonious and intelligible whole. During recent years he has arrived at the further conviction that the New Testament gospel can be reconciled with modern science by means of the hypothesis that all the far-sighted "telic" direction that we know of, and all posthumous human existence with clearly defined memory-synthesis, are limited to the (so-called) "subliminal" functions of collective human brain tissue.

Mr. Frankland has pointed out that this irenicon, in the importance it attributes to mankind as a Collectivity of living tissue—a Collectivity which acts as an overshadowing Providence

to the individual—has much affinity with Comtism, but differs from the latter in recognising the psychic unity of *all Nature* and in affirming that it is this Universal Psychism which rises to a Conscious Benevolent Providence in the “Species-Mind” of the human race. The immortality of the individual and all that gives value to his life, being recognised as contingent on the perpetuity of the race’s high-grade living tissue, it becomes a supreme aim to learn to avert everything which threatens that perpetuity; and this involves, as indispensable pre-requisite, the acquisition of a hitherto almost undreamt-of mastery over the cosmos by mankind. The present high grade of the human bioplasm has been won by the agonies of a million ages of automatic sifting, and the result is now eternally secure if the New Testament evangel can be trusted. In short, while in the Comtist system Humanity is *called* a Providence, according to Mr. Frankland’s “Limited Theism,” it actually *is* a Providence. And while the good man is, in Comte’s system, *called* immortal, in the system of “Limited Theism” he actually *is* immortal.

PRESS NOTICES

OF THE

FOURTH EDITION

*Extract from "THE WEEKLY TIMES" (London) of
12th February, 1911.*

"THOSE of our readers who are metaphysically inclined will be interested in the announcement of some short studies in this field by Mr. F. W. Frankland, J.P., F.I.A., F.S.S., London, who is already well known in philosophic circles through his numerous metaphysical and theological works. The new book now promised by David Nutt will be sold for 1s. 6d. net. Mr. Frankland is English born—one of the many distinguished thinkers now resident in the dominions beyond the seas, who are making the entire Empire their grateful debtors."

Extract from "NATURE" of 2nd March, 1911.

"THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS"

Being a series of Short Studies on Theological and Metaphysical Subjects.

By F. W. FRANKLAND. Pp. xii + 101. (London: David Nutt, 1911.) Price 1s. 6d. net.

"This collection of studies on philosophical and religious subjects has now reached a fourth edition, which is sufficient proof that the author's treatment of profoundly important matters has appealed to a wide circle of readers."

By the REV. E. W. LEWIS, M.A., B.D.

Extract from "THE LIBERAL CHRISTIAN MONTHLY" (London).

"This volume is interesting because it is written by a man deeply versed in the positive sciences, and consists of a series of short studies on theological and metaphysical subjects. Interesting also because it is a product of a mind of this training and calibre trying to find true ground for the essentials of the Christian Faith in the midst of modern religious unrest. It is apologetic from the pen of a scientific layman who has thought things out for himself. The small volume is, if anything, overweighted with fact and argument; almost every paragraph would bear expansion. It is emphatically a student's book, and will repay close consideration."

Extract from "THE FEILDING STAR," Saturday, 25th March, 1911.

MR. F. W. FRANKLAND'S LATEST.

"Although he is on tour abroad, Mr. F. W. Frankland, of Foxton, who was and is to be again a candidate for the Manawatu seat, has found time to do some more publishing. He has just added to his already long list of books and pamphlets on philosophical, statistical, and religious subjects 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems,' a copy of which comes to us from Mr. David Nutt, London's foreign and classical publisher. Most of us humans—especially that section of us connected with journalism—have to be content with grappling with the problems that each day brings. But Mr. Frankland, who put his strenuous days and nights behind him when he left the service of (first the New Zealand Government and then the New York Life Insurance Company, as actuary, is now a gentleman of leisure, and he delights in devoting his time to abstruse questions theological and metaphysical. And the book of 'Thoughts' which has just come to us, neatly and clearly printed, deals with such, and is really a fourth and enlarged edition of a previous book on Ultimate Problems. The reader who desires an introduction to the Franklandian theology or who wants to catch up on the Foxton Philosopher's comments on the sum of human problems cannot

do better than peruse these 'Thoughts,' especially as the author has been thoughtfully wise enough to provide a careful analysis and summary of his chief philosophical and religious positions. Even this little list—beginning with his statement on Objective Idealism, or Panpsychist Realism, and ending with the treatment in a few lines of cosmic catastrophes and the future—occupies twelve pages. We notice in the new book that Mr. Frankland quotes 'The Feilding Star's' critique on his little 'Johannine' pamphlet, published in July 1909."

"THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS,"

By F. W. FRANKLAND. (David Nutt. 1s. 6d. net.)

(Reprinted from the "CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH" (London) of 22nd February, 1911.)

"The writer of this booklet cannot be accused of any attempt to captivate his readers by specious arts or high-flown rhetoric. There is a sort of 'take it or leave it' style about the discussions. . . . The writer, by profession an actuary, is a mathematician, whose mind teems with bold speculation. In his exposition of what he denominates 'Panpsychic Realism,' there is a touch, here of Leibniz with his 'Monads,'¹ there of Herbart and his 'Reals,'¹ and again of Schopenhauer,¹ though with that philosopher's pessimism relieved, if not removed. It is stated that this fundamental thesis was first propounded in 1870, when, according to the brief biographical statement prefixed to the volume, the author would be a flourishing youth of sixteen—

¹ The affinity with Herbart's theory of "Reals" is much greater than with Leibniz's theory of "Monads," because in my variety of Panpsychist Realism the noumenal counterpart of each smallest or undecomposable physical fact is identified, not with an *ego* or *self*, but with a smallest or undecomposable psychic experience of one or more egos or selves. Also, there is less affinity—in *detail*—with Schopenhauer (and even with Berkeley) than with Hegel, because *Will* is not in my system supposed to be the *only* noumenal reality which underlies phenomenal appearance.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

a prodigy indeed of philosophical precocity.¹ The treatise suffers from excessive¹ brevity of statement, and from the absence of expository and illustrative material. The first section, in fact, is avowedly a synopsis of the author's essays in theology and metaphysics; and it would be unreasonable to expect in such a compressed statement the elucidatory work which has presumably been carried through in the earlier essays referred to. But the same desideratum is found in sections where there is no such extenuation for laconic treatment. Section 3, *e.g.*, is headed 'Notes on a New Theory of Time' (the theory being that the experience of *before* and *after* in the finite mind is essentially the counterpart of logical concatenation in the universal Ego), and to this subversive, not to say adventurous, proposition a single² page is devoted. Similarly with Section 4 on 'Altruism and Happiness or Rational Eschatology,' which is a fragment merely,³

¹ It was precisely this "precocity" which caused the breakdown in physical health alluded to in the preface of my book as having necessitated a too condensed literary style. The only fundamental thesis, however, which I reached at that early age was the evolutionary panpsychist realism afterwards formulated by Professor Clifford in his celebrated "Mind-Stuff" theory, and since expounded with such great wealth of detail in Strong's book, "Why the Mind has a Body." And even this thesis was, in a dim way, suggested to me by a remarkable section of Herbert Spencer's chapter on "The Substance of Mind" in the first volume of his "Principles of Psychology," which—rewritten as an integral part of his *Synthetic Philosophy*—had then just appeared.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

² Besides the single page devoted exclusively to a particular aspect of my Time-theory, there are numerous scattered elucidatory references to that theory *as a whole* in other parts of the book. *Vide* pages 2, 3, 15, 16, 24, 25, 27, 28, 55, and 56 of the fourth edition. What first directed my mind toward the investigation which at last resulted in this new theory of the Time-process ("new" unless it has in reality been anticipated by Hegel in one or more of the abstruse pronouncements about the meaning of which commentators are so apt to differ!) was noticing, as a boy, that in Mill's "Logic" there was no Universal Law of Co-existence to parallel his Universal Law of *Sequence* (*viz.* the Principle of the Uniformity of Causation, wrongly believed by him to be logically based on an *inductio per simplicem enumerationem*). This suggested to me that Time was a much more fundamental thread than Space in the network of the world, and directed me into what I have ever since conceived to be the right path of investigation towards ascertaining (or, at least, plausibly *guessing at*) its real ontological significance.—F. W. F.

³ Its fragmentary character is due to the fact that most of the deductions I have drawn from its fundamental suggestion (which the critic finds so interesting, relatively), do not belong naturally to "Thoughts on *Ultimate*

though containing what is perhaps the most interesting suggestion in the book. The later sections are occupied with cursory discussions of such questions as 'The Johannine Problem,' 'Historical Data Relative to the Birth of Christ' (this chapter containing suggestions by which it is sought to save the historicity of the narrative at what most readers will consider a ruinous¹ cost to religious sensibility), 'Eschatology of the New Testament,' where again speculation runs rampant.² Mr. Frankland would pro-

Problems," but to my "Collected Essays and Citations: Vol. II., *Ethics and Politics*." The voluminous nature of the deductions I have drawn may be guessed from the titles of the sections in this latter work:—§1. Altruistic Eudaemonism or Universal Benevolence; §2. Objective Basis of Altruistic Eudaemonism; §3. The Sanctions of Altruistic Eudaemonism; §4. Human Co-operation in the Enforcement of Altruism; §5. Consequent Justification of Socialistic Laws; §6. The "Utopian" Communistic Societies to be taken as the Final Model; §7. The Needed Limitations and Qualifications of Socialism; §8. Private Enterprise must (proximately) be Retained but Rendered Subordinate; §9. The Malthusian Law of Population; §10. The Darwinian Law of the "Survival of the Fittest"; §11. Limitations Imposed by Group-Rivalry; §12. These Limitations can only be Removed by Internationalism; but the World-State must be Federal in Structure—not Centralised; §13. Meanwhile New Zealand Furnishes the Best Model for Domestic Legislation, and Switzerland (leaving out of view the question of Female Suffrage) for Constitutional Machinery; §14. The Status of Womanhood.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ I take it that the only reason why the suggestions of Dr. Erich Bischoff (which I endorse in my brochure) relative to the Christian Incarnation will be condemned by so large a proportion of readers is that they assert the dignity of our physical sex-nature against the *Zeitgeist* of the present and of all preceding "civilised" ages. The repudiation of this dignity by "civilised" mankind is forcibly brought out by Lecky in his "History of European Morals," though unhappily he endorses in his capacity as moralist the trend which as historian he chronicles. The ethical issue involved is *fundamental*, and for me no compromise on the subject is possible. Æsthetic fastidiousness cannot legitimately be allowed to over-ride the Ethical Imperative.—F. W. F.

² A certain amount of "speculation" is inevitable in regard to our Lord's "Parousia" or "Second Advent" prediction for one who, like myself, believes its main fulfilment to have been in the posthumous experiences of the Christian saints who were His contemporaries. Such posthumous experiences are (at present at least) not within the purview of exact science, and the hypotheses we frame about them are of necessity to some extent speculative. On the other hand, some of the *outward* accompaniments of the "Parousia," such as the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and the portents during the preceding siege, the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79 and the other contemporary convulsions noted by Rénan in his "Anti-Christ," and the enormous improvement in both the religious

bably have accomplished more had he attempted less. But many readers of his brochure will find in its freshness and its independence, along with its real erudition, a stimulation of interest which is perhaps the best justification for any publication whatever. Some of the intellectually 'elect' may find in it not only quickening but illumination." E. E. C.

and secular condition of mankind during the second century, are hardly matters of *speculation*, but (in the main) of undisputed *history*; and, assuming that much at least of the prophecy was uttered prior to the event (which, as a matter of literary criticism, is the more probable supposition), we have no right to discount the "supernormal" character of our Lord's prevision on the ground that modern science does not permit us to regard cataclysms in the inorganic world as *telic* or "providential." Although non-*telic*, these cosmic disturbances may be an inexorable *prius* to which the "providential" government of mankind is (at least in part) *adjusted*.

In any case, the great present urgency of careful discussion and appraisal in this matter is now conceded by leading thinkers of, at all events, the Anglican Communion—largely as a result of the bold and forceful speculations of Dr. Schweitzer in his recent celebrated work, "The Quest of the Historic Jesus." The enormous significance of this particular study is well illustrated by the recently reported fact, or alleged fact, that so great and earnest a thinker as Henry Sidgwick was prevented from embracing the Christian faith more by the apparent falsification of Christ's apocalyptic teaching than by any other one cause. And what is thus stated with respect to Sidgwick is, within the knowledge of the present writer, true of other earnest souls whose lives have been embittered by failure to see any possible truth in the chief prophecy of Him whom they would otherwise have acclaimed as their Saviour and Lord.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

PRESS NOTICE

OF THE
THIRD EDITION

(Philip Wellby, Henrietta Street, London, 1906.)

Extracted from "THE EVENING POST" of 17th August, 1907.

"FROM Mr. F. W. Frankland, Foxton, we have a copy of the third and revised edition of his 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems' (London: Philip Wellby, 6, Henrietta Street, W.C.), an earlier edition of which we noted at some length in 1905. As we then mentioned, the pamphlet sets out Mr. Frankland's own views in parallel columns with those of Mr. Weeks, an investigator in the same region, whose 'Theodicy' opens with the theorem: 'The sole driving force of the cosmic process is the cosmic craving to produce joy.' It takes a good part of Mr. Weeks's statement, as may be presumed, to explain this hard saying. Mr. Frankland prefers to define this force as 'logical implication,' at once realising the necessity of defining 'driving force.' The book is metaphysical and highly technical in form. Unlike most metaphysical writers, Mr. Frankland accepts the essentials¹

¹ The critic here states the case very appositely. It is precisely the *essentials* of the Christian system which are retained in the speculative construction he is reviewing. The non-essentials are so altered that many orthodox adherents of Christianity would probably regard the proposed change as fatal. Thus, while the conception of a personal and loving Providence is retained, it is not regarded as the transcendental prius of all natural development, but as a *conquest* achieved—late in Time—by way of blind and automatic processes. The Darwinian or Epicurean view of Natural *Origins* is posited: but it is contended that this blind Epicurean groping has, as a matter of fact, already *produced* a conscious Providence operating in the transliminal brain-processes of mankind and that personal identity subsists between this highest product of evolution and the Universal Self of which all events are, on this view, the experiences and of which

of the Christian system, including the Fall of Man, his Redemption, and Immortality. He ventures the surmise that 'the same principle of parcimony which threatens to banish matter and ether in favour of electricity, will yet banish matter, ether, and electricity in favour of space, the varied and changing geometries of which will be found adequate to account for all the phenomena of the material world.' Mr. Frankland, by the way, is a multi-dimensionist.¹ The objection might naturally be suggested that, as all geometries extending beyond three dimensions are hypothetical only, and that as 'space,' like 'time,' is a pure mental abstraction,² Mr. Frankland's metaphysics, like

the Time-process is the logical unfolding. The "Fall," similarly, is regarded as a vast anthropological process determined by the opportunities for selfish exploitation which increased knowledge and intellectual growth have afforded at a certain stage of human evolution: and "Redemption" is held to include a return (on a higher plane) to the altruistic forms of primitive group-life. Lastly, "Immortality," though conceived as truly personal and reminiscent, is held to be possible only through the telepathic transference which already goes on during life from human brain to brain and which thus secures a posthumous existence in the brain-tissues of survivors,—a posthumous existence which can become "immortal" or endless only if Humanity acquires, by discoveries in Science and inventions in Technics, such a mastery of the Cosmos as to successfully bid defiance to the threat of ultimate destruction. Catastrophes, astronomical or other, are an inevitable result (however long deferred) of the unchecked operation of the world's non-telic forces: and the achievement of human *immortality* (as distinguished from mere posthumous existence) is contingent—according to the speculation here defended—on the acquisition of power to either avert cosmic catastrophes or else to escape the consequences of them.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ The critic's implication is here somewhat misleading. I have never suggested that there is any evidence of, or any reason even to suspect, the existence of a fourth or higher "dimension" of Space. But I have so far attributed a serious importance to the modern Metageometry or Pangeometry, not merely as a department of Abstract Logic but as a criterion of cosmic or physical possibility, that I have suggested—as Professor Clifford did before me—that the Euclidian homogeneity of Space (or rather, in the first instance, its "*homaloidal*" character) may break down in the region of the very small, and that this heterogeneity (and even discreteness and atomic structure or finite divisibility, according to my own personal view) may be the ultimate fact into which all material or mechanical structure will some day be found to resolve itself.—F. W. F.

² I am unable to agree with the view of Space here contended for by the critic. The "field" of our visual sensations—as simultaneously experienced at any one moment of time—furnishes us with a real concrete "space," the existence of which it is impossible to deny (since introspection guarantees it), even though that space is only of finite and bounded extent, only of *two*

those of certain philosophers of India, would in the 'ultimate' reduce everything to Zero.¹ The new matter in this edition consists largely of footnotes relating to recent speculations of science, and an elaborate 'Theory of Discrete Manifolds.' Incidentally, the author touches on many problems, and an adequate presentation of his ideas, instead of occupying forty pages, would fill a large volume."²

dimensions, and only of finite divisibility. It is a real concrete manifold having defined geometrical properties which appertain to the branch of mathematics now called "Finite Geometry" (closely affiliated to "Tactic"). Now, it is my suggestion that the "Space" of the physical investigator also has concrete reality, that it is a nexus of psychic units, all (or nearly all) of which are quite unknown and perhaps inconceivable to us—a nexus analogous mathematically to the field of our visual sensations (*i.e.* belonging to the class of nexuses with which "Finite Geometry" deals), but of course on an immeasurably larger scale, and with greater complication in the facts of nextness where the minutest regions are concerned, though where larger regions are concerned it differs only in having three dimensions instead of two.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

¹ For the reasons urged in the immediately preceding footnote, the speculations under review do not lead to any conclusion resembling Metaphysical Nihilism. On the contrary, they lead to a species of what is known in current metaphysical terminology as "Absolutism": and yet they are by no means necessarily inconsistent with the still more modern "*Pragmatist*" philosophy, though the reconciliation between these two apparently opposite standpoints still remains to be worked out, and is (in my opinion) hardly likely to be effected until the pragmatists cultivate a much greater precision of statement than they have as yet vouchsafed to the public. Perhaps the reconciliation might proceed somewhat on the lines of a paper entitled "The World as *Worth*," contributed many years ago to the Aristotelian Society (London) by Dr. Wm. Boultong, who (simultaneously with the present author and independently of him) worked out the theory of Panpsychist Realism, and who is now one of the greatest living disciples and defenders of the Absolutist or "Intellectualist" philosophy of Mr. Bradley. My own speculations suppose an Absolute Existence with positive (though purely psychic) content,—a content of which human minds form a part, and the rest of which is *in vague outline* partially knowable by the human mind.—F. W. F.

² The author has in contemplation a larger volume which, it is hoped, will expound systematically and in greater detail the ideas of the pamphlet under review and of his other cognate essays, and which it is proposed to subdivide into a series of sections following the same order as the "synopsis" constituting Appendix E of the present volume.—F. W. F.

PRESS NOTICES

OF THE
SECOND EDITION

Critique in the "MELBOURNE ARGUS," July 1, 1905.

THERE are, and must always be, many inquiring minds which are not content to leave undiscussed the fundamental questions underlying experience, knowledge, science, and theology. Neither agnosticism nor dogma satisfies their craving for a right understanding of reality—of themselves and of the universe. To such metaphysical intellects a strong appeal will be made by a little pamphlet recently published in New Zealand. It is entitled 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems: Being a Synoptic Statement of Two Theodicies' (Wellington: W. J. Lankshear). The author, Mr. F. W. Frankland, has evidently devoted much time and thought to transcendental mathematics and transcendental philosophy. His pamphlet is the offspring of a long correspondence with a kindred spirit, Mr. R. W. Weeks. In the margin are given Mr. Weeks's tentative metaphysical conclusions, making up the first of the two theodicies. The text, which is in form a commentary on the views of Mr. Weeks, presents a concise statement of Mr. Frankland's own theories. His theodicy is, he admits, to a large extent provisional, and, to prevent any misconception of his attitude, he develops it under the heading of 'Speculations.' It is, however, grounded on the basic theorem of Berkeleyan Idealism, that all existence is necessarily psychic, a theorem which Mr. Frankland holds as an 'indubitably proven fact,' being certain that 'mentality is the *summum genus* of which all possible existences are the species.' It is the mental experiences of God, the Universal Ego, which constitute the totality of existence. 'What appear to us as the

relations of "before" and "after" are really the logical relations in the constituents of an all-inclusive Personal Intellect which is behind Time.' Starting from this position—a position common to modern personal idealists—Mr. Frankland works out a system to explain the origin of evil, the need of a Redeemer, the final triumph of good, and even the existence of a devil, Satan or Ahriman. Generally speaking, his metaphysical reasoning brings him into agreement with orthodox theology, though it is a little surprising to find him asserting that evil was introduced into the world 'without foresight of any of its effects,' simply by 'dialectical necessity.'"

Extract from the "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS" (London and Philadelphia), July 1905.

"THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS" (Second Edition).

By F. W. FRANKLAND. Wellington, New Zealand: W. J. Lankshear. Pp. 20.

"From New Zealand, from London, and from Boston have come to us recently three answers to the ever-recurring question, Whither are we bound? Mr. Frankland, a metaphysician and mathematician of considerable repute, publishes in pamphlet form his speculations on the problem of the theodicy. He holds 'as an indubitably proven fact that all existence is necessarily psychic,' and on this fact as a basis he proceeds to elaborate a number of epistemological and theological theorems, the upshot of which is that an all-inclusive Personal Intellect, behind Time, is working itself out by a necessary, logical evolution, into pure moral goodness.¹

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY."

New York.

¹ Pure moral goodness is posited, in the author's theory, as a fundamental attribute of the Divine Will: and the "logical evolution" consists in the gradual imposition of this Divine Will over the whole area of the Divine Experience, which at first includes experiences some of which are unwilled and some of which are generated by an antagonistic Will arising as dialectical antithesis to the Divine.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

Critique in the "ANIMAL'S GUARDIAN," London, of December 1905.

"Theodicy has an old-world sound in the ears of modern thinkers, not because theodicies are really few, but because those who write them are usually careful not to use the term. Sir William Hamilton's *Philosophy*, for example, is a theodicy almost from beginning to end. Sir Robert Anderson's 'Silence of God' is a theodicy, but not philosophical. Mr. Frankland's theodicy, and that of his correspondent Mr. Weeks, will interest those who care for ontological speculations. Our author is a Berkeleyan, not in the merely negative and phenomenal sense in which Hume and Mill were so, but in the positive sense of Berkeley himself. On his first page he says: 'What appear to us as "before" and "after" are really the logical relations in the constituents of an all-inclusive Personal Intellect which is behind Time.' It would be useless for me to attempt a description of this 'Synoptic Statement.' It is already so excessively synoptic that any further attempt to condense it would result in making it unintelligible. This, however, I may say, that Mr. Frankland's answer to Sir Robert Anderson's question, as to the silence and inactivity of God while the grossest cruelty and oppression are being perpetrated, is that God is undergoing the logical unfoldment of His being.'¹ This is true to the subjective tenor of Mr. Frankland's philosophy, and may be called *the keynote* ² of his theodicy. This little pamphlet

¹ One might otherwise phrase it by saying that the First Article of the Creed ought, on this hypothesis, to read, "I believe in God the Father, *Thinker* of heaven and earth" rather than "I believe in God the Father *Almighty, Maker* of heaven and earth." It would still remain true, in a deep sense, that the Universal Ego is "*Maker* of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible," but not in the *colloquial* sense. On the orthodox theory a Purposive Spirit is the *deliberate Designer* of all that is (excepting only the volitions and voluntary actions of the supposed "free agents" He is alleged to have created), while on the hypothesis here under consideration a dialectically unfolding Self or Universal Subject is the *partly involuntary Thinker* of all that is.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

² Yes, because this theodicy makes world-history itself to be essentially an *argument* or logical process of Divine *Inference* from a relatively small original collection of "surds" or brute facts. It regards the world-process as differentiated from the logical concatenation of a valid human argument, not in *essential nature*, i.e. in its most *fundamental* features, but only in subsidiary features (such as the enormous multiplicity of concurrent sequences, contrasting so strikingly with the *serial* nature of human thought

contains deliverances on all sorts of subjects, from the Marxian theory of value to the ultimate constitution of matter, and is a remarkable testimony to the activity of philosophic thought at the Antipodes. There is in it scarcely an adumbration¹ of Anti-Vivisection doctrine : but I learn from other sources that Mr. Frankland is a stout Anti-Vivisectionist."

—already alluded to by Herbert Spencer as, in his opinion, militating against the theistic hypothesis), which, on account of accidental peculiarities in human psychology, cannot be duplicated in human soul-life, though the achievements of a Blackburn, in conducting simultaneously a number of chess games, may possibly adumbrate the Cosmic Thought-process in its non-limitation to a single thread. In other words, the theodicy under consideration regards the cosmic process as, *in its essential nature*, more nearly duplicated by human *rationation* than by any other part of itself that we can study from the inside,—more nearly, for example, than by human *deliberation* or *design*. One might otherwise phrase it by saying that, on this hypothesis, the world-growth or world-development resembles human *rationation* in its undecomposable inner *qualitative essence*, but differs from it in quantitative or "tactical" *arrangement*,—differs from it, among other ways, much in the way that a web woven outwards from a central starting-point or a rope of continually increasing thickness differs from a single thread.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

¹ On the contrary, Anti-Vivisection doctrine is very pointedly adumbrated in the "theodicy" by the stress therein laid on the helplessness of the weak in the hands of the strong as the darkest thread in the world-tragedy, and on the Hebraic doctrine of a Divine Avenger for the weak against oppression from the strong.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

EXTRACT FROM PROF. GEO. B. HALSTED'S ESSAY ON
"THE VALUE OF NON-EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY."

(Reprinted from "THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY"
of November 1905.)

"As Frankland puts it, the possibility of explaining 'mass' (the fundamental property of matter) as a function of 'electric charge' is on the point of banishing both ordinary gross matter and also ether, since the principle of parcimony forbids needless hypothetical entities. Now the relation between the two opposite electricities so closely resembles that between Bolyaian and Riemannian space that, as Clifford adumbrated, we may expect to see matter, ether, and electricity banished in favour of *space*, the various and changing geometries of which will be found adequate to account for all the phenomena of the material world.

"Furthermore, these geometries of physical space will be found not to be 'continuous,' but to be the varied and changing 'tactical' arrangements of a *discrete*, a discontinuous manifold consisting of indivisible units.¹ The notion of continuous extension, so long considered ultimate, will, by this simplification, be subsumed under the finally ultimate notion of juxtaposition, with which Lobachevski begins his great treatise, 'Noviya Nachala,' in whose very first article he says of it: 'This simple idea derives from no other, and so is subject to no further explanation.'"

¹ These units must be indivisible *mental experiences*, more or less analogous to the indivisible mental experiences of which our whole psychical life is made up (our entire psychical or soul-life is felt to be discrete,—*not* a "continuum"). The only class of our mental experiences in which we are ourselves able to discern "tactical arrangement" (in this case always a discrete bi-dimensional or two-way "spread") is that of our *visual* sensations and the ideal complexes of faint copies of these,—in other words, our real and our imagined visual experiences.—F. W. FRANKLAND.

PRESS NOTICES

OF THE

FIRST EDITION

Extract from "THE NEW ZEALAND MAIL," February 8, 1905.

"THERE is packed within this pamphlet of twenty pages sufficient matter to fill almost as many volumes, if the ideas were amplified and explained after the manner of philosophers of the ordinary stamp. Mr. Frankland is not, however, a philosopher of the ordinary stamp. He thinks deeply, but he does not write diffusely. His actuarial experience has doubtless taught him the value of exact thinking, and has also pressed upon him the desirableness of precise and concise statement. For the ordinary reader a more diluted mixture than this would be better; but thinkers all the world over will hail the present work as a logical and stimulating contribution to the literature of idealistic philosophy. The author bases his reasoning on the theory that all existence is necessarily psychic. 'What appear to us as the relations of "before" and "after" are really the logical relations in the constituents of an all-inclusive Personal Intellect which is behind time.' It is engrossing to follow the chain of argument and discover how by pure reason the author arrives at conclusions as to the origin of evil and the necessity for a Redeemer which are, in the main, in accord with orthodox theology, including the ultimate triumph of good over evil. Mr. Frankland breaks away from the common view, however, in holding that evil came into the world by sheer force of necessity and 'without foresight of any of its effects.' We prefer the view that evil was introduced deliberately, as the result of the volition of the All-Mind, and with the object of working out beneficent results; but Mr. Frankland maintains his thesis with great ability. As illustrative of his bold and original thinking we may quote his remark on how history proves the truth of the

Hebrew story that the fruit of the tree of knowledge is fraught with disaster. 'The ethical course,' he says, 'has not been continuously upward, but—aside from the saving influence of the Redeemer—largely downward and precisely as a result of the almost continuously upward movement of human intelligence and civilisation.' It has frequently been remarked that slavery is more tolerable among savages than among civilised people; and Mr. Frankland points out that the ant is the only one among the lower animals that has developed sufficient intelligence to enslave its fellows. The work before us is the outcome of a correspondence between Mr. Frankland and Mr. R. W. Weeks, and the theodicy of the latter gentleman is given in small type in the margin. We do not enter on the enticing task of comparing and contrasting the two theodicies, but can heartily commend the study to those who are interested in ultimate problems and whose intellectual digestion is equal to the assimilation of 'strong meat.' "

Extract from the "MANAWATU EVENING STANDARD,"
January 9, 1905.

"The *Evening Post*, in referring to Mr. F. W. Frankland's pamphlet, 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems: Being a Synoptic Statement of Two Theodicies,' says: 'The name of Frankland has long been associated in the minds of students with metaphysical inquiry and investigation into the theories of transcendental mathematics, and the present treatise, which the author describes as setting forth his "speculations, tentative and provisional," though too technical for the ordinary reader, will be full of interest and suggestive thought to those whose studies lie in these directions. Mr. Frankland has been for some time in communication with a fellow-student, Mr. R. W. Weeks, whose (tentative) theodicy is set out in the margin and discussed in the text. The author tells us at the outset that he holds the fundamental theorem of Berkeleyan Idealism—that all existence is necessarily psychic—"as an indubitably proven fact, being assured indeed that the bare statement of any alternative view involves a misuse of language." But, he suggests, the distinguished idealist "was not quite right in denying to the so-called primary qualities of matter an existence outside our minds,

though, of course, he was quite right to deny the existence of these or any other qualities outside *all* minds." Recent discoveries in physics lead him to suggest the possibility that "both gross matter and also æther will be banished, in the name of the principle of parcimony, . . . from the universe as having any existence distinct from electric charge. . . . I venture the surmise . . . that the same principle . . . will yet banish matter, æther, and electricity in favour of *space*, the varied and changing geometries of which will be found adequate to account for all the phenomena of the material world." Here Mr. Frankland verges on mysticism, and elsewhere we find him quoting with respect mystics such as Harris¹ and Noyes. The tract is the work of an original student who strives to reach foundation truths, and the author's application of his theories to theology and practical sociology will interest philosophic thinkers, however they may dissent from his views.'

"With regard to this pamphlet we may mention that it embodies mathematical results which Mr. Frankland submitted to the American Association for the Advancement of Science some years ago, and which were summarised in the *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*. Of course the applications of these mathematical results, made in this pamphlet to metaphysical and theological problems, are not to be understood as made in a rigorous dogmatic spirit, but merely as tentative speculations."

¹ The reference to Thos. Lake Harris was merely an acknowledgment of indebtedness to him for a serviceable and accurately descriptive metaphysical term. It did not imply any agreement with his distinctive doctrines. The author is, as a fact, profoundly at variance with these latter, so far as he understands them, especially those of the late Mr. Harris's doctrines which treat of the relation of the sexes.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

ANTICIPATORY PRESS NOTICES

OF THE
FIFTH EDITION

Extract from "THE WEEKLY TIMES" (London).

"It is of peculiar satisfaction to every true Briton when one from a distant dominion distinguishes himself in any field of thought or endeavour. Such an achievement in the field of philosophy is not so frequent that we can overlook the peculiar success of Mr. F. W. Frankland, the author of 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems,' who has had official connection with New Zealand's Education and Insurance Departments. This brochure has passed to the fifth edition. We commend our readers of speculative mind to the announcement in another column."

*From "THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH" (London) of
30th August, 1911.*

"A most interesting New Zealand philosopher and mathematician is at present spending a holiday in England. We have referred to Mr. Frankland's book—'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems'—on more than one occasion in *The Christian Commonwealth*.

"For some years Mr. Frankland has lived in the small and picturesque town of Foxton on the west coast of the North Island of New Zealand, between Wellington and Auckland. He is heart and soul in all the movements of the little town. Often he may be seen in the capital—Wellington—heading a deputation to one of the Government Ministers on matters pertaining to the shipping or any other developing factor necessary in the town. He is consulted on all manner of subjects by town and country people, and his wise counsel is always ungrudgingly given. Nothing is too trivial with him if it helps towards the development of any part of the dominion.

"Mr. Frankland is not unique in this respect. But he is unique in so far as, all these years, he has lived the life of the scholar. Every mail brings him in that far-off town under the Southern Cross some parcel of the most important literature in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and America. Nothing seems to escape his notice. On the same day Bertrand Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics' and Harnack's 'Thesis on the Book of Acts' may arrive, and far away from the noise and tumult of the world he is to be found absorbed in both. He has long ago passed the stage of having to grapple with intricate subjects. He is well versed in so many fields of learning. It is certainly true that Mr. Frankland could fill with undoubted success two or three chairs in a university, and would be able to carry students through their degree courses in them all. All of us who have had the pleasure of meeting him in New Zealand are amazed at his great stores of learning, and personally I have never come across a man so versatile in so many subjects. It has been said of Aristotle that he could survey the whole field of human knowledge existent in his day. This cannot be said of any living person, but Mr. Frankland has made all his lifetime a marvellous attempt at such a feat.

"Of his work as a mathematician the American journals of mathematics have to speak. And they do speak highly of him. I can only write of him as a religious philosopher. And when we get his *magnum opus*, of which his present little book is the prelude, we shall receive a contribution of great value. The seeds are in his 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems' now in its fifth edition. His religious philosophy bears striking resemblances to that of Bergson, and it was conceived years before Bergson was old enough to publish anything. Nearly twenty years ago Mr. Frankland propounded his theory of reconciliation between idealism and realism, and that is exactly what Bergson and Eucken are doing to-day.

"His New Testament work aims at a reconciliation between the past and the present. He stands as an advocate of the spiritual and eternal truths of Christianity over against the accretions of the ages, and yet he sees seeds of great value in many of the things which appear worthless to some biblical critics.

"This man's career is nothing less than remarkable. But, with all his great intellectual capacities, he has the spirit of a child. He is an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile, and

The Christian Commonwealth wishes him many years of active service and happiness in the far-off island of the Southern seas. Men like Mr. Frankland are of incalculable value in young countries which have the tendency to over-emphasize the things of this world and to leave on one side the things of the spirit.

W. T. J."

From "THE HOMILETIC REVIEW" (London).

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

"THOUGHTS ON ULTIMATE PROBLEMS,

Being a series of Short Studies on Theological and Metaphysical Subjects."

By F. W. FRANKLAND. (David Nutt, 1s. 6d. net.)

"The fact that this collection of studies here reaches a fifth edition is an adequate testimony to the success of the accomplished author's aim. Evidently his method of lucidly treating topics often subjected to obscurantist processes has secured him the interested attention of numerous studious readers. Mr. Frankland's attitude is the antithesis of the materialist position, for in this 'Synoptic Statement of Two Theodicies' he re-enunciates the theorem of the Berkeleyan Idealism that all existence is necessarily psychic. The treatise is a clever sample of transcendentalism, according to which the mental experiences of God, the Universal Ego, constitute the totality of existence. Mr. Frankland's thinking is profound, but his expression is not diffuse. Indeed, his conciseness is an advantage to the reader who wishes to grasp the main thesis. By purely logical reasoning he arrives at optimistic conclusions as to the destiny of the universe. His theories as to the origin of evil and the necessity of a Redeemer do not clash with the doctrine of orthodox theology, and he maintains that good will ultimately triumph over evil. He fully accepts the Christian essentials, the Fall of Man, his Redemption and Immortality."

PRESS NOTICES

OF

“THE ‘JOHANNINE’ PROBLEM,”

By F. W. FRANKLAND. (Watson, Eyre & Co., Palmerston N.,
New Zealand, 1909. Price 1s.)

Extract from “THE FEILDING STAR” of 17th July, 1909.

“THIS is a pamphlet from the author, Mr. F. W. Frankland, containing ‘a few thoughts relating to the authorship of the fourth Gospel.’ Mr. Frankland has many interests and ambitions beyond Foxton and the Manawatu seat in Parliament. He is a voluminous writer upon a remarkable range of abstruse subjects, from ‘A New Hypothesis respecting Posthumous Personal Existence’ to ‘The Theory of Physical Space as a Discrete Manifold.’ In his latest pamphlet Mr. Frankland gives us, by way of preface, extracts from the writings of Dr. H. H. Wendt, of the University of Jena, on St. John’s Gospel, and the writings of Professor Fisher of the Yale University, on ‘The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief.’ To these the New Zealander has added elaborate and scholarly notes and comments, showing vast research and no little originality of thought and interpretation; but the polysyllabic style of doctor, professor, and commentator places the understanding of their mode of attacking the problem of John beyond the average reader. The simple and loving John never dreamt that he would be the subject of so much controversy.”

Extract from “THE DOMINION” of 10th July, 1909.

“As Cincinnatus returned to his plough, so Mr. F. W. Frankland, after his rejection by the Manawatu electors, seems to have retreated to his study. There now comes forth, as the first fruits of this period of retirement, a shilling pamphlet entitled ‘The Johannine Problem: A few Thoughts Relating to the

Authorship of the Fourth Gospel.' (Watson, Eyre, and Co., Palmerston North.) In this, as in many of his previous writings, Mr. Frankland has adopted what may be called the annotative method. That is to say, he begins with a citation from another author, appends numerous footnotes to it, and sometimes, as in the present instance, concludes with further original comment. It is not a finished nor a popular literary form, but there is something engaging and even convincing in the intimate candour with which it shows the author's mind at work. 'Franklande, franke mynde,' is, we understand, Mr. Frankland's ancestral motto, and it is curiously appropriate. The 'Johannine' pamphlet begins with annotated excerpts from the writings of Dr. H. H. Wendt, Professor in the University of Jena, and Professor Fisher, of Yale; but Mr. Frankland, who has evidently made a close study of recent Biblical criticism, refers in his notes to many other authorities. He does not absolutely bind himself to any theory as to the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, but he is inclined to hold that it was compiled by the heretic Cerinthus from the written reminiscences of John of Ephesus, and subsequently corrected by more orthodox writers. John of Ephesus, he suggests, was identical, not with the son of Zebedee, but with the 'beloved disciple' mentioned several times in the later chapters of the Fourth Gospel, and believed by Mr. Frankland to have been a cadet of the Jewish priesthood. Mr. Frankland strongly contends for the historicity of the narrative, and fully accepts its testimony to the resurrection.¹ His pamphlet, with its careful examination of the evidence against, as well as for, his hypotheses, should be of real value to students, preachers, and teachers. He regards it as preliminary to a more extended study of the Fourth Gospel, especially in its relation to the Synoptics, and he has also in contemplation a larger volume, which will expand his metaphysical pamphlet, 'Thoughts on Ultimate Problems.'"

¹ See, however, the Caveat here appended, showing that the present writer dissociates the "resurrection," as indeed all posthumous life, from physical organisms that have perished, and associates it exclusively with physical organisms that survive. This at once divorces it from all idea of the non-natural or "miraculous," and allies it to the ordinary cerebral processes where certainly soul-life is not confined to a single point of space, but spreads from structure to structure, even if only within the *same* brain.

—F. W. FRANKLAND.

COMMENT ON THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING CRITIQUE

A "CAVEAT"

THE testimony of the Fourth Gospel to the overwhelming evidences of Christ's (posthumous) heavenly existence is fully accepted by the author; but the *nature* of that heavenly or "resurrection" life is conceived by him in such a way—*vide* his monograph, "A New Hypothesis respecting Posthumous Personal Existence" (W. J. Lankshear, Wellington, New Zealand: 1905) and paragraph xiii of Appendix E in the present volume—as to disconnect it from the Holy Sepulchre and the Body which perished on the Cross. As regards these, the present writer believes that the Toldoth Jeschu legends, and the earlier Jewish traditions on which the latter are based, point toward the true conclusion,—in however malignant and disingenuous a spirit. The conduct of the (Sadducean) Synhedrial authorities with regard to the Empty Tomb is believed by him to have been thoroughly dishonest, while the Apostles acted in perfect good faith. The inference that may be drawn from the Toldoth Jeschu story (corroborated, as regards *animus*, by Matt. xxviii. 11–15) is, as some Christian apologists have pointed out, that the authorities, in their anxiety to crush the incipient Apostolic movement, possibly even stooped to *manufacture* evidence against the Resurrection. Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that a "great company of the priests" soon became converts to the Christian gospel (Acts vi. 7), even although at that time the only *really* cogent evidence of the Resurrection was the stupendous succession of christophanies (*vide* 1 Corinthians xv. 5–7) and the overwhelming tokens of Christ's continued Life in the Church ("I am He that *liveth*, and was dead; and, behold, I am *alive for evermore*"—Rev. i. 18). It is legitimate to surmise that the *true* ultimate secret of the "Garden Tomb" may have been

locked in the breast of *Nicodemus*¹—the "Buni" or "Boni" of the Talmud, one of the "*five disciples*" (apparently a different and perhaps more patrician circle than the Twelve Apostles) of "*Jeschu-ha-Notzri*" (this would then be the only substratum of truth in the Jewish accusation of Matt. xxviii. 13b), even though there

¹ This is in no way inconsistent with, but rather tends to support, a conclusion arrived at by another route by Monsignor Barnes,—viz. that a writing of Nicodemus was the real source which our third evangelist has often followed in preference to the Marcan record (doubtless, in the main, with results that were conducive to greater accuracy) in the narrative of the Passion. Nicodemus possessed information that would be inaccessible to St. Peter (who stands behind the Marcan narrative), despite the latter's introduction by his patrician colleague to an apartment of the High Priest's palace, and internal evidence has shown that the Lucan version of the Trial-Scenes possesses greater inherent probability than the earlier Marcan version, which St. Luke at various points deliberately departs from. Monsignor Barnes has even shown that this semi-official record of Nicodemus may not improbably be an original basis of those elusive documents termed "*Acta Pilati*" in patristic references and which ultimately crystallised into the late and apocryphal "*Gospel of Nicodemus*" (so-called). Under these circumstances, is it not possible that Nicodemus may also be St. Luke's source for the beautiful Emmaus-story of Luke xxiv. 13-35,—a story not found in any other gospel (save that it is barely alluded to in the Aristionian postscript to St. Mark's Gospel at xvi. 12, 13), and one which was peculiarly fitted to appeal to Nicodemus if he knew that our Lord's eternal victory over death was no resuscitation or transformation of the Body of flesh and blood that perished on the Cross? Access to *Hierosolymite* Nicodemus-records, and failure to obtain the true "post-resurrection" sequel of St. Mark's story (with what were doubtless its accounts of *Galilean christophanies*,—vide Mark xiv. 28 and xvi. 7, and the conclusion of the Pseudo-Peter fragment), may explain the puzzling enigma presented to us by the fact that St. Luke locates all the "resurrection" christophanies at Jerusalem,—a fact not sufficiently explained by his (possible) misunderstanding as to the true chronological position of our Lord's command "*Tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high*" (Luke xxiv. 49). An alternative explanation, which vindicates the historical accuracy of St. Luke by assuming that the Galilean christophanies were experienced by the Apostles *in Jerusalem* (they being only transported in *vision* to Galilee) has of late been most ingeniously suggested by the author of "*The Vision of Menelaus*." But the Pseudo-Peter fragment (so probably based on the lost ending of St. Mark) does not point in this direction at all; nor is it easily compatible even with the extant part of the Marcan narrative.

In any case, as the recent "*Oxford Synoptic Studies*" have shown, St. Luke probably follows some good independent source where he departs from or supplements the Marcan tradition of the Last Days.

may have been an earlier removal of the Body by the gardener, as suspected by Mary Magdalene (John xx. 15b) and affirmed both in the Toldoth Jeschu and by those Jews whose tradition Tertullian satirises in the "De Spectaculis." The demonstrably early date (as evidenced by the writings of Tertullian and Celsus respectively) of the Toldoth Jeschu "gardener" and "mamzer" stories warrants the more serious consideration for this medieval Jewish Anti-Gospel which Professor Krauss and Dr. Erich Bischoff have recently bespoken for it. Even its well-known anachronism, the introduction of Helena the mother of Constantine into the Gospel-story, must not blind us to the extreme likelihood that the *really* contemporary Queen Helena of *Adiabene*, who was a devout visitor to Jerusalem at festivals, may have taken an interest in the Great Palestinian Tragedy of A.D. 29 similar to that evinced by Herod Antipas (Luke xxiii. 8, 9) or by Pilate's wife (Matt. xxvii. 19).

If there is a nucleus of historic fact at the basis of these malignant traditions, we may surmise that the true naturalistic explanation of the Empty Tomb was *suspected* by the Jewish authorities, and the present writer's hypothesis about Nicodemus receives some slight confirmation from the latter's reported loss, at their hands, of all his wealth and dignities as a punishment for his adhesion to the Christian faith. On the contrary, the Church traditions (late and unreliable as they are) of enthusiastic missionary activity connected with the names of St. Joseph of Arimathea and St. Mary Magdalene (whom, partly on the strength of what has been the Latin tradition ever since the time of Tertullian, we may identify with Mary of Bethany and also—in accordance with an even more widespread tradition—with the penitent woman of Luke vii. 37–50) suggest that in *their* case there was "*uberrima fides*" in their conduct with respect to the Holy Sepulchre, save that modern research on alternation and dissociation of personality leaves open a possibility which Rénan, having regard to the orderly condition of the grave-clothes (John xx. 6, 7), has already hinted at—viz. the possibility of a perfectly *innocent* interference on the part of St. Mary Magdalene while in a trance-state. The name of Nicodemus has become almost a synonym for secrecy of action (John iii. 2), and tradition has fastened this attribute more firmly on him than on St. Joseph of Arimathea, though the latter was equally a "*secret*" disciple of our Lord (John xix. 38). It is

in *his* direction, rather than that of St. Joseph of Arimathea (*pace* Holtzmann's "Life of Jesus" and the romance woven by Guy Thorne in "When it was Dark"), that the finger of conjecture ought to point for those who, like the present writer, while firmly believing in our Lord's conscious, personal, and everlasting victory over death on Easter Day, and while not rejecting the story of the Empty¹ Tomb, are nevertheless constrained on philosophical grounds to seek a naturalistic explanation for the latter. The affinity of this view with the non-miraculous view of the gifted author of "The Kernel and the Husk" will be obvious,—also its affinity with the much-discussed thesis of Rev. J. M. Thompson, the Fellow and Dean of Divinity at Magdalen College, Oxford.

An obvious rejoinder to the conjectural reconstruction here attempted is that it is uncritical to build on documents which are centuries later than the events they refer to. So far as the Toldoth-Jeschu legends are concerned, the answer to this objection has already been hinted at. And, whatever may be the case as regards the Glastonbury and Joseph of Arimathea traditions, a somewhat similar answer may be made to anyone who should object to the lateness of the so-called "Rabanus" legends about St. Mary Magdalene's missionary activity. Though these rich medieval details came to light only in the thirteenth century (so far as extant documents go), yet certain archaeological features in them (relating to the provinces of Spain and Gaul) are accurate,—not, indeed, for the *first* century of our era, but at all events for the *fifth*. A subterranean existence of eight centuries being thus vouched for at least part of our legend, is it not more than easily possible that a part (even if only a *smaller* part) goes back four centuries further still? Nor can the tradition be discounted by any feature so damaging as that which attaches to the parallel legend about her brother Lazarus, in connection with which the investigation of scholars has revealed a sarcophagus at Marseilles belonging to a certain fifth-century Bishop of Aix

¹ How readily misunderstandings of this kind may occur in connection with the death of great and dearly-beloved religious leaders was well illustrated in the case of the Persian founder of the Babist religion half a century ago. The peculiar circumstances attending his martyrdom might easily have given rise, and *did* nearly give rise, to a belief in his miraculous disappearance.

named Lazarus (A.D. 407-417), who was thought to be the Lazarus of Bethany, thus in a measure nailing the legend to a stupid, if natural, anachronistic confusion. The point is worth noting, because those who accept a historic nucleus for the narrative of John xi., but who find it impossible to credit the so-called "physical" miracles, may have to question, along with Rénan, the *uberrima fides* of Lazarus and of his less spiritual sister Martha (but of no one else concerned—note the word "*secretly*" as applied to *Martha* in John xi. 28), and this does not accord well with the idea of subsequent vigorous missionary activity on his part, however consistent it may be with the comparatively early (Pseudo-Clementine) tradition that he was a *follower* of St. Peter in the *latter's* missionary journeys. In fact, the companionship thus resulting may have convinced the Chief Apostle that the resuscitation which so impressed Jerusalem as to determine hostile Synhedrial action against our Lord (John xi. 47-53) had not in reality been a miraculous event. And that may be the reason (which it has puzzled so many critics to conjecture) why the "resurrection" of Lazarus, in spite of its crucial importance as leading to the Passover-Tragedy of A.D. 29, finds no place in the Petrine narrative which underlies our second canonical gospel. St. John of Ephesus, on the other hand,—from his more exalted christological standpoint, and with perhaps inferior opportunities of forming a sound opinion,—may never have suspected mistake, while his editor, ignoring the significant datum of John xi. 35 ("Jesus wept"), has gone even further, and reported not only a supernatural resurrection (John xi. 17, 39) but also a complete foreknowledge by our Lord's human nature of all that was about to happen (John xi. 4, 6, 11, 13-15, 23, 40-42).

In such a maze of dubious, conflicting, and ill-authenticated data as hagiological tradition presents us with, it is difficult to pick one's steps: but for Christian Rationalists of the present writer's type it is an urgent necessity to conjure up a vivid picture, however hypothetical a one it must needs be, of the way in which the Gospel drama may truly have been enacted, on the assumption that its Divine Hero has from first to last exercised His progressive but (in the end) almighty Lordship over History exclusively through the brains of human beings. "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth" said the Lord at the great Galilean christophany (Matt. xxviii. 18): but this

(progressively increasing) power over the entire Cosmos and the course of Universal History may be exerciseable only through dominant influence on the "sub-consciousness" (so-called) of living human beings,—members of the crowning cosmic race. "God's need of Man," as Dr. Lyman Abbot phrases it, will be startlingly illustrated if this hypothesis should be true.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

“Collected Essays and Citations.”

Vol. II.: Ethics and Politics. (George T. Beale, New Zealand, 1907.)

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

- § 1. Altruistic Eudaemonism or Universal Benevolence.
- § 2. Objective Basis of Altruistic Eudaemonism.
- § 3. The Sanctions of Altruistic Eudaemonism.
- § 4. Human Co-operation in the Enforcement of Altruism.
- § 5. Consequent Justification of Socialistic Laws.
- § 6. The “Utopian” Communistic Societies to be taken as the Final Model.
- § 7. The needed Limitations and Qualifications of Socialism.
- § 8. Private Enterprise must (proximately) be Retained but Rendered Subordinate.
- § 9. The Malthusian Law of Population.
- § 10. The Darwinian Law of the “Survival of the Fittest.”
- § 11. Limitations Imposed by Group-Rivalry.
- § 12. These Limitations can only be Removed by Internationalism; but the World-State must be Federal in Structure—not Centralised.
- § 13. Meanwhile New Zealand Furnishes the Best Model for Domestic Legislation and Switzerland (leaving out of view the Question of Female Suffrage) for Constitutional Machinery.
- § 14. The Status of Womanhood.

The leading thought expressed in Mr. Frankland's Essays on Ethics and Politics is that all moral and social questions should be brought to the bar of a new Quasi-Utilitarian Test, which might be called the test of “Love” or “Pity” (those actions and those social arrangements being adjudged righteous which ultimately tend to the “Least Misery of the Most Miserable,” and *vice versa*), this test being not only psychologically equivalent to the Golden Rule of Matthew vii. 12, but also identical with the test applied at the Great Assize of Matthew xxv. 31–46, conducted by the Lord God of Love Enthroned.

“The Sacramental Union of the Sexes is Eternal: or, the Indissolubility of Marriage.”

In this paper the author argues (as in his address on “Woman in Relation to the Church”) that the changes in the molecular structure of society, which are so rapidly taking place under our eyes, must not be allowed to dissolve the sacramental union of the sexes, or to impair its sanctity. Reform must take place in the *opposite* direction. Responsibilities must be *increased* (especially responsibilities of the Male to the Female Sex) instead of being diminished. Sanctities must be recognised which have hitherto been ignored. The ephemeral must be dragged into the light of day and its eternal significance accentuated. A consideration of the startling changes which would thus result will shew that it is not in the interest of Conservatism that the author urges the Indissolubility of Marriage, but in the interest of a social transformation which shall be as humane as the much extolled panacea of Free Divorce is heartless and cruel.

PRESS NOTICE OF LETTER ON
INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM.

. BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

*Extract from "PUBLIC POLICY" (Chicago, United States), for
2nd September, 1905.*

The letter of F. W. Frankland, of Foxton, New Zealand, published in this issue under the title "Equalising Human Lots," will be interesting reading for all students of government.

The columns of *Public Policy* are open to all shades of opinion. Nothing is excluded because it does not agree with our views, and nothing is admitted for the sole reason that it supports our opinions.

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New Zealand has attracted considerable attention throughout the world by her governmental experiments, some of which have met the approval of eminent thinkers and writers.

Mr. Frankland seems to regard communism as the ideal and ultimate goal of society. The imperfection of human nature alone prevents the fulfilment of this ideal. Concessions are necessary to imperfect human nature.

It seems to us more in accordance with right reason to develop a theory of society which has its root in human nature itself and in which human nature finds the possibilities of its best development.

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It must be admitted, however, that much of our modern thought has a communistic or socialistic tinge. Fundamentally as well as practically paternalism is socialistic. Every step which looks to the general welfare instead of individual well-being as the end of the state, has a tendency in that direction.

The qualifications which Mr. Frankland is forced to put on his acceptance of the communistic theory are worthy of careful consideration. The qualifications may be more suggestive than the theory itself.



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